{"id":5507,"date":"2024-04-03T17:09:24","date_gmt":"2024-04-03T16:09:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/?p=5507"},"modified":"2026-07-20T10:29:58","modified_gmt":"2026-07-20T09:29:58","slug":"laclau-and-the-populist-subject","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/2024\/04\/03\/laclau-and-the-populist-subject\/","title":{"rendered":"Laclau and the populist subject"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In Ernesto Laclau\u2019s approach to populism, which I referred to <a href=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/2024\/03\/13\/the-trauma-of-populism\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">in my previous post<\/a>, the subject has a somewhat ambiguous position. On the one hand, as I argue below, he does make reference to the \u2018popular subject\u2019 (though not the <em>populist<\/em> one), but he is also at pains to avoid a theory of subjectivity that pre-exists political action. In other words, he wants to circumvent a common approach by theorists of populism (and especially right-wing or national populism) that populism is a product of a particular way of looking at the world. For example, the idea that what \u2018produces\u2019 right-wing populism is a set of negative attitudes amongst certain individuals and groups regarding immigrants or other \u2018outsiders\u2019. The problem here, according to Laclau, is that this is based on the idea that such political practices, for example, discrimination against immigrants, are simply an expression of the \u2018inner nature\u2019 of those engaging in such practices, i.e<em>. populist subjects<\/em>. But as Laclau notes: &#8220;The difficulties in determining the populistic character of the subjects of certain practices cannot but reproduce themselves in the analysis of the practices as such, as far as the latter simply <em>expresses<\/em> the inner nature of those subjects.&#8221; <sup><a id=\"post-5507-footnote-ref-1\" href=\"#post-5507-footnote-1\">[1]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>The point Laclau is making is that this tells us very little about populist practices themselves, but rather focuses on the \u2018inner life\u2019 or (false) consciousness of the social agents who engage in such practices. For example, in the case of Brexit, although (most) of its political opponents were relatively restrained in their views of \u2018Brexiteers\u2019 when speaking to the mainstream media, on social media many were quite open that they regarded anyone who voted for Brexit as \u2018ignorant\u2019, \u2018thick\u2019, a \u2018little Englander\u2019, a \u2018fascist\u2019, \u2018racist\u2019, \u2018bigoted\u2019, and much worse. In other words, the focus of their anger was on \u2018the type of people who voted Brexit\u2019, rather than in trying to engage with the actual politics of the situation. Laclau, however, argues that rather than the political practices that constitute populism as being the <em>expression<\/em> of particular form of subjectivity, such practices <em>constitute<\/em> the latter. Or, to put it another way, social agents are not populist because of what they think or feel, but rather because of the practices they engage in.<\/p>\n<p>In <em>Populism: What\u2019s in a Name?<\/em> Laclau refers to the \u2018popular subject\u2019 as being one form of the \u2018subject of the demand\u2019. This is part of his broader argument regarding how the demands of the populus are met (or not met) by the governing elites. In one scenario such demands are met on a case-by-case basis and constitute what Laclau calls a <em>differential chain<\/em>. In the other scenario, the demands are not met and begin to constitute what Laclau calls an <em>equivalential chain<\/em>. Although these are a set of <em>individual<\/em> demands, they are equivalent by virtue of all being <em>unmet<\/em>. Laclau argues that:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The subject of the demand is different in our two cases. In the first, the subject of the demand was as punctual as the demand itself. The subject of a demand conceived as differential particularity we will call democratic subject. In the other case the subject will be wider, for its subjectivity will result from the equivalential aggregation of a plurality of democratic demands. A subject constituted on the basis of this logic we will call popular subject.<sup><a id=\"post-5507-footnote-ref-2\" href=\"#post-5507-footnote-2\">[2]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This argument is developed in more detail in <em>On Populist Reason<\/em>, where Laclau also develops his idea of the <em>internal frontier<\/em>. Essentially, according to Laclau, development of the equivalential chain of (unmet) demands <em>produces<\/em> a division between \u2018the people\u2019 who are making such demands and \u2018the elite\u2019 (or \u2018enemy\u2019) who are frustrating them. In a \u2018normal\u2019 democracy there will always be a multitude of demands from the populus; however, as long as these are all negotiated and, in some way or other, met by the ruling administration, then no such internal frontier will arise. The problem starts when a number of demands remain unsatisfied and start to form an equivalential chain; at this point the internal frontier emerges with \u2018the people\u2019 on one side and \u2018the elite\u2019 on the other.<\/p>\n<p>Laclau argues that populism is a way to constitute relations between social agents. And it is the idea of \u2018the people\u2019 that is key in such a constitution. However, he is keen to emphasise that: \u201c\u2026\u2019the people\u2019 is not something of the nature of an ideological expression, but a real relation between social agents. It is, in other terms, one way of constituting the unity of the group.\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-5507-footnote-ref-3\" href=\"#post-5507-footnote-3\">[3]<\/a><\/sup> In other words, \u2018the people\u2019, as a shared idea, is what identifies a particular group of social agents as \u2018populist\u2019. However, there seems to be something of a circular argument here, insofar as the concept of \u2018social agent\u2019 seems to imply a shared experience. In other words, it\u2019s the shared experience (and grievances) of a particular group of individuals that that constitutes them as a social formation in the first place. In fact, the concept of a <em>group<\/em> implies some form of social organisation to start with.<sup><a id=\"post-5507-footnote-ref-4\" href=\"#post-5507-footnote-4\">[4]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>Does this mean, therefore, that Laclau is relying on an essentially <em>individualistic<\/em> concept of populism? He appears to be arguing that a \u2018group\u2019 or \u2018mass\u2019 of human beings are constituted as \u2018populist\u2019 by virtue of a set of shared grievances, which in turn creates an \u2018internal frontier\u2019 between this \u2018group\u2019 and another \u2018group\u2019 \u2013 \u2018the enemy\u2019. The key point here, perhaps, is that although <em>objectively<\/em> there exist a set of unmet demands, these need to become \u2018subjectivised\u2019 as <em>grievances<\/em> in order to constitute a \u2018people\u2019. In other words, even though Laclau is at pains to avoid defining populism in terms of individual prejudices and grievances, this is precisely what his theory demands.<\/p>\n<p>There is, however, a very different way to approach the question of the populist subject. And this is something Laclau touches upon in his own theory of populism (and especially in <em>On Populist Reason<\/em>). He argues that his theory is still lacking one key element:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Our whole approach to populism turns, as we have seen, around the following theses: (1) the emergence of the \u2018people\u2019 requires the passage \u2013 via equivalences \u2013 from isolated, heterogeneous demands to a \u2018global\u2019 demand which involves the formation of political frontiers and the discursive construction of power as an antagonistic force; (2) since, however, this passage does not follow from a mere analysis of the heterogeneous demands themselves \u2013 there is no logical, dialectical or semiotic transition from one level to the other \u2013 something qualitatively new has to intervene.<sup><a id=\"post-5507-footnote-ref-5\" href=\"#post-5507-footnote-5\">[5]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>And this \u2018something qualitatively new\u2019, according to Laclau, is <em>affect<\/em>. The crux of Laclau\u2019s argument is that, as I suggested earlier, it not enough for there simply to be an equivalential chain of unmet demands; this in itself does not create the populist movement and the antagonism between \u2018the people\u2019 and \u2018the enemy\u2019 (often viewed as \u2018the elite\u2019). In addition, there has to be what he calls a \u2018radical investment\u2019: &#8220;The different signifying operations to which I have referred so far can explain the <em>forms<\/em> the investment takes, but not the <em>force<\/em> in which the investment consists. It is clear, however, that if an entity becomes the object of an investment \u2013 as in being in love, or in hatred \u2013 the investment belongs necessarily to the order of <em>affect<\/em>.&#8221;<sup><a id=\"post-5507-footnote-ref-6\" href=\"#post-5507-footnote-6\">[6]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>He also notes that it would a mistake to treat affect and signification as two separate phenomena:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Affect is not something which exists on its own, independently of language; it constitutes itself only through the differential cathexes of a signifying chain. This is exactly what \u2018investment\u2019 means. The conclusion is clear: the complexes which we call \u2018discursive or hegemonic formations\u2019, which articulate differential and equivalential logics, would be unintelligible without the affective component.<sup><a id=\"post-5507-footnote-ref-7\" href=\"#post-5507-footnote-7\">[7]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Further on in the text he draws upon Joan Copjec\u2019s <em>The Tomb of Perseverance <\/em>to develop the idea that the investment of affect (which he now equates with Copec\u2019s use of the term <em>jouissance<\/em>) is linked to the impossibility of total satisfaction through union with the \u2018lost\u2019 primordial object, which Copec equates with the fantasy of the primordial Mother. Instead, the drive can only find \u2018satisfaction\u2019 in a range of \u2018partial objects\u2019, which all function as the object <em>a<\/em>. Laclau argues that this relates to the question of the populist subject because: \u201cThe mythical wholeness of the mother\/child dyad [the fantasy of the union with primordial mother] corresponds to the unachieved fullness evoked \u2013 as its opposite \u2013 by the dislocations brought about by the unfulfilled demands.\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-5507-footnote-ref-8\" href=\"#post-5507-footnote-8\">[8]<\/a><\/sup> However, Laclau continues, the desire for such fulfilment does not simply disappear, but, rather, gets transferred to a range of partial objects.<\/p>\n<p>At this point Laclau is not altogether clear (although he certainly implies it) as to whether he is equating such \u2018partial objects\u2019 to the objects of demand; in other words, whether each unmet demand (which then becomes a desire) relates to an instance of the object <em>a<\/em>, and whether, in turn, whether the object <em>a<\/em> relates to his idea of the empty signifier. For example, and with reference to UK politics in the run-up to the general election at some point in 2024, to what extent does the empty signifier \u2018stop the boats\u2019 (one of prime minister Rishi Sunak\u2019s \u2018five pledges\u2019) also function as an instance of the object <em>a<\/em>? It certainly appears to be the case that for most national populists in the UK, many of whom are now gravitating towards the Reform party, \u2018stopping the boats\u2019, that is, stopping immigration, has become a key political demand. And if Laclau\u2019s analysis is correct then such a demand (which is clearly <em>not<\/em> being met by the current Tory administration) is also \u2018invested\u2019 with jouissance.<\/p>\n<p>Although I think Laclau is definitely onto something here, I\u2019m not convinced he is approaching the question of jouissance and the populist subject in quite the right way. To start with, on reading Laclau\u2019s arguments in <em>On Populist Reason<\/em>, one gets a sense that the question of affect\/jouissance is something of an afterthought or \u2018add-on\u2019; in other words, it does not appear to be inherent to his theory of populism. Rather, he appears to have brought it in to try and address the problem of how a series of objective, unmet demands become the basis for a fundamental antagonism between \u2018the people\u2019 and \u2018the enemy\u2019. In principle this is not necessarily a problem, insofar as many theories evolve in such a manner. However, I think what is more problematic is his use of the concept of jouissance in the first place. It is not clear from the text whether he is purely relying on Copec\u2019s use of the term or whether he has engaged directly with Lacan\u2019s use of it. The latter question matters, in my view, because Lacan\u2019s concept of jouissance evolved quite radically during his teaching. By the 1970s it had become central to his whole theory of psychoanalysis, whereas prior to this it had been somewhat on the margins, particularly pre-Seminar XI. The very fact that Laclau is keen to emphasise the <em>structuralist<\/em> nature of his theory, by which he seems to mean his reliance on Saussure, appears to suggest he is drawing upon the Lacan of the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s and what Lydia Liu has called the \u2018French Theory\u2019 or \u2018Saussurian\u2019 reading of Lacan.<sup><a id=\"post-5507-footnote-ref-9\" href=\"#post-5507-footnote-9\">[9]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>So although I think Laclau is right to emphasise the importance of jouissance in his theory of the populist subject, in my view this needs to be developed somewhat in the light of Lacan\u2019s own development of the concept. This is something I will be addressing in my next article on psychoanalysis and populism.<\/p>\n<h4>Notes and references<\/h4>\n<ol>\n<li id=\"post-5507-footnote-1\">Ernesto Laclau, <em>On Populist Reason<\/em> (London: Verso, 2005), 33, italics in original. <a href=\"#post-5507-footnote-ref-1\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5507-footnote-2\">Ernesto Laclau, \u2018Populism: What\u2019s in a Name\u2019, in <em>Populism and the Mirror of Democracy<\/em>, ed. by Francisco Panizza (London: Verso, 2005), 37. <a href=\"#post-5507-footnote-ref-2\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5507-footnote-3\">Laclau, <em>On Populist Reason<\/em>, 73. <a href=\"#post-5507-footnote-ref-3\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5507-footnote-4\">Which from a Freudian perspective revolves around the ego-ideal as a central (libidinal) focal point (see Freud\u2019s <em>Group Psychology<\/em> paper, which Laclau draws upon in <em>On Populist Reason<\/em>). <a href=\"#post-5507-footnote-ref-4\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5507-footnote-5\">Laclau, <em>On Populist Reason<\/em>, 110. <a href=\"#post-5507-footnote-ref-5\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5507-footnote-6\">Ibid., 110, italics in original. <a href=\"#post-5507-footnote-ref-6\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5507-footnote-7\">Ibid., 111. <a href=\"#post-5507-footnote-ref-7\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5507-footnote-8\">Ibid., 114. <a href=\"#post-5507-footnote-ref-8\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5507-footnote-9\">Lydia H. Liu, <em>The Freudian Robot: Digital Media and the Future of the Unconscious<\/em> (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010). <a href=\"#post-5507-footnote-ref-9\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>This article is part of a broader research track. For a complete structural overview, please visit the <a href=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/reconciling-the-irreconcilable-politics-in-the-real\/\">Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Politics in the Real Hub<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In Ernesto Laclau\u2019s approach to populism, which I referred to in my previous post, the subject has a somewhat ambiguous position. On the one hand, as I argue below, he does make reference to the \u2018popular subject\u2019 (though not the populist one), but he is also at pains to avoid &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[280],"tags":[148,349,377],"class_list":["post-5507","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-national-populism","tag-jouissance","tag-laclau","tag-the-populist-subject"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5507","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5507"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5507\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6778,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5507\/revisions\/6778"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5507"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5507"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5507"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}