{"id":4992,"date":"2019-05-19T12:44:07","date_gmt":"2019-05-19T12:44:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/?p=4992"},"modified":"2019-05-19T17:00:15","modified_gmt":"2019-05-19T17:00:15","slug":"history-becomes-myth","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/2019\/05\/19\/history-becomes-myth\/","title":{"rendered":"History becomes myth"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In a number of writings I have made reference to Samuel Hynes\u2019 idea of the \u2018Myth of the War\u2019.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-1\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-1\">[1]<\/a><\/sup> By this term he was referring to the way the events of the First World War (the Great War) have been reworked through art, literature, poetry, film, and by historical narratives themselves. In order to fully appreciate how the Myth of the (Great) War was constructed it would seem helpful, therefore, to have a greater understanding of how history become \u2018mythologised\u2019. However, this then raises another question: to what extent is history itself <em>already<\/em> \u2018mythological\u2019, especially when history is presented in narrative form?<\/p>\n<h3>The nature of myth<\/h3>\n<p>Leaving aside the second question for a moment, what constitutes a myth in the first place? I think a good place to start is to look at Roland Barthes\u2019 theory of myth, expounded in great detail in <em>Myth Today<\/em>, which is the second part of his book <em>Mythologies<\/em>.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-2\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-2\">[2]<\/a><\/sup> In spite of the depth and complexity of this text, there are two specific ideas which seem to encapsulate the essence of Barthes\u2019 argument.<\/p>\n<p>The first, drawing on Saussure\u2019s theory of semiotics,<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-3\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-3\">[3]<\/a><\/sup> is that myth represents a <em>second order semiological system<\/em> and a <em>metalanguage<\/em>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>It can be seen that in myth there are two semiological systems, one of which is staggered in relation to the other: a linguistic system, the language (or modes of representation which are assimilated to it), which I shall call the language object, because it is the language which myth gets hold of in order to build its own system; and myth itself, which I shall call the metalanguage, because it is a second language, in which one speaks about the first.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-4\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-4\">[4] <\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The key point here is that what constitutes a <em>sign<\/em> in the first-order system (signifier and signified) becomes a <em>signifier<\/em> in the second, as shown in the following diagram<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-5\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-5\">[5]<\/a><\/sup>:<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"686\" height=\"286\" class=\"wp-image-4993\" src=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/word-image.png\" srcset=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/word-image.png 686w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/word-image-400x167.png 400w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/word-image-300x125.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 686px) 100vw, 686px\" \/><\/p>\n<p>On the plane of myth, the signifier becomes the <em>form<\/em>, and the signified is the <em>concept<\/em> (as it is on the plane of language). And it is through the form that the (mythical) concept announces itself as the <em>signification<\/em> (Barthes\u2019 term for the sign on the plane of myth):<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>I shall call the third term of the myth the signification.\u00a0 The word here is all the better justified since myth has in fact a double function: it points out and it notifies, it makes us understand something, and it imposes it on us.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-6\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-6\">[6]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Barthes\u2019 most famous example of the relationship between form and concept is the cover photo of the July 1955 edition of <em>Paris Match<\/em>, which shows a Black French solider saluting (presumably, though it is not in the picture) the French flag.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-4994\" src=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/word-image.jpeg\" width=\"294\" height=\"398\" srcset=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/word-image.jpeg 924w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/word-image-400x541.jpeg 400w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/word-image-222x300.jpeg 222w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/word-image-768x1039.jpeg 768w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/word-image-757x1024.jpeg 757w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 294px) 100vw, 294px\" \/><\/p>\n<p>On the plane of language the meaning is simply a Black soldier giving the French salute.\u00a0 However, on the plane of myth the picture signifies the greatness of France and the French Empire, which does not discriminate against anyone, regardless of their colour.\u00a0 The form empties out the meaning, in order to make ready for the (second level) signified (the concept). In this example, the story of the Black solider is displaced by the signification of him as an example of the benevolence of French imperialism.<\/p>\n<p>It is important to note, staying with this example, that the form is constituted by a number of different elements. To start with, the date of the publication, July 1955, which was just over a year after the French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam, which was at that point part of French Indochina. Ironically, perhaps, this battle marked an important episode in the <em>collapse<\/em> of French imperialism. Furthermore, France had also recently become a protagonist in the Algerian War of Independence, which was to end seven years later with another defeat for the Empire. I say \u2018ironically, perhaps\u2019, because it could also be argued that it is precisely <em>because<\/em> of the French defeat that this picture takes on such a mythological significance. Myths seem to gain their greatest power at the precise moment when the reality is the complete opposite. Interestingly, Barthes makes no reference in his text to the recent historical context of this picture, even though he must have been very conscious of it.<\/p>\n<p>The date is also important for another reason: if this picture was published today it could well be \u2018read\u2019 as signifying <em>post<\/em>-French colonialism, because at first glance it could easily be seen as portraying the picture of a Black African solider in their native (post-colonial) country.<\/p>\n<p>Another important element of the form is the fact the picture is on the front page of <em>Paris-Match<\/em>, which was (and still is) an important news and celebrity lifestyle French magazine. In many ways, publications such as this can be seen as epitomising a liberal bourgeois ideology that embraces <em>libert\u00e9, \u00e9galit\u00e9, fraternit\u00e9<\/em>. This essentially \u2018writes out\u2019 the alternative narrative which lurks in the shadows, that is, of state violence and torture, and (attempted) subjugation of \u2018inferior\u2019 peoples.<\/p>\n<p>The other key idea developed in Barthes\u2019 text is that myth is the process of <em>transforming history into nature<\/em>. In other words, complex socio-historical events, which are full of contradiction and paradox, become \u2018translated\u2019 into \u2018matters of fact\u2019 and \u2018eternal truths\u2019. This is achieved semiotically by the signifier appearing to give foundation to the signified. Referring to the <em>Paris-Match<\/em> cover example, Barthes writes:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u2026everything happens as if the picture <em>naturally<\/em> conjured up the concept, as if the signifier <em>gave a foundation<\/em> to the signified: the myth exists from the precise moment when French imperiality achieves the natural state: myth is speech justified <em>in excess<\/em>.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-7\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-7\">[7]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This idea of naturalisation matters particularly in the realm of politics and fulfils what is essentially an ideological function. In other words, if the ruling class (which for Barthes was the bourgeoisie) can present themselves as the \u2018natural\u2019 form of government, and even better, if they can appear to be \u2018apolitical\u2019, then this strengthens their grip on power. Barthes argues that the bourgeoisie achieve this sense of \u2018naturalness\u2019 through a process of disavowing their own identity and replacing it with that of <em>nation<\/em>. He describes this process of disavowal as a \u2018haemorrhaging\u2019:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u2026the bourgeoisie is defined <em>as the social class which does not want to be named. Bourgeois, petit bourgeois, capitalism, proletariat<\/em> are the locus on an unceasing hemorrhage: meaning flows out of them until their very name become unnecessary\u2026Politically, the hemorrhage of the name <em>bourgeois<\/em> is effected through the idea of <em>nation<\/em>. This was once a progressive idea, which served to get rid of the aristocracy; today, the bourgeoisie merges into the nation, even if it has, in order to do so, to exclude from it the elements which it decides are allogenous (the Communists).<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-8\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-8\">[8]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Interestingly, perhaps, Barthes equates the bourgeoisie with the political <em>right<\/em>, whereas today they would be considered part of the liberal elite, and the enemy of right-wing populism. The political left, on the other hand, and insofar as they constituted a revolutionary party or movement, is considered by Barthes to exclude myth, because revolution generates a fully <em>political<\/em> (and therefore non-mythological) speech. However, Barthes also argued that myth does exist on the left, but has different qualities to that of the right. One of the left\u2019s problems, according to Barthes, is that its mythology is <em>impoverished<\/em>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>It (the left) does not know how to proliferate; being produced on order and for a temporarily limited prospect, it is invented with difficulty. It lacks a major faculty, that of fabulizing. Whatever it does, there remains about it something stiff and literal\u2026<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-9\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-9\">[9]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3>Narrative, history and myth<\/h3>\n<p>One of the problems regarding history is that much of it is presented in the form of narratives or stories. This is not only true of \u2018pop history\u2019, as reflected in the ever-expanding history sections in high street bookshops and online, and the ever-increasing number of history documents on TV and other media, along with their \u2018celebrity historians\u2019, but applies equally to much \u2018academic\u2019 history as well.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, in some ways this is simply part of the ever-growing narrativisation of social life, where every conceivable form of human interaction becomes dramatized and turned into a \u2018story\u2019. But this then raises another question: what is so special about <em>historical<\/em> narrative as opposed to any other kind? One answer is likely to be that historical narratives are narratives about the \u2018past\u2019. However, it is not all clear what constitutes the \u2018past\u2019 in this context; in fact, it could be argued that the \u2018past\u2019 in historical narrative is <em>a product of the narrative itself<\/em>. This is why it is helpful to explore in some detail the nature of historical narrative (or \u2018narrative history\u2019 as it is sometimes described) in order to gain a better understanding of what such narratives actually \u2018produce\u2019, and how these relate to the idea of <em>myth<\/em>. As a way forward, I will outline Hayden White\u2019s argument regarding history, myth and narrative, and then look at two other writers who appear to be more sympathetic to the idea of \u2018mythic history\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>White\u2019s view on the relationship between narrative history and myth is quite complex and in many ways, ambivalent.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-10\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-10\">[10]<\/a><\/sup> On the one hand he appears to share the suspicion of many \u2018positivistic\u2019 historians that the use of narrative as a form of historical writing blurs the distinction between (real) history and mythical writing. On the other hand, he appears sympathetic to the idea that narrative history should be judged on its own merits and in relation to its particular subject matter, rather than being compared (unfavourably) to a somewhat \u2018idealised\u2019 version of \u2018scientific history\u2019, which claims to \u2018tell it as it really was\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>And this idea of \u2018telling it as it really was\u2019 is at the heart of the (so far unresolved) dispute between the \u2018scientific\u2019 historians and the more \u2018hermeneutical\u2019 ones. As White points out, the issue is not the use of narrative <em>per se<\/em>, but rather the claims by (some) proponents of narrative history that this approach gives an accurate rendering of (historical) reality. But it is precisely this notion of \u2018historical reality\u2019 that is the central problem here. Narrative history, according to White, purports to let \u2018events speak for themselves.\u2019 However, the difficulty here is that events do not in themselves constitute a narrative, a story:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Narrative becomes a problem only when we wish to give real events the form of story. It is because real events do not offer themselves as stories that their narrativization is so difficult\u2026But, by common consent, it is not enough that an historical account deal in real, rather than merely imaginary events; and it is not enough that the account represents events in its order of discourse according to the chronological sequence in which they originally occurred. The events must not only be registered within the chronological framework of their original occurrence but narrated as well, that is to say, revealed as possessing a structure, an order of meaning, that they do not possess as mere sequence.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-11\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-11\">[11]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In other words, according to the proponents of narrative history, \u2018proper\u2019 history must tell a story, even if reality, or perhaps it would be better to say <em>actuality<\/em>, is not like that. As White argues, there <em>are<\/em> other, non-narrational forms of history, for example, the annals and the chronicle. However, although the annals provide a basic \u2018mapping-out\u2019 of events (White cites the example of the <em>Annals of Saint Gall<\/em> to illustrate this point), they lack any real sense of human agency and meaning; natural events such floods, hard winters, etc, are recorded alongside acts of human agency (in this example, Charles fighting the Saxons), and both are given equal weight:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Social events are apparently as incomprehensible as natural events. They seem to have the same order of importance or unimportance. They seem merely to have occurred, and their importance seems to be indistinguishable from the fact they were recorded. In fact, it seems that their importance consists in <em>nothing other<\/em> than their having been recorded.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-12\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-12\">[12]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The chronicle is a step forward in the sense that human agency does occupy central stage (White cites the example of Richerus of Rheims\u2019 <em>History of France<\/em>), but the \u2018story\u2019 is broken off inconclusively. And the \u2018conclusion\u2019 that White has in mind is essentially a <em>moral<\/em> one. Referring to Richerus\u2019 account, White notes:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The end of the discourse does not cast its light back over the events originally recorded in order to redistribute the force of a meaning that was immanent in all of the events from the beginning. There is no justice, only force, or, rather, only an authority that presents itself as different kinds of forces.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-13\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-13\">[13]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>And this leads to White\u2019s central thesis: \u201c\u2026that narrativizing discourse serves the purpose of moralizing judgements\u2026\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-14\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-14\">[14]<\/a><\/sup> In other words, history should not so much \u2018tell it as it is\u2019, but rather, \u2018tell it as is should be\u2019, in the sense that the story should not simply be a recounting of events, but rather giving such events a meaning and a structure, that allows the narrator (the historian) to make a moral judgement or set of judgements regarding such events. And this idea of a \u2018moral authority\u2019 is precisely what the critics of narrative history, including the <em>Annales<\/em> group and the post-modernists, were opposed to, because it suggested that narrative history essentially served an <em>ideological<\/em> or <em>mythical<\/em> function, rather than a <em>scientific<\/em> one (\u2018telling it as it is\u2019.) In other words, narrative history was being used not only to tell stories, but stories with a <em>moral<\/em>; and, referring back to Barthes, stories that served to legitimate, through a process of naturalisation, particular social and political structures and forms of hegemony.<\/p>\n<p>However, this is not quite the end of the story as far as White is concerned, and this is why I noted earlier that there seems to be an ambivalence (and ambiguity) in his argument. White draws upon the work of Paul Ricoeur in order to develop the idea of narrative history as hermeneutics, based on <em>historicality<\/em> and <em>allegory<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>One of Ricoeur\u2019s key arguments is that human action can be \u2018read\u2019 like a text, and rely on the same hermeneutic principles. To quote White on this point:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u2026the study of the past has as its proper aim the hermeneutic \u201cunderstanding\u201d of human actions. In the process of attaining this understanding, explanations of various sorts are called for, in much the same way that explanations of \u201cwhat happened\u201d in any story are called for on the way to the story\u2019s full elaboration. But these explanations serve as a means to understanding \u201cwhat happened\u201d rather than as ends in themselves. Thus, in the writing of the historical text, the aim in view should be to represent (human) events in such a way that their status as parts of meaningful wholes will be made manifest.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-15\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-15\">[15]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In other words, the \u2018explanation\u2019 is only part of the story, so to speak. The key point about narrative is to provide the transition of human events from \u2018within-time-ness\u2019 to \u2018historicality\u2019 (these are Heidegger\u2019s terms used by Ricoeur). \u2018Within-time-ness\u2019 refers to our ordinary conception of time, which is effectively a \u2018space\u2019 within which events occur. \u2018Historicality\u2019 refers to situating this \u2018everydayness\u2019 experience of time within a deeper temporality, which is structured in terms of \u2018plots\u2019. The implication here is that narrative is a device for revealing the true historical nature of human existence. Furthermore, it implies that history, in its deeper, <em>historical<\/em> sense, is \u2018plotted\u2019, has a \u2018story-line\u2019, that is outside of the influence of the historian. Citing and quoting Ricoeur, White writes:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u2026this plot is not imposed by the historian on the events, nor is it a code drawn from the repertoire of literary models and used \u201cpragmatically\u201d to endow what would otherwise be a mere collection of facts with a certain rhetorical form. It is a plot, he (Ricoeur) says, that figures forth the \u201chistoricality\u201d of events: \u201cThe plot\u2026places us at the crossing point of temporality and narrativity: to be historical, an event must be more than a singular occurrence, a unique happening. It receives its definition from its contribution to the development of a plot.\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-16\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-16\">[16]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>White also notes that historical narrative should be seen as <em>figurative<\/em>, as <em>allegorical<\/em>, in the sense that it tells one story in order to reveal another, deeper one. And this seems to link to the concept of narrative as providing a transition from one mode of temporality (within-time-ness) to another (historicality). At this point, (historical) narrative is no longer an attempt to describe events in the past, but rather to \u2018translate\u2019 such events into a wider and deeper world-historical framework.<\/p>\n<p>On the basis of such arguments, White is led to conclude that as a way to speak about \u2018real\u2019 events historical narrative is problematic. The very fact that narrative predominates in mythic and fictional discourses makes it even more suspect. In other words, how can one really tell if a narrative is referring to something that \u2018really happened\u2019 or not? However, White then argues:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>But here the notion of what constitutes a real event turns, not on the distinction between true and false (which is a distinction that belongs to the order of discourses, not to the order of events), but rather on the distinction between real and imaginary (which belongs both to the order of events and to the order of discourses). One can produce an imaginary discourse about real events that may not be less \u201ctrue\u201d for being imaginary.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-17\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-17\">[17]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3>Mythistory?<\/h3>\n<p>But is the idea that narrative history is essentially mythical a problem? As William McNeill points out one historian\u2019s history is another\u2019s myth.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-18\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-18\">[18]<\/a><\/sup> Behind this statement, of course, is the idea that the best way to deride another historian\u2019s work is to classify it as \u2018myth\u2019. But this simply begs the question as to why classifying a narrative as \u2018mythical\u2019 is to deride it in the first place, at least from the point of view of \u2018real history\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>McNeill argues that non-positivistic, i.e. narrative, history aims at recognising patterns in events in order to construct meaning, and this usually takes place in the context of trying to construct shared meanings and experiences within particular groups and societies; meanings that \u2018outsiders\u2019 might view as mythical. This means that in increasingly complex societies there is a tendency for historians to reflect the dominant values of their own groups:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Thus, the founding fathers of the American Historical Association and their immediate successors were intent on facilitating the consolidation of a new American nation by writing national history in a WASPish mold, while also claiming affiliation with a tradition of Western civilization that ran back through modern and medieval Europe to the ancient Greeks and Hebrews.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-19\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-19\">[19]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>As McNeill points out, the Great War and subsequent economic crises and another world war shattered the \u2018WASPish\u2019 liberal and nationalistic view of the world, but ironically this collapse of certainties motivated the drive to find new ones, and new ideals, which revolved around new types of group identity.\u00a0At this point history become <em>mythical<\/em>, in the sense it creates an idealised version of reality, ignoring contradictions relating to group identity. However, as McNeill goes onto argue, myths can serve a positive, self-validating function.\u00a0 Amongst other things, they \u2018teach\u2019 a group or society how to behave in adverse situations, for example, &#8216;Britain&#8217;s finest hour&#8217; in 1940.<\/p>\n<p>At this point McNeill coins the term \u2018mythistory\u2019, which he defines as an attempt to attain a better balance between \u2018Truth, truths, and myths\u2019:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Eternal and universal Truth about human behavior is an unattainable goal, however delectable as an ideal. Truths are what historians achieve when they bend their minds as critically and carefully as they can to the task of making their account of public affairs credible as well as intelligible to an audience that shares enough of their particular outlook and assumptions to accept what they say. The result might best be called mythistory&#8230;<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-20\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-20\">[20]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Joseph Mali is also sympathetic to the idea of \u2018mythistory\u2019, which he argues engenders meaning into an otherwise chaotic experience of reality.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-21\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-21\">[21]<\/a><\/sup> However, his main argument is that all narrative history is mythical, and, citing Hayden White, that the role of all narrative history is to affirm moral and social authority through the representation of reality as a &#8220;conventional, well- made or fabulistic story.&#8221;<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-22\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-22\">[22]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>However, Mali does not see the idea that all narrative history is mythical as a problem. Rather, he argues that myths <em>configure <\/em>historical reality rather than (simply) &#8216;distorting&#8217; it:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>My cardinal claim is that social reality is made up of historical myths and must be interpreted in their terms. White opines that &#8220;stories are not lived; there is no such thing as a &#8216;real&#8217; story\u201d&#8230;and thus adopts a &#8220;liberal&#8221; philosophy that imparts to the historians the freedom to choose and impose their own narrative forms on historical reality. I, in contrast, would like to raise the more conservative &#8220;communitarian&#8221; objection and argue that historians actually inherit and discover these forms as already configured in that reality, primarily in their mythical traditions. These traditions are the &#8220;real narratives,&#8221; possessed not only by the peoples but also by their historians, and their critical duty, therefore, is to be (and make us) more aware of the mythical patterns of thought and action in all historical events and narratives (including their own).<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-23\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-23\">[23]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Mali essentially adopts a <em>hermeneutical <\/em>approach to history and historical narratives &#8211; focusing on <em>meaning <\/em>rather than truth (&#8216;what really happened&#8217;). He argues that White and other critics of narrative history do not appreciate the importance of myth, and they would do well to remember Nietzsche\u2019s view of the ultimate use of history, as formulated in his <em>Use and Abuse of History for Life<\/em>, which is to recover myth for modern history.<\/p>\n<h3>Conclusion: can history escape myth (and does it need to)?<\/h3>\n<p>Hopefully it has become clear from the arguments outlined above that the relationship between history, narrative and myth is a complex one, and that it is perhaps unhelpful simply to make a crude distinction between \u2018real\u2019 history and myth, especially when dealing with narrative history.<\/p>\n<p>The problem here, I would argue, is not so much that the distinction between history and myth is somewhat blurred, but the idea that it could ever be otherwise. Lurking behind the critique of narrative history is the notion of an \u2018objective, scientific\u2019 history which can \u2018tell it as it is (or was)\u2019. But back in the early 1960s even one of the stalwarts of the history academy, EH Carr, was critical of the idea of such a \u2018scientific history\u2019.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-24\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-24\">[24]<\/a><\/sup> For example, in his discussion of the nineteenth century historian\u2019s \u2018fetish of the facts\u2019, he comments:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u2026the facts of history never come to us \u2018pure\u2019, since they do not and cannot exist in a pure form: they are always refracted through the mind of the recorder. It follows that when we take up a work of history, our first concern should be not with the facts which it contains but the historian who wrote it.<sup><a id=\"post-4992-footnote-ref-25\" href=\"#post-4992-footnote-25\">[25]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Ironically, perhaps, this is precisely the point that critics of narrative history are making; that is, that all historical accounts reflect the bias of the historian in question. But, of course, this is true of any attempt to establish the facts of any situation: the facts never \u2018speak for themselves\u2019, except in the minds of die-hard empiricists. So, what is really at stake here? Perhaps it is not so much the question of the Truth, but, rather, <em>whose<\/em> truth? And for \u2018truth\u2019 perhaps we should read \u2018vested interests\u2019. In other words, both the proponents and critics of narrative history have something to lose if their ideas and views become too ridiculed, and too much out of favour. So in the end, history becomes a question of politics and ideology.<\/p>\n<p>But of course, this goes straight back to McNeill\u2019s argument that one historian\u2019s history is another\u2019s myth that I cited earlier.<\/p>\n<p>Coming back to the Myth of the (Great) War that I started with, what light can the arguments that I have explored in this text throw on the nature and meaning of such a myth? Indeed, does it deserve the status of \u2018myth\u2019 at all? Perhaps one of the key considerations here is to look at the moment that the <em>history<\/em> of the Great War became the <em>myth<\/em> of the War. And I would argue that this process of mythologisation began the moment people started to write about it in a narrative form. On this basis, of course, the war was being mythologised from the very beginning (and in fact, even prior to its beginning). This is because stories, narratives were being constructed about the war throughout the conflict and way beyond.<\/p>\n<p>Hynes\u2019 argument is that this process of mythologisation did not really start until the mid-1920s. However, he links this argument to the fact that prior to this period a number of <em>histories<\/em> of the war were being written (from around 1919 onwards), which had a shared theme of the decline and collapse of (Western) civilisation. For example, he makes reference to Masterman\u2019s <em>England After the War<\/em>, a series of writings by Harold Begbie published in the <em>Pall Mall Magazine<\/em>, and Wells\u2019 <em>Outline of History<\/em>. All of these texts were essentially exercises in narrative history, so if we take the arguments of White, McNeill and Mali seriously, they are already <em>mythological<\/em>, or at least potentially so.<\/p>\n<p>According to Hynes\u2019 argument, there was a ten year gap, or \u2018silence\u2019, between the end of the War and the start of the mythologisation of it, from the late 1920s onwards. Such a \u2018silence\u2019 could be seen as a necessary gestation period before the myth could begin to take shape. And, of course, the general shape and thrust of this Myth is well known: a generation traumatised, disillusioned, betrayed and lost. A generation made old before their time, and for whom there was an unbridgeable chasm between \u2018before\u2019 and \u2018after\u2019; between a lost innocence and complete disillusionment. Furthermore, the writers and propagators of the Myth are well known too: the artists, the writers, the poets, the film makers, and even, to a certain extent, the historians themselves.<\/p>\n<p>Going back to Ricoeur\u2019s idea, as formulated by White, that narrative enables the transition from within-time-ness to historicality, perhaps it can be argued that whilst particular accounts of the War, both personal and \u2018official\u2019, can be seen to be situated within-time-ness, once such accounts are used as the basis for constructing a <em>meaning<\/em>, or perhaps one could even say a <em>hermeneutic<\/em>, of the War, through narrative, then it becomes truly <em>historicised<\/em>. At this point we are on the plane of <em>myth<\/em> rather than <em>history<\/em> as such.<\/p>\n<h3>References<\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-1\"><a id=\"post-4992-_Hlk5461074\"><\/a>Samuel Hynes, <em>A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture<\/em> (London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1990). <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-1\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-2\">Roland Barthes, <em>Mythologies<\/em>, Mythologies, the Complete Edition, in a New Translation (New York\u202f: Hill and Wang, 2013). <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-2\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-3\">Ferdinand de Saussure, <em>Course in General Linguistics<\/em>, trans. by Roy Harris (London: Duckworth &amp; Co, 1983). <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-3\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-4\">Barthes, <em>Mythologies,\u00a0<\/em>p.224 <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-4\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-5\">Anders Fagerjord. Notes from lecture 30 March, 2006. https:\/\/www.uio.no\/studier\/emner\/hf\/imk\/MEVIT2110\/v06\/undervisningsmateriale\/barthes.html <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-5\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-6\">Barthes, <em>Mythologies<\/em>, p.226 <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-6\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-7\">Barthes, <em>Mythologies<\/em>, p.240, italics in original. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-7\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-8\">Barthes, <em>Mythologies<\/em>, p.250, italics in original. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-8\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-9\">Barthes, <em>Mythologies<\/em>, p.261. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-9\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-10\">Hayden White, <em>The Content of the Form\u202f: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation<\/em> (Baltimore: Baltimore, 1987). <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-10\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-11\">White, <em>The Content of the Form<\/em>, pp.4-5 <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-11\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-12\">White, <em>The Content of the Form<\/em>, p.7, italics added. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-12\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-13\">White, <em>The Content of the Form<\/em>, p20. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-13\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-14\">White, <em>The Content of the Form<\/em>, p24. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-14\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-15\">White, <em>The Content of the Form<\/em>, p.50. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-15\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-16\">White, <em>The Content of the Form<\/em>, p.51. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-16\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-17\">White, <em>The Content of the Form<\/em>, p.57. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-17\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-18\">William H. McNeill, \u2018Mythistory, or Truth, Myth, History, and Historians\u2019, <em>The American Historical Review<\/em>, 91.1 (1986), 1\u201310 &lt;https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2307\/1867232&gt;. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-18\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-19\">McNeill, \u2018Mythistory, p.4. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-19\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-20\">McNeill, \u2018Mythistory&#8217;, p.8. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-20\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-21\">Joseph Mali, \u2018Narrative, Myth, and History\u2019, <em>Science in Context<\/em>, 7.1 (1994), 121\u201342 &lt;https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/S0269889700001629&gt;. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-21\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-22\">Mali, \u2018Narrative, Myth, and History\u2019, p.123. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-22\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-23\">Mali, \u2018Narrative, Myth, and History\u2019, p.125. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-23\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-24\">Edward Hallett Carr, <em>What Is History?<\/em>, 2nd ed \/ edited by R. W. Davies.. (London\u202f: Penguin, 1990). <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-24\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-4992-footnote-25\">Carr, <em>What Is History?,\u00a0<\/em>p.22. <a href=\"#post-4992-footnote-ref-25\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In a number of writings I have made reference to Samuel Hynes\u2019 idea of the \u2018Myth of the War\u2019.[1] By this term he was referring to the way the events of the First World War (the Great War) have been reworked through art, literature, poetry, film, and by historical narratives &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[20],"tags":[331,181,332],"class_list":["post-4992","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-trauma-history-and-memory","tag-barthes","tag-narrative","tag-white"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4992","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4992"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4992\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5007,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4992\/revisions\/5007"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4992"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4992"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4992"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}