{"id":2751,"date":"2016-03-06T22:36:17","date_gmt":"2016-03-06T22:36:17","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.therapeia.org.uk\/wp\/touching-the-real-2\/?p=2751"},"modified":"2016-03-06T22:36:17","modified_gmt":"2016-03-06T22:36:17","slug":"fabricated-pasts","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/2016\/03\/06\/fabricated-pasts\/","title":{"rendered":"Imaginary histories?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>One of the problems with any form of history, be it personal, social, or political, is how the historical narrative, the story told by the historian, relates to \u2018what really happened\u2019.\u00a0 As the quotation marks suggest, the status of this \u2018what really happened\u2019 is itself problematic.\u00a0 In semiotic terms we could perhaps pose the question in terms of how the narrative relates to its <em>referent<\/em>; in this case the referent refers to the events that the narrative is purportedly describing.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, this opening paragraph is making a number of assumptions, not least that narrative or story telling is what historians actually engage in; or even, perhaps, that this is what analysts and analysands engage in during the work of psychoanalysis.\u00a0\u00a0 The key point here is that both analysts and (professional) historians are working with material from \u2018the past\u2019 (another highly problematic concept) and both, in their different ways, often (though not always) present such material in the form of a narrative.\u00a0 The classic example of this in psychoanalysis is the case history, and in the case of professional historians the narrative form tends to dominate most historical accounts, be it the (his)story of the Thirty Years War or that of the Cold War.<\/p>\n<p>This is not to suggest that history is purely about story telling and the <em>interpretation<\/em>\u00a0 or <em>analysis<\/em> of such stories is of little or no consequence; rather, it is to suggest that the narrative <em>form<\/em> itself lends itself to such an analysis.\u00a0 This is certainly the position of theorists such as Hayden White, whose work I shall be referring to a number of times in this text. <sup><a href=\"#footnote_1_2751\" id=\"identifier_1_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"White, H. 1984. The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory. History and Theory. 23(1),pp.1&ndash;33.\">1<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>However, this still doesn\u2019t resolve the question of what exactly such narratives, such stories, are actually <em>about<\/em> .\u00a0\u00a0 In other words, do the narratives of, for example, the Thirty Years War tell the story of \u2018what really happened\u2019?\u00a0 Or, to give perhaps a more contentious example, do the stories of childhood abuse told by analysands in the consulting room refer to \u2018what really happened\u2019 to them?\u00a0 This latter example immediately raises the spectre of, amongst other things, the whole controversy of \u2018recovered memories\u2019, which raged so bitterly in the 1980s and \u201890s.\u00a0 That controversy in turn refers back to the (again bitterly contested) argument of whether Freud did or did not think his patients were describing real events when they told him about their early childhood sexual experiences (most of which would now be seen as sexual abuse), or whether these were fantasies.<\/p>\n<p>Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether the narratives recounted in psychoanalysis have the same (epistemological) standing as those recounted in history books, the question of \u2018what really happened\u2019 touches upon a rather sensitive nerve in the whole\u00a0domain of the social sciences, and particularly\u00a0in the field\u00a0of history.\u00a0 This relates to the \u2018scientific\u2019 status of such disciplines, and for history this seems to hinge on the question of \u2018referentiality\u2019; in\u00a0 other words, does history \u2018tell it as it was\u2019, does it describe \u2018actual events\u2019?\u00a0\u00a0 As White points out, the adherents of \u2018scientific history\u2019 (and there still seem to be plenty around) would argue that:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u2026what distinguishes \u201chistorical\u201d from \u201cfictional\u201d stories is first and foremost their <em>contents<\/em>, rather than their <em>form<\/em>.\u00a0 The content of historical stories is real events, events that really happened, rather than imaginary events, events invented by the narrator.\u00a0 This implies that the form in which historical events present themselves to a prospective narrator is <em>found<\/em> rather than <em>constructed<\/em>.\u00a0 <sup><a href=\"#footnote_2_2751\" id=\"identifier_2_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"ibid, p.2, italics in original.\">2<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>But as White reminds us, the truth is <em>not<\/em> out there, at least in the sense of some crude correspondence theory of knowledge, some naive empiricism.\u00a0 Even before the heyday of post-structuralism, theorists such as L\u00e9vi Strauss and Roland Barthes were arguing against this approach.\u00a0\u00a0 Barthes, for example (quoted by White) asks the question:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Does the narration of past events, which, in our culture from the time of the Greeks onwards, has generally been subject to the sanction of historical \u201cscience\u201d bound to the underlying standard of the \u201creal\u201d, and justified by the principle of \u201crational\u201d exposition\u00a0\u2013 does this form of narration really differ, in some specific trait, in some indubitably distinctive feature, from imaginary narration, as we find it in the epic, the novel, and the drama? <sup><a href=\"#footnote_3_2751\" id=\"identifier_3_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"ibid p.12\">3<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Note, however, that in this quotation Barthes is emphasising the <em>form<\/em> of the discourse rather than its <em>content<\/em>.\u00a0\u00a0 And this raises another interesting point about historical narrative, again highlighted by White: that in such narratives <em>the form is treated as the content<\/em>.\u00a0\u00a0 In other words, the narrative form, the form as story, <em>is<\/em> the story.\u00a0 What matters is whether the story \u2018hangs together\u2019, whether it can develop a coherent <em>plot<\/em> or set of sub-plots.<\/p>\n<p>At this point I think it is important to emphasise that neither I or writers such as White are suggesting that there is nothing \u2018outside of the text\u2019, as some post-structuralists would have it.\u00a0 Rather, the argument is that this \u2018extra-discursive\u2019 reality (or perhaps we should name it the Real) is precisely that, i.e. outside of the text, outside of discourse.\u00a0 In other words, the idea that historical narrative can \u2018tell it as it was\u2019 is a complete fallacy.\u00a0\u00a0 What is perhaps more puzzling\u00a0is that although these arguments have been circulating around for decades now, they seem to by and large have been resisted or ignored in the field of history.\u00a0 Hence the fact that so many historical documentaries\u00a0and history texts\u00a0include, at some point in the proceedings, the words \u2018we now know that\u2026.\u2019\u00a0 The implication, of course, is that \u2018we\u2019 (the contemporary body of (celebrity) historians) have access to a knowledge that their (pre-scientific) predecessors lacked.<\/p>\n<p>But to what extent can such arguments be applied to psychoanalysis?\u00a0\u00a0 Doesn\u2019t psychoanalysis deal with a different kind of truth, a different notion of \u2018what really happened\u2019?\u00a0 I would argue that it does not, and the only reason that it can be argued otherwise is to retain some mythical notion of \u2018historical truth\u2019 which\u00a0can be\u00a0contrasted with\u00a0the kind of truth that emerges in psychoanalysis.\u00a0\u00a0 Interestingly, though, the proponents of \u2018historical versus psychoanalytic truth\u2019 argument are not necessarily claiming that historical truth is <em>actually<\/em> accessible.\u00a0 Rather, their argument seems to hinge on the notion that such a truth exists <em>in principle<\/em>.\u00a0 Paul Roth explores this argument with particular reference to the work of Donald Spence.\u00a0 <sup><a href=\"#footnote_4_2751\" id=\"identifier_4_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Roth, P.A. 1991. Truth in Interpretation: The Case of Psychoanalysis. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 21(2),pp.175&ndash;195.\">4<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0 As Roth notes:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>For Spence, historical truths are brute facts. Narratives give them a connection which is not merely chronological. The process of presenting a narrative about one\u2019s past requires identifying what events are significant and why. The problem is not that reports of the analysand or the listening of the analyst are subject to some special bias; rather, the problem resides precisely in the selection which occurs in the very processes of speaking and hearing.<span style=\"font-family: Thread-000021c0-Id-00000004;\"> <sup><a href=\"#footnote_5_2751\" id=\"identifier_5_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"ibid p.178\">5<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Interestingly, Spence\u2019s position is that there is a difference between historical truth (\u2018what really happened\u2019) and the narratives that attempt to describe this truth.\u00a0 At the same time he is sceptical regarding the possibility of ever gaining access to such historical truth.\u00a0 Furthermore, he does not deny the validity of the truths that emerge in psychoanalysis; rather, he applies a different criteria of \u2018truth\u2019 to them.\u00a0\u00a0 To quote Spence (in Roth&#8217;s paper):<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Narrative truth can be defined as the criterion we use to decide when a certain experience has been captured to our satisfaction; it depends on continuity and closure and the extent to which the fit of the pieces takes on an aesthetic finality. Narrative truth is what we have in mind when we say that such and such is a good story, that a given explanation carries conviction, that <em>one<\/em> solution to a mystery must be true. Once a given construction has acquired narrative truth, it becomes just as real as any other kind of truth; this new reality becomes a significant part of the psychoanalytic cure. <sup><a href=\"#footnote_6_2751\" id=\"identifier_6_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"ibid pp.178-9, italics in original\">6<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Essentially, Spence is arguing that the psychoanalytic cure rests on the possibility of the analysand being able to formulate a narrative which \u2018makes sense\u2019 to him or her, rather than such a narrative referring to \u2018what really happened\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>There are a number of serious problems with this argument, not least that the \u2018making sense\u2019 can be part of the subject\u2019s <em>problem<\/em> rather than their \u2018cure\u2019.\u00a0 However, the key difficulty here is Spence\u2019s distinction between what he describes as \u2018narrative truth\u2019 and \u2018historical truth\u2019.\u00a0\u00a0 And this is turn is linked to the false distinction between form and content.\u00a0 Ironically, perhaps, he fails to recognise that what he describes as \u2018narrative truth\u2019, i.e. the kind of truth that (according to him) emerges in psychoanalysis, is precisely the kind of truth that\u00a0emerges in <em>all<\/em>\u00a0 historical narrative, whereby the<em> form functions as the content<\/em>.\u00a0 In other words, it is all about constructing a \u2018good story\u2019 that \u2018makes sense\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>However, this is precisely what psychoanalysis is <em>not<\/em> about.\u00a0 This is not to say that analysands (and analysts for that matter) do not tell stories, which may or may not make sense.\u00a0 However, whilst such stories may indeed provide (some of) the material for the analysis, this is by no means the end of the story.\u00a0\u00a0 At the same time it should be acknowledged that being able to construct a \u2018personal narrative\u2019 for oneself can indeed have strong therapeutic effects, and give one a sense of meaning and identity.\u00a0\u00a0 Ironically perhaps, this applies equally, if not more so, to narratives that centre on abuse; being able to construct a history that revolves around being abused as a child can actually, in some almost perverse way, give a person a sense of \u2018comfort\u2019, of meaning, because all of a sudden all their troubling thoughts, feelings, their nightmares, their flashbacks, make sense.<\/p>\n<p>But does this mean that, at the end of the day, analysis should try to get an idea of \u2018what really happened\u2019, rather than constructing a \u2018good story\u2019?\u00a0 Interestingly, Freud himself seems to have been rather sceptical as to whether his patients could ever remember \u2018what really happened\u2019.\u00a0 For example, in his paper <em>Constructions in Analysis<\/em> he writes:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The path that starts from the analyst&#8217;s construction ought to end in the patient&#8217;s recollection; but it does not always lead so far. Quite often we do not succeed in bringing the patient to recollect what has been repressed. Instead of that, if the analysis is carried out correctly, we produce in him an assured conviction of the truth of the construction which achieves the same therapeutic result as a recaptured memory. The problem of what the circumstances are in which this occurs and of how it is possible that what appears to be an incomplete substitute should nevertheless produce a complete result\u2014all of this is matter for a later enquiry.<span style=\"font-family: Thread-000021c0-Id-00000004;\">\u00a0 <sup><a href=\"#footnote_7_2751\" id=\"identifier_7_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Freud, S. 1937. Constructions in Analysis. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XXIII (1937-1939): pp.255-270\">7<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Here Freud seems to be acknowledging precisely what Spence is arguing for, i.e. that therapeutic efficacy does not have to correlate with the \u2018reality\u2019 of the subject\u2019s history.\u00a0 In other words, analysis can \u2018work\u2019 through enabling the subject to construct a story that has beneficial effects, even though they may not be able to remember \u2018what really happened\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>At the same time though, one senses that Freud is not altogether comfortable with this position.\u00a0\u00a0 And neither, perhaps, should he be.\u00a0 This is not because the idea of the notion\u00a0that \u2018the truth is (somewhere) out there\u2019 is (necessarily) worth pursuing.\u00a0 In the case of psychoanalysis this would presumably\u00a0mean that there is some way for the analysand to remember \u2018what really happened\u2019.\u00a0\u00a0 Interestingly, though, in his paper, Freud makes a number of references to \u2018historical truth\u2019 and the problems of arriving at it.\u00a0 And it is seems clear that, like Spence, Freud equates such a truth with \u2018what really happened\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>It seems to me, however, that a more profitable avenue would be to look at where the historian and psychoanalyst <em>differ<\/em> in their approach to the whole question of historical narrative <em>as form itself<\/em>.\u00a0 If we start with the assumption that, in actual fact, there is no distinction between \u2018historical\u2019 and \u2018narrative\u2019 truth, and that in both psychoanalysis and in historical studies in general the form is the content, i.e. the narrative form, is the content, then the question\u00a0of\u00a0\u2018what really happened\u2019 is a misnomer.\u00a0\u00a0 What seems more interesting, to me at any rate, is <em>how such narratives are constructed in the first place<\/em>\u00a0\u2013 and <em>why<\/em>.\u00a0 And this is where the historian and the psychoanalyst perhaps part company.\u00a0\u00a0 The analyst is far more interested in the <em>process<\/em> by which a particular narrative is constructed than whether it relates to \u2018what really happened\u2019.\u00a0\u00a0 Equally important are situations in which the constructions of such narratives <em>fail<\/em>, which is linked to the status of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father in the subject&#8217;s history.<\/p>\n<p>This is not to suggest that historians do not reflect carefully on the process by which they construct their own particular narratives, i.e. the histories that they present and publish; I\u2019m sure they do.\u00a0 Rather, I would argue, this is not the focus on their work, whereas it is (or should be) for the psychoanalyst.<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, though, there is still a shadow that lurks behind all of this.\u00a0 Not so much the shadow of \u2018what really happened\u2019, although at some point perhaps this question will have to confronted.\u00a0 Rather, it\u2019s the shadow of \u2018the past\u2019; in other words, it is not simply a question of \u2018what really happened\u2019, but <em>when\u00a0<\/em>did it happen, or perhaps, even, <em>where<\/em> did it happen?\u00a0 Where is this \u2018place\u2019, this \u2018other country\u2019, called \u2018the past\u2019?<\/p>\n<ol class=\"footnotes\"><li id=\"footnote_1_2751\" class=\"footnote\">White, H. 1984. The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory. <i>History and Theory<\/i>. <b>23<\/b>(1),pp.1\u201333.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\">[<a href=\"#identifier_1_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_2_2751\" class=\"footnote\">ibid, p.2, italics in original.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\">[<a href=\"#identifier_2_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_3_2751\" class=\"footnote\">ibid p.12<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\">[<a href=\"#identifier_3_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_4_2751\" class=\"footnote\">Roth, P.A. 1991. Truth in Interpretation: The Case of Psychoanalysis. <i>Philosophy of the Social Sciences<\/i>. <b>21<\/b>(2),pp.175\u2013195.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\">[<a href=\"#identifier_4_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_5_2751\" class=\"footnote\">ibid p.178<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\">[<a href=\"#identifier_5_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_6_2751\" class=\"footnote\">ibid pp.178-9, italics in original<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\">[<a href=\"#identifier_6_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_7_2751\" class=\"footnote\"><\/span>Freud, S. 1937. Constructions in Analysis. <em>The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XXIII (1937-1939): <\/em>pp.255-270<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\">[<a href=\"#identifier_7_2751\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><\/ol>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>One of the problems with any form of history, be it personal, social, or political, is how the historical narrative, the story told by the historian, relates to \u2018what really happened\u2019.\u00a0 As the quotation marks suggest, the status of this \u2018what really happened\u2019 is itself problematic.\u00a0 In semiotic terms we &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[20],"tags":[115,125,126,181],"class_list":["post-2751","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-trauma-history-and-memory","tag-freud","tag-historic-abuse","tag-history","tag-narrative"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2751","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2751"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2751\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2751"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2751"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2751"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}