{"id":5828,"date":"2025-04-16T15:48:53","date_gmt":"2025-04-16T14:48:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/?p=5828"},"modified":"2026-03-15T09:32:40","modified_gmt":"2026-03-15T09:32:40","slug":"the-clinic-of-ideology-1-althussers-ghost","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/2025\/04\/16\/the-clinic-of-ideology-1-althussers-ghost\/","title":{"rendered":"The Clinic of Ideology (1): Althusser&#8217;s Ghost"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h4><a href=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/Althusser-photo.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter wp-image-5920\" src=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/Althusser-photo.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"319\" height=\"300\" \/><\/a>Introduction<\/h4>\n<p>To paraphrase Marx, there is a spectre haunting Lacanian psychoanalysis \u2013 the spectre of Louis Althusser. And behind Althusser, of course, there is Marx himself\u2026In this article I will begin to make the case for a (long overdue) Lacanian \u2018return to Althusser\u2019, which I believe is urgently required in order to address the current crisis in the critique of ideology; a crisis that is occurring at the very moment when such a critique is most desperately needed in the wake of the \u2018return of ideology\u2019 and especially the resurgence of populist ideologies.<\/p>\n<p>I emphasise a \u2018return to Althusser\u2019 as opposed a \u2018return to Marx\u2019 because part of the problem regarding the crisis of ideological critique is precisely the overkill of \u2018Lacanian Marxism\u2019; an overkill, I would argue, that has been brought about, at least in part, in an attempt to exorcise the ghost of Althusser. And just to be clear, this \u2018exorcism\u2019 has a long history, stretching back over thirty years. Furthermore, even at the time (over thirty years ago) it was recognised, at least in some (Slovenian) quarters, that the figure of Louis Althusser was creating difficulties. The following quote by Mladen Dolar (whose work I will be coming back to later) give us a flavour of the problem:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>There is something quite extraordinary about the fate of Althusserian ideas (apart from his personal fate, which is extraordinary beyond measure)&#8230; Themes and topics widely discussed two decades ago have passed into oblivion; interest now remains con\ufb01ned to the notoriety of his personal life (scandalous enough to produce even best\u2014sellers). I think this theoretical amnesia is not simply due to his falling out of fashion\u2014it is not that his ideas have simply been superseded or supplanted by better ones. Rather, it is perhaps more a case of forgetting in a psychoanalytic sense, a convenient forgetting of something disagreeable and uncomfortable.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-1\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-1\">[1]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: 'Open Sans'; font-size: 17px;\">And likewise, this from Slavoj \u017di\u017eek:<br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino, serif; font-size: 14pt;\">There is something enigmatic in the sudden eclipse of the Althusserian school: it cannot be explained away in terms of a theoretical defeat. It is more as if there were, in Althusser&#8217;s theory, a traumatic kernel which had to be quickly forgotten, &#8216;repressed&#8217;; it is an effective case of theoretical amnesia.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-2\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-2\">[2]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In a much more recent paper, published in 2020, Dolar appears to lament the demise of the critique of ideology, which some might argue is rather ironic bearing in mind that he (and \u017di\u017eek) could be seen as being at least partly responsible for such a crisis in the first place.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-3\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-3\">[3]<\/a><\/sup> And Caren Irr\u2019s remarks regarding the demise of ideological critique at the very moment it is most needed seem particularly apt:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>In universities, analyzing culture and ideology has long been the responsibility of the hermeneutic disciplines\u2026However, in the first decades of the twenty-first century, many of the tools necessary for ideology critique in particular have been dismantled in favor of approaches such as surface reading and the critique of critique. Some of this resistance to critical readings of ideology announces itself as anti-rational and anti-political \u2014 seeing little remaining to the humanities in a period of social crisis beyond the excavation and appreciation of antiquarian curiosities. Other scholarly approaches restrict the \u201cpolitical\u201d (that is, the ideological) to a narrow set of national or subnational themes having no material basis, while still others find too few cultural spaces sufficiently autonomous from capital to allow the project of critique to flourish.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-4\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-4\">[4]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This crisis of the critique of ideology is occurring just as:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Ideology, in all its forms, is proliferating in the twenty-first century. Whether we understand ideology as extreme ideas, the disputed content of political discourse, the institutionalized pragmatism of the status quo, or the spontaneous, embodied, and\/or habitual practices of everyday life, it is ubiquitous and effective. The present far-right nationalist sentiments that seem everywhere on the rise present only its most obvious face.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-5\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-5\">[5]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>But how is it that just as a robust critique of ideology is most needed such a critique is notable by its absence? After all, there has been no lack of intellectual output on the subject from the 1980s onwards, and particularly in the wake of the work of such theoreticians as \u017di\u017eek, Dolar, Laclau and others. In order to attempt to address this question I will focus on an aspect of ideology which Althusser himself can be credited for, that of <em>interpellation<\/em>. I have chosen this topic partly because it has been a longstanding interest of mine (in fact it was through a study of ideology and discourse that I \u2018discovered\u2019 Lacan in the first place) and partly because I think the field of ideology is a prime example of \u2018Lacanian\u2019 attempts of \u2018exorcise\u2019 the spectre of Althusser.<\/p>\n<h4>A Lacanized Marx?<\/h4>\n<p>The fact that David Pav\u00f3n Cu\u00e9llar\u2019s otherwise excellent paper on \u2018Lacanizing Marxism\u2019 never mentions Althusser\u2019s name once is extremely telling; even in 2019, some thirty years after his death, it seems that writers such as Cu\u00e9llar, a self-confessed Marxist, are unable to bring themselves to utter his name. In fact, in the whole of the edition of <em>Crisis and Critique<\/em> dedicated to Lacan\u2019s work, the majority of the references (30 out of 57) occur in one paper,<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-6\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-6\">[6]<\/a><\/sup> and another ten in the Introduction.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-7\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-7\">[7]<\/a><\/sup> However, Cu\u00e9llar\u2019s article is interesting for another reason: his concept of \u2018Lacanian Marxism\u2019 (for which he is a great advocate in his text) and the related concept of \u2018Lacanizing Marxism\u2019. This latter idea refers to the different ways (five of which Cu\u00e9llar outlines in his paper) that Lacanian theory has been used to problematise, historicise, generalise, confirm and\/or complete various aspects of Marxist writings. So, for example, Cu\u00e9llar argues that:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Instead of simply avoiding Marxism by considering it Lacanianly (sic) irrelevant, it is possible to problematise its ideas as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe did by using Lacan to discuss the Marxist conception of the subject, of society or of the working class, as a given empirical being. The Lacanian perspective makes this subject problematic, showing its \u2018precariousness and absence of suture\u2019 and its \u2018ambiguous, incomplete, polysemical\u2019 character as \u2018discursive identity\u2019, which is what makes a \u2018hegemonic articulation\u2019 possible and necessary to \u2018construct nodal points\u2019 that \u2018fix the meaning of the subject\u2019.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-8\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-8\">[8]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>It&#8217;s worth noting here that in his later work Laclau would \u2018Lacanize\u2019 populism as well,<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-9\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-9\">[9]<\/a><\/sup> a focus that is perhaps more pertinent at the current time than worrying about the fate of his \u2018post-Marxism\u2019. However, coming back to Cu\u00e9llar\u2019s article, most of it is devoted to his own attempt to \u2018Lacanize\u2019 Marx through using these five \u2018affirmative effects\u2019 (Cu\u00e9llar\u2019s term), namely, problematisation, historicisation, generalisation, confirmation and completion. The degree to which he achieves such a \u2018Lacanization\u2019 of Marx and Marxist theory is probably best left to the reader to decide, but what interests me far more is the basic concept of \u2018Lacanization\u2019 in the first place; in other words, the idea of using Lacanian ideas to somehow \u2018improve\u2019 and\/or critique Marxist ones. Although Cu\u00e9llar is somewhat scathing about the \u201caverage Lacanian (who) is familiar with at least some of the \u2018mistakes\u2019 of Marxism\u201d,<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-10\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-10\">[10]<\/a><\/sup> especially those who have never actually read any Marx, as I have already indicated he still supports the idea of using Lacanian ideas, albeit in a more sensible and sophisticated manner than some of those \u2018average Lacanians\u2019, in order to \u2018read\u2019 Marx and Marxist theory in a new light:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>When read through a Lacanian lens, Marx and the Marxists are transfigured and shown in a totally different light. It\u2019s almost as if they become others or mad. Suddenly, their speeches are full of nonsense, paradoxes, tensions, uncertainties and enigmas. Their theories are reconfigured. Certain parts are revalued and others are devalued and reduced to absurdity. Some of their lateral ideas become decisive, while their central ideas lose importance. Their seemingly simple and obvious notions cease to seem that way; they become complicated, they move away from common sense, they are carried to their ultimate consequences and reappear with new nuances and an unfathomable depth. It happens that their perspective becomes more solid, radicalises and reinvigorates, acquires greater scope and reveals unexpected aspects. We are surprised again by what no longer surprised us. We stop understanding what we understood perfectly.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-11\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-11\">[11]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>As Cu\u00e9llar notes, reading Marx through a \u2018Lacanian lens\u2019 was never an activity that Lacan himself engaged in; any more than he read Hegel, Saussure, and other authors through such a \u2018lens\u2019. True, he used the ideas of such thinkers in order to develop and illustrate his own theories, but this is not the same as reading them through a particular \u2018lens\u2019. This rather begs the question, therefore, why Cu\u00e9llar himself then proceeds to engage in such a reading. With regards to Lacan\u2019s \u2018reading\u2019 of Marx, as Adrian Johnston points out in his paper on the \u2018very last Lacan\u2019 (which he defines as centred around Seminars XXIV and XXV) Lacan \u201c\u2026particularly starting in the mid-1960s, evinces commitments to a Marxism-indebted materialism as a philosophical position.\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-12\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-12\">[12]<\/a><\/sup> Furthermore, it is clear from Lacan\u2019s teachings that certain \u2018Lacanian\u2019 ideas, for example, surplus jouissance, are based on Marxist ones (in this example, surplus value).<\/p>\n<p>However, I am not advocating a \u2018reverse Lacanization\u2019, that is, using Marxist ideas to problematise, historicise, generalise, confirm and complete Lacanian ideas. Or, rather, not in the way that the \u2018Lacanization\u2019 of Marxism seems to operate. In other words, it is not a case of \u2018re-reading\u2019 Lacan through a Marxist \u2018lens\u2019 any more than it is a case of \u2018re-reading\u2019 Marx through a Lacanian \u2018lens\u2019. Rather, it is a question of examining what Marx and Marxist ideas can bring to the table, so to speak, in order to shed light on some of Lacan\u2019s key ideas.<\/p>\n<h4>Interpellation and its beyond<\/h4>\n<p>In chapter twelve of <em>On the Reproduction of Capitalism<\/em> Althusser outlines his theory of ideology and its central thesis: that ideology interpellates individuals as subjects.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-13\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-13\">[13]<\/a><\/sup> In introducing his main thesis Althusser states:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>This thesis simply comes down to making our last proposition explicit [that ideology has a material existence]: there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects. In other words, there is no ideology except for concrete subjects (such as you and me), and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject: in other words, by the category of the subject and its functioning.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-14\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-14\">[14]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Althusser is using the term \u2018interpellation\u2019 to describe how ideology \u2018hails\u2019 the human subject. One of his well-known examples is when someone is \u2018hailed\u2019 by a police officer in the street (often as a precursor to being arrested). The moment that the police officer shouts \u2018hey, you there!\u2019 the subject in question immediately recognises themselves (and no-one else) as the subject of interest. What interests Althusser is why this happens; in other words, why a particular individual would \u2018recognise\u2019 themselves as the subject of the police officer\u2019s attention. At this point it is important to note that, for Althusser, human individuals are always already subjects:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Since ideology is eternal, we must now suppress the temporal form in which we have represented the functioning of ideology and say: ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects. This ineluctably leads us to one last proposition: <em>individuals are always-already subjects<\/em>.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-15\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-15\">[15]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>What Althusser is getting at here is that although the idea of ideological \u2018hailing\u2019 (interpellation) seems to suggest a temporal sequence (one is hailed and at this point one recognises oneself as a subject) in reality \u201c\u2026things happen <em>without succession<\/em>. <em>The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing<\/em>.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-16\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-16\">[16]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>And for Althusser interpellation is effected through a number of different ideological state apparatuses (ISAs), including the Church, schools, the media, the family, the legal system and so on. Some of these ISAs, for example, the family, would appear to have very little to do with the concept of the \u2018state\u2019 as it is normally understood and would seem instead to reside in the realm of the \u2018private\u2019. However, as Althusser points out, citing Gramsci: \u201cThe distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law, and valid in the (subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its &#8216;authority&#8217;.\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-17\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-17\">[17]<\/a><\/sup> In other words, the distinction between \u2018public\u2019 (state) and \u2018private\u2019 is an artificial (and ideological) construction of the capitalist ruling class.<\/p>\n<p>But the \u2018recognition\u2019 brought about by ideological interpellation is, in fact, a <em>mis-recognition<\/em>. And this links back to Althusser\u2019s first \u2018thesis: that ideology represents individuals\u2019 <em>imaginary relation <\/em>to their real conditions of existence. However, this should not be conceived of in terms of some kind of \u2018false consciousness\u2019, which is often the \u2018standard\u2019 (and na\u00efve) reading of Marx\u2019s concept of ideology. As Althusser explains, the first \u2018version\u2019 of the false consciousness argument, which dates back to the emergence of the concept of ideology in eighteenth century, is based on the idea that a small group of dominant individuals (priests or despots, according to Althusser) forge and disseminate \u2018Beautiful Lies\u2019 to the people so they would believe they were obeying the will of God, whereas in reality they were submitting to the will of the priests and despots (the ruling class). For example, workers in the factories of Victorian England (and indeed well into the twentieth century) experienced horrendous conditions, long hours and little pay, only to be told every Sunday in church that their salvation was yet to come; and, furthermore, they might be at the bottom of the social pile in their own country but they were still vastly superior to the \u2018natives\u2019 in the Empire\u2019s colonies. From a (na\u00efve) Marxist perspective the answer is for such workers to \u2018wake up\u2019 and recognise the reality of their exploitation and to join a trade union and\/or a political party in order to combat it.<\/p>\n<p>The second \u2018version\u2019 is that of Feuerbach, which is taken up by the \u2018early Marx\u2019, and argues that ideological distortion is caused by the material alienation of people\u2019s very existence:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>This is how Marx defends, in <em>The Jewish Question<\/em> and elsewhere, the 100 per cent Feuerbachian idea (enhanced with economic pseudo\u00adconsiderations in the <em>1844 Manuscripts<\/em>) that people devise an alienated (that is, imaginary) representation of their conditions of existence because those conditions of existence are themselves alienating (in the <em>1844 Manuscripts<\/em>: because those conditions are dominated [by] the essence of alienated society: <em>&#8216;alienated labour&#8217;<\/em>).<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-18\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-18\">[18]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>However, and this is the critical point for Althusser, it is not that people (mis)represent, through ideology, their real conditions of existence (exploitation, poverty, and so on), but, rather, their <em>relation<\/em> to such conditions. This might seem a rather subtle distinction (between representation and relation) but as I understand it, what Althusser is getting at here is that in the \u2018na\u00efve\u2019 reading of ideology there is an underlying (material) reality which is \u2018covered over\u2019 and distorted by ideology. This is certainly the case with the first \u2018version\u2019 of the false consciousness argument; with the second \u2018version\u2019 things are a bit more complicated because it is not altogether clear (in my view at least) how the alienating conditions of existence (which \u2018produce\u2019 the ideological distortion) are <em>not<\/em>, in fact, a <em>relation<\/em>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u2026if it is true that the representation of the real conditions of existence of individuals holding posts of agents of production, exploitation, repression, ideologization and scientific practice arises, in the last instance, from the relations of production and relations deriving from them, we may say the following: every ideology represents, in its necessarily imaginary distortion, not the existing relations of production (and the other relations deriving from them) , but, above all, individuals&#8217; (imaginary) relation to the relations of production and the relations deriving from them. What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of real relations governing individuals&#8217; existence, but those individuals&#8217; imaginary relation to the real relations in which they live.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-19\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-19\">[19]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In one sense, of course, it is perfectly true that, in any work environment, be it a factory, a call centre or even a therapy clinic, most workers do not recognise the true (exploitative) conditions of their situation; or if they do then one must assume they have either resigned themselves to it or are hoping to effect change \u2018from within\u2019. In other words, their working situation is distorting their consciousness. But isn\u2019t such a distortion a consequence of the workers\u2019 <em>relationship<\/em> to their work environment? However, as Irr argues in the article I cited earlier, the term \u2018relation\u2019 needs careful consideration. He contends that \u2018relation\u2019 should be read as <em>rapport<\/em>, which is how it appears in Althusser\u2019s French text. Irr notes that in French the primary definitions of the word \u2018rapport\u2019 include bureaucratic reports and commercial profit \u201c\u2026with overtones of interpersonal accord or sexual intimacy.\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-20\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-20\">[20]<\/a><\/sup> This leads Irr to suggest that:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Retaining a fuller set of connotations for rapport illuminates the \u201cimaginary\u201d aspect of Althusser\u2019s theory of ideology, in particular. Listening for rapport prompts an understanding of ideology as a report that emphasizes the individual\u2019s harmonious social situation and intimate life. As Imre Szeman stresses\u2026for Althusser ideology returns the crisis-ridden subject to a default setting where she concludes, no matter the evidence, \u201cso be it\u201d or \u201call is well.\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-21\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-21\">[21]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The critical point here is that ideology constructs an imaginary <em>rapport<\/em> for the subject; that is, an imaginary\/illusory sense of <em>harmony<\/em> with their real conditions of existence. This clearly has strong echoes with Lacan\u2019s contention that there is no sexual rapport, that is, harmony, between the sexes.<\/p>\n<h4>Althusser and Lacan<\/h4>\n<p>Coming back to Althusser\u2019s concept of interpellation, at first sight it might seem to resonate quite powerfully with the Lacanian idea of subject formation, especially if we think of the subject as being \u2018hailed\u2019 by language. In other words, the idea that human subjects are constituted by the human being\u2019s entry into language. However, Dolar argues that the Lacanian subject is, in fact, the result of the <em>failure<\/em> of interpellation:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>To put it in the simplest way, there is a part of the individual that cannot successfully pass into the subject, an element of \u201cpre-ideological\u201d and \u201cpresubjective\u201d <em>materia prima<\/em> that comes to haunt subjectivity once it is constituted as such. A part of external materiality remains that cannot be successfully integrated in the interior. Interpellation was based on a happy transition from a pre-ideological state into ideology: successfully achieved, it wipes out the traces of its origin and results in a belief in the autonomy and self-transparency of the subject.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-22\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-22\">[22]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>More critically, though, the Althusserian \u2018subject\u2019 is not a <em>subject<\/em> at all in the Lacanian sense. Rather, it appears to correspond to Lacan\u2019s idea of the <em>specular ego<\/em>, an imaginary identification with another person (the \u2018little other\u2019). As Carsten Strathausen points out: &#8220;It is obvious that Althusser&#8217;s concept of interpellation rests on the idea of the &#8216;mirror-stage&#8217; as the founding moment of the &#8216;imaginary,&#8217; a theory which Lacan developed in his essay &#8216;The Mirror Stage&#8230;&#8217; &#8220;<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-23\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-23\">[23]<\/a><\/sup> The key point Lacan\u2019s paper, of course, is that the infant child\u2019s identification with its image, the image of a \u2018whole person\u2019, is a way to cover over the <em>hole<\/em>, the <em>void<\/em> that is the human subject.<\/p>\n<p>In fact, later on in his paper, Strathausen discusses Miller&#8217;s theory of suture, which he (Miller) defines as:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u2026the relation of the subject to the chain of its discourse; we shall see that it figures there as the element which is lacking, in the form of a stand-in. For, while there lacking, it is not purely and simply absent. Suture, by extension &#8211; the general relation of lack to the structure of which it is an element, inasmuch as it implies the position of a taking-the-place-of.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-24\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-24\">[24]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>To develop his thesis Miller engages in a detailed analysis of Frege\u2019s argument in <em>Grundlagen der Arithmetik <\/em><sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-25\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-25\">[25]<\/a><\/sup> regarding the genesis of the sequence of whole natural numbers. Miller\u2019s is a complex argument which relies on Frege\u2019s idea that the <em>number<\/em> zero is a \u2018substitute\u2019 or \u2018stand-in\u2019 for the <em>actual<\/em> (or in Miller\u2019s terminology, <em>absolute<\/em>) zero, that is, nothing. From this proposition Frege claims to be able to generate the whole series of natural numbers. But in the process of generating this series of numbers, which are also a series of <em>signifiers<\/em>, something, an object, is excluded, which is what Frege defines \u201cnot identical with itself.\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-26\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-26\">[26]<\/a><\/sup> This (impossible) object is the <em>real<\/em> zero (nothing) as opposed to the <em>number<\/em> zero, which, we recall, is the \u2018stand-in\u2019 for the actual, impossible object. And it is this impossible object that Miller names as the <em>subject<\/em>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The impossible object, which the discourse of logic summons as the not-identical with itself and then rejects as the pure negative, which it summons and rejects in order to constitute itself as that which it is, which it summons and <em>rejects wanting to know nothing of it<\/em>, we name this object, in so far as it functions as the excess which operates in the series of numbers, the subject.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-27\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-27\">[27]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>What Miller appears to be doing here is trying to demonstrate how it is possible for the subject to both appear and disappear (be excluded) at the same time. But more importantly, perhaps, he is formulating the <em>logic of the signifier<\/em>, which he defines as \u201c\u2026the relation of lack to the trait (the signifier).\u201d<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-28\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-28\">[28]<\/a><\/sup> If I understand Miller correctly, what he is arguing is that Frege\u2019s logic, that is, the logic that leads to the construction of the series of natural numbers, is <em>precisely<\/em> the logic of the signifier. In the process of suturing, the subject appears both as a <em>stand-in<\/em> (in Fregean logic repeated iterations of zero as <em>number<\/em>) and as <em>excluded<\/em>, the impossible object, which is the subject of the unconscious. This is represented, according to Miller, by \ua7a8A, which is the subject excluded from the field of the Other.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-29\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-29\">[29]<\/a><\/sup> As Strathausen notes: \u201cSuture, thus, names the process by which the subject identifies itself with itself as the nonidentical; it identifies with the lack as the result of its failed representation.\u201d <sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-30\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-30\">[30]<\/a><\/sup> In other words, the subject that emerges within the chain of signifiers is a \u2018stand-in\u2019 for the excluded subject of the Real. The function of ideological interpellation is the create the \u2018fiction\u2019 of subjects within a unified totalised field, and although it does not constitute the subject &#8220;&#8230;it nonetheless provides the space for it to emerge as a lack and simultaneously tries to cover this lack again&#8230;&#8221;<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-31\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-31\">[31]<\/a><\/sup> Furthermore:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The inevitable failure of ideological interpellation \u2026results in a lack. Ideology attempts to mask this lack through a fantasy, which again works through identification. This implies that every ideological edifice (i.e., the idea of Society as an organic Whole) &#8220;knows&#8221; about its own impossibility (the fact that it will never become real) and thus always invents a fantasy which explains in advance its inevitable failure.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-32\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-32\">[32]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Here Strathausen is drawing upon \u017di\u017eek\u2019s arguments regarding the impossibility of the totalitarian (totalising) aim of ideology, which is linked closely the idea of the \u2018impossibility of society\u2019. According to \u017di\u017eek ideology creates the fantasy of the social whilst recognising the impossibility of the social; an idea, according to Strathausen, that Althusser himself would have rejected. However, this seems to be based on a misrepresentation of Althusser\u2019s concept of ideology, which in works such as <em>For Marx<\/em> he equates with philosophy and contrasts with (Marxist) science.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-33\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-33\">[33]<\/a><\/sup> Althusser is well aware that ideology creates the illusion of totality which sustains our everyday practices and social relations. Marxist Theory (with a capital T),<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-34\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-34\">[34]<\/a><\/sup> on the other hand, is able to recognise the functioning of ideology, that is, of sustaining capitalist relations. This implies, of course, that Marxist theorists such as Althusser are able to \u2018step outside\u2019 of ideology to the extent of being able to recognise both its existence and operation.<\/p>\n<h4>Post-Althusserianism and its apologists<\/h4>\n<p>And perhaps this is at the root of the desire to exorcise Althusser\u2019s ghost that I touched upon earlier. The idea that it is possible to \u2018step outside\u2019 of ideology in order to reveal its nature and operation is at the heart of the \u2018critique of ideology\u2019; otherwise such a critique is itself ideological. Now, as I noted above, Althusser himself was very critical of the \u2018false consciousness\u2019 concept of ideology; rather, his interest was in trying to understand how ideology actually works. But gaining such an understanding does not in itself imply that there is a \u2018way out\u2019 of ideology; anymore than, from a psychoanalytic position, there is a \u2018way out\u2019 of the fantasies that govern our day-to-day lives.<\/p>\n<p>As I indicated earlier, the \u2018way out\u2019 of ideological mystification for Althusser is through Marxist Theory, that is, historical materialism. The problem, however, that he was developing these ideas at the very moment (the mid-1960s onwards) that Marxism, both as a theory and a political practice, was being called into serious question. Many European Marxists were reeling from the Soviet Union\u2019s suppression of the uprisings in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the revelations regarding the true nature and extent of Stalin\u2019s crimes in the 1930s. Furthermore, the deeply theoretical nature of Althusser\u2019s work was the antithesis of the spontaneity and anarchism of the \u2018events of 68\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>But this is only half the story; because from the ashes of Marxist theory a whole new corpus of thought emerged, which often (and erroneously in my view) gets labelled \u2018post-structuralism\u2019. I say \u2018erroneously\u2019 because as Johannes Angermuller argues in his book <em>Why there is no Poststructuralism in France <\/em> the terms was essentially an invention of the North American Academy in the 1970s.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-35\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-35\">[35]<\/a><\/sup> More specifically, it was an invention of certain English Literature departments within the Academy and before long also found its way into cultural studies\u2019 departments. As the title of his book suggests, in France the term \u2018poststructuralism\u2019 has hardly ever been recognised, and none of the so-called \u2018poststructuralist\u2019 thinkers (Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, and so on) would ever have recognised this label during their own lifetime. But this is not the end of the story. For not only was the idea of poststructuralism invented in North America but it was soon \u2018exported\u2019 back across the Atlantic and found fertile ground in the humanities and cultural studies\u2019 departments of many European universities.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-36\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-36\">[36]<\/a><\/sup> And at this point it is perhaps worth mentioning the fate of Lacanian theory itself, which became one of post-structuralism\u2019s many casualties. This is something Lydia Liu highlights in her book <em>The Freudian Robot<\/em> where she argues that Lacan\u2019s ideas were captured by \u2018French Theory\u2019 (her term for post-structuralism), which has very little to do with actual French theory but is rather the product of the aforementioned North American Academy.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-37\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-37\">[37]<\/a><\/sup> This capture saw the emergence of what might be best described as the \u2018Saussurian Lacan\u2019, that is, Lacan read through the \u2018lens\u2019 of structural linguistics, which also seems to be linked to the idea of \u2018anti-essentialism\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>The latter term often seems to be a euphemism for <em>anti-materialism<\/em>, although just to complicate things Laclau and Mouffe argued that Marx was, in fact, an <em>idealist<\/em> because he still retained the Hegelian notion of the Real as rational and because of this Marx\u2019s historical \u2018materialism\u2019 is, in fact, historical <em>idealism<\/em>, because it is based on being able to \u2018grasp\u2019 the objective laws of History, which are in the realm of the <em>form<\/em>.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-38\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-38\">[38]<\/a><\/sup> A true materialism, argue Laclau and Mouffe, would recognise that the ultimate reality of objects is not constituted by the fixed form (the idealist position), which can also be theorised in terms of <em>essences<\/em>; rather, such a reality must be:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>&#8230;founded on a systematic weakening of form, which consists in showing the historical, contingent and constructed character of the <em>being<\/em> of objects; and in showing that this depends on the reinsertion of that being in the ensemble of relational conditions which constitute the life of a society as a whole.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-39\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-39\">[39]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In other words, \u2018ultimate reality\u2019 is <em>relational<\/em> not <em>essentialist<\/em>, that is, based on <em>objective forms<\/em>. Furthermore, according to Laclau and Mouffe, essentialism is in fact both <em>idealist<\/em> and <em>realist<\/em>, in the sense such forms have an objective reality (even though such a reality resides in an \u2018objective mind\u2019), and a great deal of Marxist \u2018materialism\u2019 falls into this category. On this basis I think it is reasonable to argue that Laclau and Mouffe\u2019s \u2018materialism\u2019 would be better described as a form of <em>social constructionism<\/em> and what they define, and criticise, as \u2018idealism\u2019 might be better described as <em>(critical) realism<\/em>.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-40\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-40\">[40]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>I do not have the space in this text to explore the concept of social constructionism and its relation to realism, but I would strongly recommend Dave Elder-Vass\u2019s <em>The Reality of Social Constructionism<\/em> as an excellent introduction to the key arguments.<sup><a id=\"post-5828-footnote-ref-41\" href=\"#post-5828-footnote-41\">[41]<\/a><\/sup> But put very simplistically, realists maintain that there is an objective reality beyond human thought, whereas social constructionists maintain either that there is no such distinction or, if there is, because such an \u2018objective\u2019 reality is beyond representation and comprehension, it is of no consequence. At this point we need to remind ourselves of Laclau and Mouffe\u2019s assertion that the essence of idealism is <em>not<\/em> that there is no \u2018objective reality\u2019, but rather that there is an <em>identification between human thought and objective form<\/em>. Such an identification allows the (rational) human mind to comprehend such objective and universal forms which reside in a transcendental reality. Now it should be clear that in this approach to ontology, human thought plays a critical role in comprehending reality, and therefore it follows that language must also place a critical role. What does <em>not<\/em> follow, however, is the idea that reality can be \u2018reduced\u2019 to human thought, which is basically what radical social constructionists (and here I would include Laclau and Mouffe) are arguing for. If there is no objective reality beyond human thought, that is, beyond language and discourse, then clearly reality (including the human subject itself) is a social construction, that is, a construction of language and discourse.<\/p>\n<p>Returning now to the concept of a \u2018Lacanized Marx\u2019, in my view a great deal of such \u2018Lacanization\u2019 depends on the type of anti-essentialist\/social constructionist ontology outlined above. Such an approach would clearly have been anathema to Althusser who, in spite of the density (and wordiness) of his theory, still believed in a reality beyond language; a reality that could be reached through the correct application of Marxist Theory (historical materialism). But as I pointed out earlier, it would seem that the tide of history (and especially the history of ideas) was firmly against him\u2026until now, that is&#8230;<\/p>\n<h4>Notes and references<\/h4>\n<ol>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-1\">Mladen Dolar, \u201cBeyond Interpellation,\u201d <em>Qui Parle<\/em> 6, no. 2 (1993), 75. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-1\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-2\">Slavoj \u017di\u017eek, <em>The Sublime Object of Ideology<\/em>, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2008), xxiii-xxiv. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-2\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-3\">Mladen Dolar, \u201cLifting the Veil,\u201d <em>South Atlantic Quarterly<\/em> 119, no. 4 (October 1, 2020): 671\u201380. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-3\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-4\">Caren Irr, \u201cIntroduction: An Althusser for the Twenty-First Century,\u201d <em>Mediations | Journal of the Marxist Literary Group (Online Publication)<\/em> 30, no. 2 (2017),29-30. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-4\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-5\">Ibid., 29. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-5\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-6\">Gabriel Tupinamb\u00e1, \u201c\u2018Pandora\u2019s Box Has Been Opened\u2019: Lacanian Psychoanalysis and Politics after 2017,\u201d <em>Crisis and Critique<\/em> 6, no. 1 (2019): 340\u201363. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-6\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-7\">Frank Ruda and Agon Hamza, \u201cJacques Lacan: Psychoanalysis, Politics, Philosophy,\u201d <em>Crisis and Critique<\/em> 6, no. 1 (2019): 4\u20139. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-7\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-8\">Cu\u00e9llar, \u2018Lacanizing Marxism\u2019, 265-266. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-8\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-9\">A topic that I have discussed <a href=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/?s=Laclau\">in a number of other postings<\/a> <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-9\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-10\">Ibid., 264. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-10\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-11\">Ibid., 265. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-11\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-12\">Adrian Johnston, \u201cLacan\u2019s Endgame: Philosophy, Science, and Religion in the Final Seminars,\u201d <em>Crisis and Critique<\/em> 6, no. 1 (2019): 159. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-12\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-13\">Louis Althusser, <em>On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses<\/em> (London: Verso, 2014). An abridged version of this chapter along with extracts from other chapters in the book formed the basis of <em>Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards and Investigation)<\/em> which up until the French publication of <em>On the Reproduction of Capitalism<\/em> in 1995 and the English translation in 2014 was the main reference source for Althusser\u2019s theory of ideology. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-13\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-14\">Ibid., 188. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-14\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-15\">Ibid., 192, italics in original. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-15\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-16\">Ibid., 191, italics in original. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-16\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-17\">Ibid., 244. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-17\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-18\">Ibid., 182, italics in original. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-18\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-19\">Ibid., 183. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-19\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-20\">Irr, \u201cAn Althusser for the Twenty-First Century\u201d, 32. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-20\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-21\">Ibid., 32. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-21\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-22\">Dolar, <em>Beyond Interpellation<\/em>, 77. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-22\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-23\">Carsten Strathausen, \u201cAlthusser\u2019s Mirror,\u201d <em>Studies in 20th Century Literature<\/em>, Article 7, 18, no. 1 (1994), 66. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-23\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-24\">Jacques-Alain Miller, \u2018Suture (Elements of the Logic of the Signifier)\u2019, <em>Screen<\/em>, 18.4 (1977), 25-26. Interestingly, a version of this formed a presentation by Miller in Lesson 9 of Seminar XII. However, this section is missing, at least in Gallagher\u2019s translation. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-24\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-25\">Gottlob Frege, <em>The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number<\/em> (New York: Harper &amp; Brothers, 1953). <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-25\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-26\">Frege, <em>Foundations of Arithmetic<\/em>, 88. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-26\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-27\">Miller, \u2018Suture\u2019, 32, italics in original. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-27\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-28\">Ibid., 32. \u201cIf we now determine the trait as the signifier, and ascribe to the number the position of the signified, the relation of lack to the trait should be considered the logic of the signifier.\u201d <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-28\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-29\">I give a much fuller account of Miller\u2019s reading of Frege in my book <em>Traumatic Neurosis Revisited<\/em> (Palgrave, 2025), forthcoming. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-29\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-30\">Strathausen, \u201cAlthusser\u2019s Mirror\u201d, 69. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-30\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-31\">Ibid., 69. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-31\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-32\">Ibid., 70. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-32\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-33\">Louis Althusser, <em>For Marx<\/em>, E-book edition (London: Verso, 2005). <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-33\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-34\">In <em>For Marx<\/em> Althusser states:I shall call Theory (with a capital T), general theory, that is, the Theory of practice in general, itself elaborated on the basis of the Theory of existing theoretical practices (of the sciences), which transforms into \u2018knowledges\u2019 (scientific truths) the ideological product of existing \u2018empirical\u2019 practices (the concrete activity of men). This Theory is the materialist dialectic which is none other than dialectical materialism. Op. cit., 168. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-34\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-35\">Johannes Angermuller, <em>Why There Is No Poststructuralism in France The Making of an Intellectual Generation<\/em> (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-35\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-36\">Interestingly, Angermuller includes thinkers such as Slavoj \u017di\u017eek and Alain Badiou amongst these European \u2018poststructuralists\u2019, which is somewhat ironic bearing in mind that \u017di\u017eek in particular would be the first to renounce such a label. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-36\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-37\">Lydia H. Liu, <em>The Freudian Robot: Digital Media and the Future of the Unconscious<\/em> (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010). <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-37\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-38\">Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, \u201cPost-Marxism without Apologies,\u201d <em>New Left Review<\/em> 166 (1987): 79\u2013106. I explore the whole question of Lacan\u2019s alleged \u2018anti-essentialism\u2019 <a href=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/2021\/12\/23\/a-materialist-lacan\/\">in my article A Materialist Lacan?<\/a> <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-38\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-39\">Ibid., 91, italics in original. <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-39\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-40\">By \u2018critical realism\u2019 I am thinking especially of the work of Roy Bhaskar and colleagues. See for example: Roy Bhaskar, <em>A Realist Theory of Science<\/em>, Rev. ed. (London: Routledge, 2008). <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-40\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"post-5828-footnote-41\">Dave Elder-Vass, <em>The Reality of Social Construction<\/em> (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2012). <a href=\"#post-5828-footnote-ref-41\">\u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>&nbsp; Introduction To paraphrase Marx, there is a spectre haunting Lacanian psychoanalysis \u2013 the spectre of Louis Althusser. And behind Althusser, of course, there is Marx himself\u2026In this article I will begin to make the case for a (long overdue) Lacanian \u2018return to Althusser\u2019, which I believe is urgently required &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[34,141,401],"class_list":["post-5828","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ideology-and-discourse","tag-althusser","tag-interpellation","tag-post-structuralism"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5828","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5828"}],"version-history":[{"count":13,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5828\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5914,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5828\/revisions\/5914"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5828"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5828"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5828"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}