{"id":5806,"date":"2025-03-13T18:10:30","date_gmt":"2025-03-13T18:10:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/?p=5806"},"modified":"2026-03-31T12:19:41","modified_gmt":"2026-03-31T11:19:41","slug":"war-and-theatre-of-trauma-part-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/2025\/03\/13\/war-and-theatre-of-trauma-part-2\/","title":{"rendered":"War and theatre of trauma (part 2)"},"content":{"rendered":"<h4>Trauma as drive-jouissance<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/2025\/03\/06\/war-and-theatre-of-trauma-part-1\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">In part 1 of this essay<\/a> I concluded by arguing that rather than focusing on the \u2018vulnerability\u2019 of those subjects who have experienced \u2018traumatic\u2019 events, for example, in war and conflict, it would be more helpful (from a psychoanalytic position) to think about the jouissance of the drive (drive-jouissance) that, in certain situations, can overwhelm the subject.<\/p>\n<p>The concept of drive-jouissance and its relation to trauma is something I explore in some detail in my doctoral dissertation<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-1\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-1\">[1]<\/a><\/sup> and forthcoming book,<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-2\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-2\">[2]<\/a><\/sup> but very briefly it draws upon Freud\u2019s arguments in <em>Beyond the Pleasure Principle,<\/em><sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-3\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-3\">[3]<\/a><\/sup> and, more importantly, perhaps, in I<em>nhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety<\/em>, where he writes about trauma as excitation; excitation that overwhelms the pleasure principle.<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-4\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-4\">[4]<\/a><\/sup> In <em>Beyond the Pleasure Principle<\/em> Freud focuses on how such excitation breaches the \u2018defensive shield\u2019 of the psychical apparatus, which implies that the source of the excitation is \u2018external\u2019 (to the psychical apparatus), but in <em>Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety<\/em> he argues that the excitation can emanate from the drive.<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-5\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-5\">[5]<\/a><\/sup> In fact, it\u2019s probably unhelpful to think in terms of \u2018external versus internal\u2019 when it comes to the source of the trauma (excitation), especially, as I pointed out in my previous text, the concepts of \u2018externality\u2019 and \u2018internality\u2019 are deeply problematic within Lacan\u2019s thinking. And this applies especially, I would argue, to the nature of the drive.<\/p>\n<p>Before exploring this idea further, though, I would just like to mention that the term drive-jouissance is used by Jean-Louis Gault in his paper <em>Two Statuses of the Symptom<\/em>,<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-6\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-6\">[6]<\/a><\/sup> and Jacques-Alain Miller in his paper Is <em>Feminine Jouissance not Jouissance as such? <\/em><sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-7\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-7\">[7]<\/a><\/sup> Gault argues that a neurotic \u201c\u2026is a subject who has found a solution to defend himself against the real. This solution relies on the Name-of-the-Father and the fundamental identification that goes with it.\u201d A defence against the Real is essentially a defence against trauma and, according to Gault \u201c\u2026always involves a repression of drive-jouissance.\u201d The problem here, however, is that such a solution always fails and the subject is \u201c\u2026contaminated by the return of drive-jouissance.\u201d <sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-8\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-8\">[8]<\/a><\/sup> This suggests that even \u2018normal\u2019, that is, neurotic, subjects are beholden to the jouissance of the drive. And this is essentially the Lacanian thesis: we are all always already traumatised. The only question that remains, I would argue, is where exactly is the trauma located?<\/p>\n<p>One answer to this question is to be found in the following schema:<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"410\" height=\"382\" class=\"wp-image-5807\" src=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/a-diagram-of-different-symbolsdescription-automati.png\" alt=\"A diagram of different symbolsDescription automatically generated\" srcset=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/a-diagram-of-different-symbolsdescription-automati.png 410w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/a-diagram-of-different-symbolsdescription-automati-300x280.png 300w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/a-diagram-of-different-symbolsdescription-automati-322x300.png 322w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/a-diagram-of-different-symbolsdescription-automati-400x373.png 400w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 410px) 100vw, 410px\" \/><\/p>\n<p>The term <em>troumatisme<\/em> is used by Lacan in lesson eight of <em>Seminar XXI<\/em> to describe trauma as a \u2018hole\u2019 in the Real.<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-9\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-9\">[9]<\/a><\/sup> The idea of a \u2018hole in the Real\u2019 is somewhat counterintuitive, perhaps, because the concept of a \u2018hole\u2019 implies the existence of a signifying network. However, as I understand it, the intersection of the three Borromean rings is a way to show how one register can create a rupture in another; in this case both the Symbolic and the Imaginary are creating a rupture in the Real. However, such a schema does not in itself throw much light on the drive as being neither \u2018external\u2019 nor \u2018internal\u2019; or, to put it another way, the idea of the drive as <em>extimate<\/em>.<\/p>\n<h4>The \u2018extimacy\u2019 of the drive<\/h4>\n<p>One way to illustrate the extimacy of the drive is to think about the relation between the drive and culture. At first sight these might seem to be diametrically opposed; after all, isn\u2019t the drive something \u2018internal\u2019 to the subject, whereas culture is something \u2018external\u2019? And as Mladen Dolar points out in his paper on this topic, it is all too easy to read Freud this way, for example in <em>Civilisation and its Discontents<\/em>.<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-10\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-10\">[10]<\/a><\/sup> Dolar, however, argues that culture and the drive are intertwined in six different ways (which he describes as the \u2018six fundamental traits of the drive\u2019), and these are (i) as the mastery of nature, (ii) as the non-functional supplement (the inverse of (i)); (iii) the drive towards cleanliness, which Dolar links to the anal drive); (iv) the drive towards order, which Dolar links to the compulsion to repeat; (v) spiritual elevation, which he links to sublimation; (vi) the renunciation of satisfaction, which as Dolar notes, following Lacan, is precisely the drive\u2019s <em>means<\/em> of satisfaction. In terms of my own argument, there a number of overlaps with Dolar\u2019s. For example, the drive\u2019s continuous repetition, which, paradoxically becomes its mode of satisfaction; and the idea of the \u2018supplementary\u2019 nature of the drive\u2019s object. Dolar\u2019s argument here is that one way to view culture is precisely in terms of its <em>non-utility<\/em>, its \u2018uselessness\u2019: \u201cThe moment of expenditure, of the non-functional, of waste, which defies the logic of self-preservation and survival, is the true breeding ground of culture.\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-11\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-11\">[11]<\/a><\/sup> There seem to be strong echoes here of the idea of a surplus (supplementary) enjoyment (jouissance), which appears to undermine a strictly utilitarian concept of culture, that is, one that functions to ensure human survival. With regards to this apparent dichotomy between the utilitarian and the \u2018non-functional Dolar comments:<\/p>\n<p>The two first traits form a paradoxical couple: on the one hand, culture as the maximization of utility, and on the other hand, culture as uselessness, pure expenditure. Is culture something that serves best or something that doesn\u2019t serve at all? Utility or futility? The maximum purpose or no purpose at all? But purpose for what, in view of what?<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-12\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-12\">[12]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>In many ways this seems to be another way of describing the (apparent) dichotomy between the pleasure principle and its \u2018beyond\u2019 (the Other jouissance). This is also, perhaps, a way to read Freud\u2019s <em>Civilisation and its Discontents<\/em>.<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-13\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-13\">[13]<\/a><\/sup> Freud\u2019s basic argument here was the price of civilisation (and it is important to note that the German title of the work is <em>Das Unbehagen in der Kultur<\/em>) is the renunciation of the (direct) satisfaction of the drives. In other words, ensuring that the pleasure principle fulfils its function. But as Lacan realised, the idea of a \u2018direct\u2019 satisfaction of the drive was something of a misnomer; rather, the drive\u2019s \u2018satisfaction\u2019 lay precisely in its eternal repetition, its \u2018non-satisfaction\u2019. In this reading, \u2018civilisation\u2019 (<em>Kultur<\/em>) becomes the site for the enactment of the (death) drive rather than the renunciation of it.<\/p>\n<p>However, one problem that Dolar does not address is the precise relationship <em>between<\/em> the \u2018external\u2019 and the \u2018internal\u2019; in other words, how the \u2018internal\u2019 drive acts on the \u2018external\u2019 culture. And this is where Lacan\u2019s concept of extimacy is crucial, and where the Borromean schema I referred to earlier is especially useful, because it effectively circumvents the whole dichotomy of \u2018internal-external\u2019. Furthermore, such a schema allows us to avoid having to talk about the \u2018external world\u2019 as being the <em>site<\/em> of trauma, and, conversely, the <em>construction<\/em> of trauma as taking place \u2018within\u2019 the psychical apparatus (through the operation of drive-jouissance).<\/p>\n<h4>The drive and surplus jouissance<\/h4>\n<p>But what of the <em>jouissance<\/em> in \u2018drive-jouissance\u2019? In <em>Seminar XVII<\/em> Lacan argues that knowledge \u201c\u2026is dominated, articulated by purely formal necessities, the necessities of writing, and in our day this leads to a certain type of logic.\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-14\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-14\">[14]<\/a><\/sup> This \u2018certain type of logic\u2019, Lacan explains, is modern logic and although it might be regarded as the most \u2018purified\u2019 form of knowledge, it is the same knowledge that appears, in the guise of repetition, in the analyst\u2019s consulting room.<\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, according to Lacan:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>This knowledge here reveals it roots in the fact that in repetition, and in the form of the unary trait to begin with, it is found to be the means of <em>jouissance<\/em> \u2013 precisely insofar as <em>jouissance<\/em> goes beyond the limits imposed, under the term of pleasure, on the usual tensions of life.<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-15\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-15\">[15]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The essence of Lacan\u2019s argument here is that the signifier is an <em>apparatus of jouissance<\/em>. However, there is a further key part of Lacan\u2019s argument, and this is that in its endless repetition, jouissance is <em>running down<\/em>, <em>disappearing<\/em>, which he refers to as its <em>entropy<\/em>. At the same time, though, something appears in place of this \u2018disappeared\u2019 or \u2018lost\u2019 jouissance, the object <em>a<\/em>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>What becomes evident\u2026is, as we were saying just before, that there is a loss of <em>jouissance<\/em>. And it is in the place of this loss introduced by repetition that we see the function of the lost object emerge, of what I am calling the <em>a.<\/em> What does this impose on us? If not this formula that at the most elementary level, that of the imposition of the unary trait, knowledge at work produces, let\u2019s say, an entropy.<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-16\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-16\">[16]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This \u2018lost object\u2019, the object <em>a<\/em>, is a \u2018stand-in\u2019 for the \u2018actual jouissance\u2019 of the subject, and in the same seminar is described by Lacan as <em>surplus jouissance<\/em>. However, in developing his concept of surplus jouissance Lacan also discounts his previous argument (in <em>Seminar VII<\/em>) that jouissance is a transgression, something forbidden; on the contrary, argues Lacan:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>We are not dealing with a transgression, an irruption into some forbidden field through the wearing away of vital regulatory apparatuses (the pleasure principle). In fact, it is only through this effect of entropy, through this wasting, that <em>jouissance<\/em> acquires a status and shows itself. This is why I initially introduced it by the term \u201c<em>Mehrlust<\/em>,\u201d surplus <em>jouissance<\/em>\u2026Only the dimension of entropy gives body to the fact that there is surplus <em>jouissance<\/em> there to be recovered.<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-17\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-17\">[17]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In other words, surplus jouissance is an effect of the repetition of the signifier; a repetition that is \u2018powered\u2019 by the circuit of the drive. According to Jacques-Alain Miller, such surplus jouissance can be regarded as a <em>supplement<\/em> to the loss of jouissance and as extending the register of the object<em> a<\/em> beyond &#8216;natural&#8217; objects and encompassing those of industry and culture.\u00a0 These are the &#8216;crumbs&#8217; of jouissance &#8211; &#8216;minor <em>objet petit a<\/em>&#8216;: \u201cWe see our cultural world inhabited by substitutes for jouissance, which are little nothings.\u00a0 These are crumbs of jouissance which give a particular style to our way of life and our way of enjoying.\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-18\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-18\">[18]<\/a><\/sup> What Miller is getting at here is that although previously Lacan (following Freud) was arguing that the objects of the drive were all \u2018natural\u2019, that is, the erogenous zones of the body, and therefore the object <em>a<\/em> was related to the \u2018lost\u2019 jouissance associated with each of these zones, with the advent of the concept of surplus jouissance this effectively <em>generalises<\/em> the idea of jouissance; in other words, <em>anything<\/em>, any object in world, can be the source of the \u2018lost\u2019 jouissance.<\/p>\n<h4>The concept of \u2018drive-scraping\u2019<\/h4>\n<p>There is one more question that arises in relation to drive-jouissance: how does surplus jouissance get to <em>traumatise<\/em> the subject? In other words, even if Miller is right and the subject gains (\u2018crumbs\u2019 of) enjoyment from objects in the cultural world, what is the \u2018mechanism\u2019 (for want of a better term) that leads to the subject becoming overwhelmed, that is, traumatised, by such enjoyment? My contention is that such a mechanism can be described as <em>drive-scraping<\/em>, which is a term I have borrowed from the world of computing and the concept of <em>web scraping<\/em>. Put very briefly, this is the automated process of extracting data from websites. It involves using software or scripts to access web pages, parse their content (typically HTML), and retrieve specific information such as text, images, or links. Businesses, researchers, and developers use web scraping to gather data for market analysis, academic studies, price monitoring, and so on.<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-19\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-19\">[19]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>The crux of my argument is that just as robots \u2018scrape\u2019 the web for ever more data, so does the drive \u2018scrape\u2019 the cultural landscape for ever more surplus jouissance. And it is worth noting, of course, that the Internet and the World Wide Web are very much part of this cultural landscape and provide the source of a great deal of Miller\u2019s \u2018crumbs of jouissance\u2019. Furthermore, the analogy between drive and web scraping may be even more apt when we remember that in <em>Seminar II<\/em> Lacan\u2019s argument regarding the mechanism of language and its relation to the drive drew heavily upon his interest in cybernetics which provides the foundations for modern computing and artificial intelligence (AI). This is something John Johnston discusses in some depth in his study of cybernetics, AI and artificial life.<sup><a id=\"post-5806-footnote-ref-20\" href=\"#post-5806-footnote-20\">[20]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<h4>Implications for war trauma<\/h4>\n<p>What, though, has this to do with the overall topic of this essay, that is, the trauma of war? First of all, it is important to note that war has its own \u2018cultural landscape\u2019; and if we think of the current conflict in Ukraine, such a landscape extends from the trenches on the front line to the UAV (drone) ground control stations which may be hundreds (or even thousands) of miles away. In fact, bearing in mind that the war is being constantly beamed around the globe via mainstream and social media, one might argue that its cultural landscape is now also global.<\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, it is also important to remember that the idea that a particular war or conflict has an ever-broadening cultural landscapes is nothing new. Think, for example, of the whole \u2018Holocaust industry\u2019 that grew out of the Shoah; or the seemingly insatiable appetite for First and Second World War \u2018history\u2019. And, approaching this from a slightly different angle, works such as Paul Fussell\u2019s <em>The Great War and modern memory<\/em> are a reminder that not only do wars and conflicts become continually \u2018reimagined\u2019 by successive generations, but even at the time (in this case, the Great War of 1914-1918) a continuous cultural (re)construction is taking place. For example, Fussell notes that the ideas of the English pastoral and the influence of Georgian poetry were critical in shaping how contemporary war poets, writers and artists thought about and represented the war on the Western Front; both at the time and in the years following the Armistice of 1918. Such representations were then conveyed to the public on the \u2018home front\u2019 in the form of poems, books, films, photographs, paintings, newspaper articles, and so on. In other words, even whilst the Great War was going on there was a continual \u2018scraping\u2019 of the cultural landscape of war for surplus jouissance, and this only intensified in the years and decades following. And by the time we get to the Vietnam War in the 1960s, its cultural landscape had become truly global with images of the war being beamed every night into people\u2019s living rooms all round the world.<\/p>\n<p>At this point it could be argued that what I\u2019m actually describing is so-called \u2018vicarious trauma\u2019, that is, trauma experienced by those not physically present at the site of the (traumatic) event. And such \u2018traumas\u2019 were already been recognised both during and in the aftermath of the Vietnam War when it was realised that a number of people who were developing the symptoms of PTSD (Freud\u2019s war neurosis) had never been anywhere near a combat zone. But the crux of my argument is that although those who are physically present at the site of the event (for example, soldiers on the front line) are clearly going to be far more exposed to (and potentially overwhelmed by) its intensity, the trauma itself lies not in the event but in the jouissance of the drive. This means that even for those individuals who may be watching the war unfold from the \u2018comfort\u2019 of their living room on TV or on social media, such drive-jouissance can still become unbearable. Or, to put it another way, even those who are physically present at the site of the event still have to \u2018subjectify\u2019 it in the form of representations. And such \u2018subjectification\u2019 and representation, I argue, is the work of the drive.<\/p>\n<h4>Notes and References<\/h4>\n<ol>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-1\">https:\/\/eprints.kingston.ac.uk\/id\/eprint\/55990\/ <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-1\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-2\">Leslie Chapman, <em>Traumatic Neurosis Revisited: drive jouissance and the wounds of life<\/em> (London, Palgrave, 2025), forthcoming. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-2\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-3\">Sigmund Freud, \u201cBeyond the Pleasure Principle,\u201d in <em>The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud<\/em>, vol. XVIII (London: Hogarth Press, 1920), 3\u201364. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-3\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-4\">Sigmund Freud, \u201cInhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety,\u201d in <em>The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud<\/em>, vol. XX (London: Hogarth Press, 1926), 77\u2013175. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-4\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-5\">I use \u2018drive\u2019 in the singular following Lacan\u2019s proposition that there is only <em>one<\/em> drive, namely, the death drive. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-5\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-6\">Jean-Louis Gault, \u2018Two Statuses of the Symptom: \u201cLet Us Turn to Finn Again\u201d\u2019, in <em>The Later Lacan: An Introduction<\/em>, ed. by V\u00e9ronique Voruz and Bogdan Wolf (State of New York: Sunny Press, 2007), 73\u201382. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-6\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-7\">Jacques-Alain Miller, \u201cIs Feminine Jouissance Not Jouissance as Such?,\u201d <em>Lacanian Lnk<\/em>, no. 55\/56 (2021): 34\u201351. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-7\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-8\">Gault, \u2018Two Statuses of the Symptom\u2019, 80. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-8\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-9\">\u201cBut we all know, because all of us invent something to fill up the hole in the Real. Where there is no sexual relationship this gives a &#8216;<em>troumatisme<\/em>\u2019\u201d (Jacques Lacan, <em>The Seminar of Jacques Lacan\u202f: Book XXI\u202f: Les Non Dupres Errent: 1973-1974<\/em>, trans. by Cormac Gallagher (Dublin: Unpublished translation by Cormac Gallagher, 2010), 151. (Hereafter <em>Seminar XXI<\/em>) <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-9\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-10\">Mladen Dolar, \u2018Of Drives and Culture\u2019, in <em>Analyzing the Cultural Unconscious: Science of the Signifier<\/em>, ed. by Henrik Bjerre and others (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 69\u201386. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-10\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-11\"><em>Ibid.,<\/em> 74. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-11\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-12\"><em>Ibid.,<\/em> 75. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-12\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-13\">Sigmund Freud, \u201cCivilisation and Its Discontents,\u201d in <em>The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud<\/em>, vol. XXI (London: Hogarth Press, 1930), 59\u2013145. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-13\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-14\">Jacques Lacan, <em>The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII<\/em>, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W.W Norton and Co., 2007), 48. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-14\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-15\">Ibid., 48. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-15\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-16\">Ibid., 48. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-16\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-17\">Ibid., 50. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-17\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-18\">Jacques-Alain Miller, \u201cSix Paradigms of Jouissance,\u201d <em>Psychoanalytical Notebooks<\/em>, no. 34 (December 2019), 61. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-18\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-19\">For a (reasonably) academic introduction to this process see: Nicholas J DeVito, Georgia C Richards, and Peter Inglesby, \u2018How We Learnt to Stop Worrying and Love Web Scraping.\u2019, <em>Nature<\/em>, 585.7826 (2020), 621\u201322. And for the Wikipedia entry for this topic see: \u201cWeb Scraping,\u201d in <em>Wikipedia<\/em>, February 22, 2025, https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Web_scraping&amp;oldid=1277016561. <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-19\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5806-footnote-20\">John Johnston, <em>The Allure of Machinic Life: Cybernetics, Artificial Life and the New AI<\/em> (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2008). <a href=\"#post-5806-footnote-ref-20\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Exploring the &#8216;wounds of life&#8217; requires moving beyond the literal event to the structural truth of the drive. To see how this analysis fits into a wider clinical framework, please<a href=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/the-empire-of-trauma-from-the-event-to-the-drive\/\"> visit the Empire of Trauma Hub<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Trauma as drive-jouissance In part 1 of this essay I concluded by arguing that rather than focusing on the \u2018vulnerability\u2019 of those subjects who have experienced \u2018traumatic\u2019 events, for example, in war and conflict, it would be more helpful (from a psychoanalytic position) to think about the jouissance of the &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[20],"tags":[372,371],"class_list":["post-5806","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-trauma-history-and-memory","tag-drive-jouissance","tag-war-neuroses"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5806","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5806"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5806\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6527,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5806\/revisions\/6527"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5806"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5806"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5806"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}