{"id":2730,"date":"2016-01-30T12:01:51","date_gmt":"2016-01-30T12:01:51","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.therapeia.org.uk\/wp\/touching-the-real-2\/?p=2730"},"modified":"2016-01-30T12:01:51","modified_gmt":"2016-01-30T12:01:51","slug":"a-culture-of-madness","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/2016\/01\/30\/a-culture-of-madness\/","title":{"rendered":"A culture of madness?"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"csl-bib-body\">\n<div class=\"csl-entry\">\n<p>In the 1960s and into the 1970s the psychotic individual increasingly became positioned both as &#8216;victim&#8217; and &#8216;anti-hero&#8217;.\u00a0 Psychiatrists such as Ronald Laing and his colleagues argued that schizophrenia was caused by dysfunctional (if not outright pathological) family relationships, in which the schizophrenic subject found themselves in an impossible, no-win situation.\u00a0 And although the proponents of biological psychiatry have\u00a0 tried ever since to totally discredit this idea, and to argue that schizophrenia has a biological foundation and has nothing to do with family dynamics, there is plenty of clinical evidence to suggest that there is something peculiar about the family backgrounds of many psychotic people.\u00a0 This connects closely with Lacan&#8217;s idea that psychosis is linked to a failure of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father (more of that later).<\/p>\n<p>However, what is perhaps even more problematic is the notion that somehow the psychotic subject is &#8216;heroic&#8217;; or perhaps it would be better to say, &#8216;anti-heroic&#8217;.\u00a0 In many ways, the psychotic is the ultimate deviant, the ultimate non- conformist.\u00a0 Furthermore, he or she often has the audacity to see through and point out the contradictions, hypocrisy, fictions and downright falsehoods that enable &#8216;normal&#8217; (i.e. neurotic) social life to function in the first place.<\/p>\n<p>This gave rise, in some quarters, to the idea that the psychotic individual (and this usually meant the schizophrenic subject) was an &#8216;outsider&#8217;, someone who was not bound by the (neurotic and hypocritical) niceties and conventions of everyday social relationships. The problem here was not so much that this was (and still is) not true, but that this was seen as being, in some way, &#8216;glamorous&#8217; or &#8216;romantic&#8217;.\u00a0 Of course, this resonated perfectly with the zeitgeist of the late 1960s and early to mid 1970s, where all sorts of things were glamorised and romanticised that would nowadays be seriously frowned upon.\u00a0 However, it also left a lasting legacy which we are still struggling with today.<\/p>\n<p>Part of this legacy was what might be described as the &#8216;phenomenological turn&#8217; in psychotherapy, which began in the wake of anti-psychiatry and which continues to this day.\u00a0 I would argue that most of the &#8216;person-centred&#8217; therapies, and even, to a certain extent, cognitive-behavioural therapy, owes a great deal to this &#8216;turn&#8217;, which can be linked closely to the idea that there is &#8216;meaning in madness&#8217;.<\/p>\n<p>In fact, this should really be described as a phenomenological <em>return<\/em>, because the idea that the psychotic has something meaningful to tell us can be traced back to the beginning of the twentieth century, before psychiatry began its &#8216;biological turn&#8217;. Laing, for example, was essentially resurrecting the ideas of psychiatric thinkers such as Jaspers and Binswanger.\u00a0\u00a0 One of Laing&#8217;s key arguments, which has been taken up by the therapies highlighted above, was that the apparently bizarre ideas and actions of psychotic people made perfect sense if one took the time and effort to understand their history and the life-situation of the psychotic individual.\u00a0 This was in contrast to clinical approaches which dismissed such thoughts and behaviours as simply &#8216;symptoms&#8217; of the person&#8217;s illness.<\/p>\n<p>The problem with this approach is not that we shouldn&#8217;t listen very carefully to what &#8216;mad&#8217; people are telling us; rather, the problem is when this is taken at face value.\u00a0 Consider, for example, if you were a psychotherapist and one of your clients told you that they were Jesus Christ.\u00a0 You might just acknowledge that this is what they believe, that it&#8217;s absolutely OK to hold such beliefs, and let them get on with it.\u00a0 But what if they went on to tell you that they had come to cleanse the world of all its evil and were going to make a start by killing all the prostitutes and drug dealers in the local area?<\/p>\n<p>At this point you might make some excuse to leave the room and call the police or the local psychiatric team.\u00a0 On the other hand, you might want to explore these ideas with the individual a bit more, and to try and discover how he or she arrived at this particular belief system, what function such a belief system serves in their life,and perhaps even to suggest that another course of action than the one they were proposing might be more expedient.\u00a0 Of course, you might still eventually decide that this individual was a risk both to themselves and others, and take appropriate action.\u00a0 However, the point I&#8217;m getting at here is that the moment a therapist or analyst starts to engage with the person&#8217;s belief system and starts exploring it a bit more, they have moved beyond phenomenology, beyond simply listening to what the person has to say.<\/p>\n<p>However, I think there is a more fundamental issue here, and this is the idea (or perhaps one might even say <em>ideology<\/em>) that things <em>should<\/em> be taken at face value; that we <em>should<\/em> just accept whatever anyone tells us, however much we might think there is something rather peculiar about it, and perhaps even that they might be about to act upon such ideas or beliefs with potentially disastrous consequences.<\/p>\n<p>This is not to suggest for one minute that ideas and beliefs that seem alien or strange to us should be rubbished, dismissed out of hand as the ramblings of a mad man or woman.\u00a0 On the other hand, there is no reason why such ideas and beliefs shouldn&#8217;t be explored, questioned, worked through. In order to do this, however, there needs to be some form of theoretical framework within which such an exploration, such a questioning, such a working through, can be carried out.\u00a0 It&#8217;s at this point, however, that the phenomenological position (or rather, the <em>therapeutic (mis)appropriation<\/em> of phenomenology) runs into trouble.<\/p>\n<p>But there is more at stake here, I would argue, than simply a particular therapeutic approach; and one which, I think it&#8217;s fair to say, has a lot more to offer than other approaches that focus on simply medicating away a person&#8217;s experience.\u00a0 What&#8217;s at stake, as I&#8217;ve already hinted at, is a whole ideology; an ideology which has now permeated the culture.\u00a0 And this ideology is linked closely to, or is in fact a manifestation of, what might be best described as the <em>hegemony of meaning<\/em>; or, to put it another way, to the <em>triumph of the Imaginary<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>Ours is the age of the Imaginary.\u00a0 This does not just refer to the dominance of the image, although this is of crucial importance.\u00a0 In Lacanian terms, the Imaginary is on the side of the <em>signified<\/em>, as opposed to the <em>signifier<\/em>.\u00a0 In other words the Imaginary refers to the domain of <em>meaning<\/em>, the concept attached to the signifier.\u00a0 The significance of this only becomes apparent when we consider the other two Lacanian registers: the Real and the Symbolic.\u00a0 The Symbolic refers to the network of signifiers that structure our lives. Although the Symbolic is often equated with language, it should be borne in mind that in this context &#8216;language&#8217; refers to any structuring of signs, which includes the architecture of buildings as much as it includes the structure of a written or spoken text.<\/p>\n<p>The Real is often portrayed as being extra-discursive, as being outside of language, although I think there is also a good case for arguing that the Real is an <em>effect<\/em> or even a <em>function<\/em> of the Symbolic. In semiotic terms the Real could also be thought of in terms of being the <em>referent<\/em>, what the sign (constituted by the signifier and signified) refers to, although the advent of post-structuralism called the whole notion of the referent, the extra- discursive, into question.<\/p>\n<p>In Lacanian theory, the Real, Symbolic and the Imaginary (often abbreviated to the acronym RSI) are viewed as three distinct &#8216;registers&#8217;, but which, for the &#8216;normal&#8217; (that is, neurotic) subject are &#8216;knotted&#8217;\u00a0 together.\u00a0 In Lacan&#8217;s later teachings, this knotting function is attributed to the <em>sinthome<\/em>, which is a development of Lacan&#8217;s concept of the symptom. There is some debate within Lacanian circles as to whether neurosis itself, in terms of the repression of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father, is a form of sinthome.\u00a0 The key point in the current discussion, however, is the question of what happens when this knotting function <em>fails<\/em>, what happens when the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary become &#8216;detached&#8217; from one another.<\/p>\n<p>There are two ways to address this question.\u00a0 The first is from a <em>clinical<\/em> point of view; the second is to look at the question from the point of view of <em>culture<\/em>.\u00a0 Starting with the clinic, the failure of the knotting together of the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary is the basis of psychosis.\u00a0 And Lacan was very clear that the mechanism of such an &#8216;unknotting&#8217; was the foreclosure of the signifier of the Name-of-the- Father, which serves as an &#8216;anchoring point&#8217; for the subject.<\/p>\n<p>One of the consequences of foreclosure is that the psychotic subject becomes prey to both the Real and the Imaginary, with no mediation by the Symbolic. I shall explore the Real dimension of psychosis later on, but for the time being I want to focus on its Imaginary aspect.\u00a0 As I mentioned earlier, the Imaginary is the domain of the signified, of meaning.\u00a0 In a universe where the three registers are knotted together, meaning is structured, and in practical terms (relatively) fixed.\u00a0 However, in a universe where such a (Symbolic) structuring is absent, meaning is effectively &#8216;adrift&#8217;, unanchored.<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, the <em>image<\/em> itself becomes prevalent.\u00a0 In this sense the Imaginary is very much the domain of the image.\u00a0 The image is what gives the human subject a sense of <em>wholeness<\/em>, of <em>completeness<\/em>; this can be best exemplified through Lacan&#8217;s idea of the mirror stage, where the infant child is held up in front of the mirror and sees him or herself as a &#8216;complete&#8217; image rather than a fragmented body <sup><a href=\"#footnote_1_2730\" id=\"identifier_1_2730\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Lacan, J. 1949. The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience In: &Eacute;crits: Translated by Bruce Fink, 2006. New York: W.W.Norton and Company, pp. 93&ndash;81.\">1<\/a><\/sup>.\u00a0 And it is also worth noting that in Saussure&#8217;s semiotic theory, the image is the signified, the idea represented by the acoustic sound (the signifier) <sup><a href=\"#footnote_2_2730\" id=\"identifier_2_2730\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"de Saussure, F. 1983. Course in General Linguistics. London: Duckworth &amp; Co.\">2<\/a><\/sup>.\u00a0 So we can see that there is a very close association between the Imaginary, meaning and the image.<\/p>\n<p>The psychotic&#8217;s universe is essentially an Imaginary one.\u00a0 At the same time, however, it is an extremely precarious universe, which is in constant danger of collapsing into the Real. This is because there is no Symbolic structuring of the Imaginary, and consequently no &#8216;fixing&#8217; of meaning or identity.\u00a0 The psychotic is constantly haunted by an omnipresence of meaning &#8211; and yet constantly struggles to know what to do with it.<\/p>\n<p>The strange thing is, though, this also sounds rather like a description of contemporary\u00a0 culture This is the world of 24\/7 news, continual information overload, a world so saturated with meaning that it becomes meaningless.\u00a0 A world where everything is out-dated the moment it comes into being; and yet, at the same time, a world of the eternal present.\u00a0 This brings us to the second dimension of the Imaginary universe: the cultural, and poses the following question: if the Imaginary universe is a pretty good description of contemporary culture, <em>does that mean we leave in a psychotic culture<\/em>?<\/p>\n<p>Perhaps the best way to explore this idea is to contrast it with another type of culture; one which we might describe as &#8216;neurotic&#8217;.\u00a0 It is often proclaimed that psychoanalysis was born and grew up in such culture, but that at some (undefined) point in recent history, things changed.\u00a0 Stephen Frosh, for example argues that we now live in some form of schizo-borderline culture, which he correlates with the rise of post- modernism <sup><a href=\"#footnote_3_2730\" id=\"identifier_3_2730\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Frosh, S. 1991. Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis and the Self. London: Macmillan Education Ltd.\">3<\/a><\/sup>.\u00a0 Others have made similar arguments.\u00a0 The problem here is that it&#8217;s sometimes a little too easy to jump from what is essentially a clinical structure of a human subject to applying the same concepts to a culture or social formation.\u00a0 In other words, does it make sense to talk about a &#8216;neurotic&#8217; or &#8216;psychotic&#8217; culture?\u00a0 This raises all kinds of theoretical problems regarding the ontological status of cultures and societies <sup><a href=\"#footnote_4_2730\" id=\"identifier_4_2730\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Although it has to be said that these same problems exist when talking about &lsquo;individuals&rsquo;\">4<\/a><\/sup>.<\/p>\n<p>Putting such problems to one side for a moment, perhaps it might be more fruitful to ask what it means to live in a culture dominated by the Imaginary. This is not to say that the Symbolic (and certainly not the Real) is not still there in the background, but what if we do now all live in some Baudrillardian simulacrum, where &#8216;reality&#8217; is purely appearances?\u00a0 In many ways, of course, this could be a Lacanian definition of &#8216;reality&#8217; (as opposed to the Real).\u00a0 Perhaps one way to look at this is to ask a simple question: can a particular kind of culture make people mad?\u00a0 In other words, does living in a culture dominated by the Imaginary &#8216;make&#8217; people psychotic?<\/p>\n<p>This is a very difficult question to answer.\u00a0 From a &#8216;classical&#8217; Lacanian position the answer is likely to be &#8216;no&#8217;, because, according to the theory, people do not &#8216;become&#8217; psychotic later in life: they either have or do not have a psychotic structure; the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father is either foreclosed or it is not.\u00a0 This immediately raises another question: how would someone with a psychotic structure respond to a culture dominated by the Imaginary?<\/p>\n<p>Bearing in mind that the psychotic&#8217;s world is already dominated by the Imaginary, one could conjecture that they would feel perfectly at home in such a culture.\u00a0 Furthermore, in many ways such a culture could be beneficial to them clinically, because, unlike their own &#8216;universe&#8217;, in this one the Symbolic is still functioning.\u00a0 In other words, there is a Symbolic structure operating &#8216;behind&#8217; the simulacrum.\u00a0 <sup><a href=\"#footnote_5_2730\" id=\"identifier_5_2730\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"The best analogy that I can think of is to think about a modern computer operating system with its graphical user interface (GUI), for example Windows, Android or Apple. Although the user (normally) only every encounters and engages with the interface with it images and apps, there is a complex layering of computer code lying &lsquo;behind&rsquo; the GUI that keeps the whole thing functioning (the computer geeks are indeed inheriting the earth&hellip;..)\">5<\/a><\/sup> Such a structural underpinning could work nicely for the psychotic because it effectively provides them with a &#8216;prosthetic symbolic&#8217;, which is otherwise lacking.\u00a0 Furthermore, such a &#8216;prosthetic symbolic&#8217; is &#8216;repressed&#8217;, hidden, just as the Symbolic is repressed in the neurotic subject.\u00a0 Perhaps we could go even further and argue that such a culture constitutes a &#8216;neurotic simulacrum&#8217; for the psychotic subject.<\/p>\n<p>The point I&#8217;m getting at here is that although contemporary culture may appear to be dominated by the image, by the Imaginary, appearances can be deceptive.\u00a0 The Symbolic register is still operating, albeit in a &#8216;repressed&#8217; (hidden) form.\u00a0 Therefore it makes little sense to talk about a \u2018psychotic culture\u2019: unless, of course, we are referring to the possibility that the majority of people today are psychotic, which is another question altogether\u2026\u2026..<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<ol class=\"footnotes\"><li id=\"footnote_1_2730\" class=\"footnote\">Lacan, J. 1949. The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience <i>In<\/i>: <i>\u00c9crits: Translated by Bruce Fink, 2006<\/i>. New York: W.W.Norton and Company, pp. 93\u201381.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\">[<a href=\"#identifier_1_2730\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_2_2730\" class=\"footnote\">de Saussure, F. 1983. <i>Course in General Linguistics<\/i>. London: Duckworth &amp; Co.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\">[<a href=\"#identifier_2_2730\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_3_2730\" class=\"footnote\">Frosh, S. 1991. <i>Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis and the Self<\/i>. London: Macmillan Education Ltd.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\">[<a href=\"#identifier_3_2730\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_4_2730\" class=\"footnote\">Although it has to be said that these same problems exist when talking about &#8216;individuals&#8217;<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\">[<a href=\"#identifier_4_2730\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_5_2730\" class=\"footnote\">The best analogy that I can think of is to think about a modern computer operating system with its graphical user interface (GUI), for example Windows, Android or Apple. Although the user (normally) only every encounters and engages with the interface with it images and apps, there is a complex layering of computer code lying &#8216;behind&#8217; the GUI that keeps the whole thing functioning (the computer geeks are indeed inheriting the earth&#8230;..) <span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\">[<a href=\"#identifier_5_2730\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><\/ol>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the 1960s and into the 1970s the psychotic individual increasingly became positioned both as &#8216;victim&#8217; and &#8216;anti-hero&#8217;.\u00a0 Psychiatrists such as Ronald Laing and his colleagues argued that schizophrenia was caused by dysfunctional (if not outright pathological) family relationships, in which the schizophrenic subject found themselves in an impossible, no-win &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[39,80,210,216],"class_list":["post-2730","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-society-and-culture","tag-anti-psychiatry","tag-culture","tag-psychosis-2","tag-rd-laing"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2730","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2730"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2730\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2730"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2730"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2730"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}