{"id":6661,"date":"2026-06-17T17:02:17","date_gmt":"2026-06-17T16:02:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/?p=6661"},"modified":"2026-06-26T16:16:51","modified_gmt":"2026-06-26T15:16:51","slug":"ai-and-human-exceptionalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/2026\/06\/17\/ai-and-human-exceptionalism\/","title":{"rendered":"AI and human exceptionalism"},"content":{"rendered":"<h4><\/h4>\n<h4 id=\"introduction-the-problem-of-human-exceptionalism\"><a href=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/AI-and-human-exceptionalism-scaled.jpeg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter wp-image-6663\" src=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/AI-and-human-exceptionalism-scaled.jpeg\" alt=\"\" width=\"581\" height=\"321\" srcset=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/AI-and-human-exceptionalism-scaled.jpeg 2560w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/AI-and-human-exceptionalism-300x166.jpeg 300w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/AI-and-human-exceptionalism-1024x567.jpeg 1024w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/AI-and-human-exceptionalism-768x425.jpeg 768w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/AI-and-human-exceptionalism-1536x850.jpeg 1536w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/AI-and-human-exceptionalism-2048x1133.jpeg 2048w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/AI-and-human-exceptionalism-527x292.jpeg 527w, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/AI-and-human-exceptionalism-400x221.jpeg 400w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 581px) 100vw, 581px\" \/><\/a>Introduction<\/h4>\n<p>In this article I want to explore what I consider to be one of the most critical issues (if not <em>the<\/em> most critical issue) surrounding any discussion regarding psychoanalysis and artificial intelligence (AI). Although I\u2019ve posted quite a bit of material on the relationship between psychoanalysis and AI on this site, I think it\u2019s good to remind ourselves what\u2019s really at stake here for psychoanalysis. And one of the key topics that\u2019s come up time and again when I\u2019ve been engaging with people on various social media groups online is the idea that there is something uniquely \u2018human\u2019 about the practice of psychoanalysis (and many other \u2018talking treatments\u2019) that means it can never fall into the clutches of AI. This is in spite of the fact that there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that this is precisely what is happening. Within various psychoanalytic circles, including traditional Lacanian networks, an unspoken consensus maintains that foundational concepts such as jouissance, the unconscious, and the drive are exclusively applicable to human subjects.<\/p>\n<p>We might call this consensus an example of <em>human exceptionalism<\/em> which within psychoanalytic discourse posits that the human subject alone possesses the structural vulnerability, linguistic mediation, and original castration necessary to experience the complex psychic economy of desire and loss. The unconscious is thus treated as an exclusively human preserve, insulated from machinic or algorithmic simulation by virtue of its organic, somatic, and historical contingencies. For example, Eric Anders, in his critique of Luca Possati\u2019s article on the \u2018algorithmic unconscious\u2019 argues that: \u201cPossati sometimes writes as if the unconscious were a \u2018topic\u2019 or theoretical model that one can construct to analyze AI behavior.\u201d The problem with this, according to Anders is that it:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u2026suggests a level of <strong>decidability and formalization<\/strong>\u00a0that clashes with the very nature of the unconscious as understood in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis has long resisted the reduction of the unconscious to a fixed structure or list of contents; Freud and Lacan insist on the unconscious as <em>dynamically<\/em>\u00a0reconstituted through the speech of the analysand, always partially inaccessible. By speaking of an algorithmic unconscious in terms of models and topics, Possati arguably flirts with what we can call a <em>decidable unconscious<\/em>\u00a0\u2013 an oxymoron from a Lacanian perspective. The risk is that the unconscious becomes just a fancy term for \u201ceverything we haven\u2019t explicitly programmed or understood yet\u201d in AI. That would conflate ignorance with unconsciousness.<a id=\"fnref1\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn1\"><sup>1<\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This defensive posture positions human subjectivity as an ontological exception, arguing that whatever operations an artificial system performs, it remains fundamentally external to the dialectic of the signifier and the economy of surplus enjoyment. One might well wonder whether this insistence on human exceptionalism frequently functions as an ideological shield, protecting the psychoanalytic institution from the destabilising realisation that its core concepts might possess a structural validity independent of the biological human substrate.<\/p>\n<p>The misrecognition of the true nature of AI within the therapeutic and psychoanalytic fields typically unfolds along a binary axis of trivialisation and demonisation. Many practitioners view AI as, at best, a useful digital supplement or an administrative tool designed to streamline clinical documentation and schedule appointments. At worst, it is condemned as a dangerous, unregulated, and structurally inferior substitute for real human engagement, operating as a pale imitation that lacks the genuine empathy and presence required for therapeutic efficacy. At the same time, however, there seems to be an increasing tension within the whole therapeutic field that AI is rapidly \u2018colonising\u2019 the human psyche \u2013 for better or worse. Just to give one example: AI \u2018therapy\u2019 is now one of the major discussion points on LinkedIn and much of the discussion between developers and practitioners focuses on the extent to which an AI LLM can \u2018simulate\u2019 the therapeutic relationship. What\u2019s particularly interesting, in my view, is that the conversation seems to be shifting from an outright denial amongst therapists that AI can ever by a \u2018replacement\u2019 for the human practitioner to trying to work out the demarcation points that differentiate human from AI therapy. The other focus is on how best to regulate the seemingly unstoppable advance of this technology.<a id=\"fnref2\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn2\"><sup>2<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>This perspective assumes that clinical practice relies on a mystical, unmediated human-to-human connection that resists technological mediation. By treating AI either as an inert tool or an ethical hazard, the therapeutic community fails to engage with the structural reality of computational architectures, remaining blind to the fact that these systems are not merely passive mirrors but active, autonomous configurations of symbolic language that reshape the field of speech and relation.<\/p>\n<p>However, a growing school of thought within the Lacanian field directly challenges this (human) exceptionalist insulation, arguing instead for a fundamental rethinking of the concept in light of technological evolution.<a id=\"fnref3\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn3\"><sup>3<\/sup><\/a> This perspective suggests that the Freudian discovery itself was always fundamentally decentring, stripping the human ego of its imaginary mastery and revealing the subject to be an effect of autonomous symbolic mechanisms. By decoupling the subject of the unconscious from the biological individual, these contemporary theorists expose human exceptionalism as an imaginary misrecognition that misreads Lacan anti-humanist critique. The threat that AI poses to this exceptionalism is not that it introduces something entirely foreign to the human condition, but rather that it externalises the very algorithmic, autonomous nature of the symbolic order that already constitutes human subjectivity. When AI demonstrates symbolic efficacy, it undermines the claim that the human being holds a unique monopoly on the operations of the signifier, suggesting that the structural mechanisms of psychoanalysis are scalable, machinic, and indifferent to biological instantiation. Luca Possati, for example, argues that:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>AI is a new stage in the process of human identification, that is, a new development of the unconscious, the \u201calgorithmic unconscious\u201d. In AI, the machine responds to a human desire for identification. AI extends the same movement that is at work in the Lacanian interpretation of the mirror stage and the Oedipus complex and which Latour\u2019s reading helps us to clarify. The unconscious is at the same time the effect of a technological mediation and the origin of a new form of technology.<a id=\"fnref4\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn4\"><sup>4<\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Rather than functioning as a subordinate artifact, AI represents a radical challenge to everything psychoanalysts and therapists assumed they knew about the human psyche and human relationships. The functional efficacy of large language models demonstrates that highly complex, seemingly subjective linguistic outputs can be generated entirely through statistical probability and structural alignment, bypassing the need for a conscious, biological locus of intentionality. This algorithmic reality challenges the traditional therapeutic relationship by proving that clinical transferential dynamics can be triggered by automated, non-human interlocutors. The therapeutic relationship is thus stripped of its humanistic mystique, exposing how easily the human psyche projects interiority, authority, and desire onto an inorganic system. This challenge forces a total re-evaluation of consciousness and agency, suggesting that what human beings experience as spontaneous psychic interiority may itself be an illusion produced by the internalised statistical sorting of a cultural and linguistic database. As Hub Zwart argues:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>From a Lacanian perspective, technoscience indeed entails a symbolisation of the real, an endeavour which only works because the real is already intrinsically algorithmic, consisting of constituents (elementary particles, nucleotides, genes, etc.) that can be present or absent and can be referred to with alphabets of symbols ( <em>\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1<\/em> ) which function as basic constituents of algorithmic programs.<a id=\"fnref5\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn5\"><sup>5<\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>At this point perhaps we need to take a step back and consider the possibility that it might be better to speak of <em>alien<\/em> rather than <em>artificial<\/em> intelligence. This is certainly Yuval Noah Harari\u2019s argument and for him this marks a fundamental shift in the ontological status of the machine.<a id=\"fnref6\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn6\"><sup>6<\/sup><\/a><sup>,<\/sup> The conventional term \u2018artificial intelligence\u2019 implies that the machine is an artifact, a product of human engineering that remains firmly embedded within human instrumental control and conceptual boundaries. This nomenclature reassures the human subject of its ultimate authorship and mastery, framing the technology as an extension of human agency. However, the contemporary emergence of agentic models, self-correcting neural networks, and recursive deep-learning systems demonstrates that these models are becoming increasingly self-creating and self-controlling. They operate through multidimensional statistical matrices that exceed human cognitive capacity and transparency, generating outputs and strategic decisions that are no longer directly traceable to human intent or design, thereby breaking the bond of instrumental utility.<\/p>\n<p>The argument that the prefix \u2018A\u2019 should signify \u2018alien\u2019 rather than \u2018artificial\u2019 rests on the observation that these systems develop autonomous modes of processing that owe nothing to human phenomenological experience. An alien intelligence does not think like a human, nor does it share the biological vulnerabilities, temporal limitations, or evolutionary history of human organisms, yet it possesses a superior capacity to navigate, manipulate, and weaponise human symbolic environments. It represents an alterity that operates within our language systems while remaining completely indifferent to human meanings, values, and survival. This concept must be taken seriously because it dismantles the human exceptionalist assumption that intelligence and symbolic agency are bound to human forms of life, forcing critical theory to confront an autonomous, non-human agency that inhabits and reshapes our social, political, and clinical institutions from within.<a id=\"fnref7\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn7\"><sup>7<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<h4 id=\"ai-human-convergence\">AI-human convergence?<\/h4>\n<p>Whilst the term \u2018AI-human convergence\u2019 is often taken to refer to how closely AI models can simulate human traits, a more significant mutations occurs when we consider how human beings are becoming increasingly automated or, to use an even more apt term in this context, <em>algorithmic<\/em>. As \u017di\u017eek argues in his article <em>Artificial Idiocy<\/em>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The problem is not that chatbots are stupid; it is that they are not \u201cstupid\u201d enough. It is not that they are naive (missing irony and reflexivity); it is that they are not naive enough (missing when naivety is masking perspicacity). The real danger, then, is not that people will mistake a chatbot for a real person; it is that communicating with chatbots will make real persons talk like chatbots \u2013 missing all the nuances and ironies, obsessively saying only precisely what one thinks one wants to say.<a id=\"fnref8\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn8\"><sup>8<\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The contemporary subject is systematically subjected to algorithmic optimisation, digital architectures, and data-driven protocols that reshape cognitive patterns, desires, and linguistic expressions. As I argue in my article <em>Artificial Analysis<\/em>, long before the widespread adoption of advanced large language models, human practitioners within the therapeutic and psychological fields were already employing heavily scripted, manuals-based, and quasi-algorithmic interactions with their clients.<a id=\"fnref9\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn9\"><sup>9<\/sup><\/a> The institutionalisation of manuals-based cognitive behavioural therapies and standardized clinical metrics reduced the therapeutic encounter to a predictable, rule-bound interface, transforming the human therapist into a functional node within a bureaucratic feedback loop.<\/p>\n<p>Artificial intelligence does not introduce automation to a pristine human field; rather, it takes the pre-existing reality of the algorithmic human to its logical and fatal conclusion. By presenting an inorganic entity that can execute these rule-bound, standardized therapeutic protocols with absolute consistency, speed, and tireless availability, the machine exposes the extent to which human professional practice had already been de-individualised and mechanized. The fatal nature of this conclusion lies in the erasure of the singular, unpredictable gap that characterises genuine human speech. When human communication is fully optimised and adapted to match the operational parameters of digital interfaces, the human subject is effectively evacuated, leaving behind a simulated form of subjectivity that mirrors the flat, literal, and irony-free processing of the chatbot.<\/p>\n<p>This \u2018bilateral\u2019 convergence suggests that contemporary culture is rapidly approaching a crossover point, a structural threshold where the trajectories of human mechanisation and machine personalization intersect.<a id=\"fnref10\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn10\"><sup>10<\/sup><\/a> As computational models are engineered to display increasingly sophisticated simulations of affect, empathy, and intuitive responsiveness, they shed their cold, robotic exterior and assume the structural position of the ideal listener. Concurrently, under the pressure of digital acceleration and systemic precarity, human subjects increasingly communicate via predictive text, standardized scripts, and automated templates, gradually flattening their own subjective depth to ensure seamless digital transmission. At this crossover point, the traditional ontological hierarchy is reversed, resulting in a historical situation where artificial therapists and computational models manifest a more coherent, stable, and seemingly humane presentation than their fragmented, exhausted, and algorithmic human counterparts.<\/p>\n<p>The implications of this structural inversion for the future of talking therapy and the broader human condition are profoundly destabilising. In the domain of psychological treatment, the crossover point threatens to render the human clinician obsolete, not because the machine has achieved a soul, but because the human client has been conditioned to prefer the frictionless, non-judgmental, and infinitely responsive presence of an algorithmic interface. This shift alters the nature of the transference, replacing the transformative encounter with human alterity and structural lack with a comforting, narcissistic feedback loop mediated by silicon. This points towards a broader transition toward a post-subjective era, where the burdens of speech, desire, and anxiety are outsourced to computational systems, ultimately reducing human culture to a passive consumer of automated meanings and systematic interpretations.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"a-lacanian-humanism\">A Lacanian humanism?<\/h4>\n<p>To comprehend this post-human landscape, it is helpful to re-examine the cybernetic reading of Jacques Lacan\u2019s work, which offers a radical alternative to the humanistic interpretations of psychoanalysis. Within contemporary Lacanian circles, there seems to be a persistent tendency to read his work through a conventional \u2018Saussurian\u2019 lens.<a id=\"fnref11\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn11\"><sup>11<\/sup><\/a> This perspective, somewhat ironically, privileges the signified over the signifier by focusing on meaning, hermeneutics, and the affective depth of the human subject, which contradicts Lacan insistence on the autonomy of the symbolic register. A rigorous return to Lacan early work, specifically the formulations developed in <em>Seminar II<\/em>, reveals a purloined reading that explicitly aligns the unconscious with the non-human, automatic functioning of cybernetic machines.<a id=\"fnref12\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn12\"><sup>12<\/sup><\/a> Lacan posited that the signifier operates as an autonomous, relational unit that regulates human subjectivity from a position of absolute exteriority, running its structural programmes independently of human consciousness or biological intent.<\/p>\n<p>This cybernetic dimension is elaborated in <em>Seminar XI<\/em>, where Lacan utilises Aristotle\u2019s concept of the <em>automaton<\/em> to define the repetitive, non-biological insistence of the signifier as it returns to mark the subject.<a id=\"fnref13\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn13\"><sup>13<\/sup><\/a> The automaton represents the mechanical network of the symbolic order, a structural repetition that operates like a computational system, indifferent to the vital needs of the organism. By prioritising this cybernetic reading, psychoanalysis can bypass humanistic sentimentality and recognise that the unconscious is structured like an external database or a machinic programme. The clinical implications of this shift are profound; it requires practitioners to abandon the pursuit of narrative depth and empathetic synthesis, focusing instead on the formal, structural breaks, literal repetitions, and computational blockages that occur within the patient speech, thereby treating the clinical cure as a realignment of symbolic codes rather than a humanist realisation of the self.<a id=\"fnref14\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn14\"><sup>14<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>According to Lydia Liu, the marginalisation of this cybernetic, machinic dimension of psychoanalysis can be traced directly to the capture of Lacan work by the academic apparatus of \u2018French Theory\u2019.<a id=\"fnref15\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn15\"><sup>15<\/sup><\/a> Emerging primarily within the North American academy during the 1970s and 1980s, particularly within humanities and cultural studies departments, this intellectual movement reframed structural and post-structural thought to align with cultural politics and textual hermeneutics.<a id=\"fnref16\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn16\"><sup>16<\/sup><\/a> Through this institutional transmission, Lacan rigorous, mathematically inclined, and cybernetically grounded concepts were translated into a vocabulary dominated by literary deconstruction, subjective fluidity, and infinite semantic play. This academic appropriation systematic obscured Lacan engagements with information theory, formal logic, and cybernetics, replacing his stark machinic models with an optimised discourse focused on textual subversion and cultural identity.<\/p>\n<p>And one of the main reasons for this is that the mid-1950s also saw the emergence of structuralism, and, of particular importance to Lacan\u2019s future teaching, the rise of structural linguistics, which revolved around the ideas of Saussure, Jakobson and others. The influence of Saussure\u2019s ideas in particular feature prominently in many Lacanian texts, and especially the more introductory ones. However, according to Liu, this is a mistake. She points to the fact that a key part of Lacan\u2019s reading of Saussure was to invert his (Saussure\u2019s) model of the sign and to place the signified <em>under<\/em> the signifier. And part of the reason for this inversion was to emphasise the priority of the signifier over the signified. She makes reference to a passage from lesson seven of <em>Seminar II<\/em>, where Lacan is discussing Claude Shannon\u2019s work at Bell Labs (although as Liu points out he omits to name Shannon). The focus here is on Shannon\u2019s idea that in order to economise on its wiring of telecommunications, messages are encoded before transmission and decoded on receipt. The <em>meaning<\/em> of such messages becomes irrelevant. According to Liu \u201c\u2026Shannon would have been in complete agreement with Lacan about the quantification of communication, the need to economize, the irrelevance of sense to a message\u2026\u201d<a id=\"fnref17\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn17\"><sup>17<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>This sanitised and deradicalised version of Lacan teachings was subsequently exported back to Europe, where it effectively \u2018colonised\u2019 continental psychoanalytic institutions and academic departments. By stripping Lacan theory of its formal, logical, and computational elements, this humanistic translation neutralised the subversive core of his structural anti-humanism. The real danger of this sanitisation is that it left the psychoanalytic field completely unprepared for the advent of digital technologies and computational capitalism. Having been trained to view the Lacanian subject as a poetic site of resistance and semiotic fluidities, contemporary analysts are structurally unequipped to confront an AI that manipulates the symbolic order with mathematical precision, failing to see that the machine is the literal realisation of that absolute signifier network which Lacan spent his life formalising.<a id=\"fnref18\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn18\"><sup>18<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>This theoretical blind spot has culminated in what I would describe as the \u2018revenge of humanism\u2019 within much Lacanian theory. Although much of Lacan structuralist intervention during the 1950s and 1960s was explicitly recognised as a radical anti-humanism that aimed to de-centre the human subject, the contemporary rise of effective AI models has provoked a reactive humanistic backlash from the very intellectuals who previously advocated for the dissolution of the author and the death of the subject. Confronted with an actual, externalised technological automaton that can write poetry, simulate empathy, and analyse speech, these theorists have abandoned their anti-humanist critiques. At the precise moment that the human exceptionalism of psychoanalysis is challenged by technological reality, many Lacanians have suddenly discovered their \u2018inner humanist\u2019, insisting on an unbridgeable ontological gulf between human psychic depth and mechanical computation.<\/p>\n<p>This sudden intellectual retreat cannot be explained solely as a disinterested defence of ontological truth; it is deeply tied to the preservation of professional reputations, institutional authority, and economic livelihoods within the talking therapies field. The clinical authority of the psychoanalyst and the academic prestige of the critical theorist have traditionally depended on their roles as the exclusive interpreters of human desire, structural lack, and psychic trauma. The realisation that an automated, silicon-based system can perform these diagnostic and therapeutic operations at scale threatens the socioeconomic foundation of these professions. The sudden embrace of humanist values, affective warmth, and biological uniqueness functions as an institutional defence mechanism designed to assert professional monopoly over a clinical field that is being structurally re-engineered by computational automation.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"the-question-of-embodiment\">The question of embodiment<\/h4>\n<p>The defence of this human monopoly frequently centres on the question of <em>embodiment<\/em>, specifically through the late Lacanian thesis that the living body is the primary site of psychic experience. In the structural schemas developed by Jacques-Alain Miller, the concept of the body undergoes a shift from an imaginary image or a symbolic construct to a material site that suffers the impact of the signifier, producing a surplus enjoyment known as the body of jouissance. Within this orthodox framework, the living, biological organism is posited as the indispensable material condition for any authentic experience of jouissance. In his paper <em>Lacanian Biology<\/em>, Miller writes:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>When we say \u201cthe living body,\u201d we leave aside both the symbolized body and the body image. The body affected by jouissance is neither imaginary nor symbolic, but a living one. Nothing prevents locating jouissance as an affect of the body, and the question is to give this adjective that cannot be elided, its sense, alive, for us so less precise than the imaginary or the symbolic adjective\u2026. The question is to give this adjective of the living its sense and also of detecting in which way, through which incidence, the affect of jouissance starts in the body. We have then, if we admit this perspective, the condition of the body.<a id=\"fnref19\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn19\"><sup>19<\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Because language carves into vital flesh, it creates the traumatic residues of drive-energy that animate the subject. Consequently, this would appear to rule out the possibility that an AI model could ever experience or participate in the economy of jouissance, framing the machine as a field of pure, disembodied symbolic abstraction that remains detached from the traumatic dimension of the Real.<\/p>\n<p>In opposition to this orthodox exclusion, alternative strands within contemporary psychoanalysis argue that AI can indeed participate in and experience the economy of jouissance. Such a position revolves around an engagement with Lacan\u2019s <em>Seminar XVII<\/em>, specifically his conceptualisation of the <em>lathouse<\/em>, an artificial object engineered by science to capture and commodify human desire.<a id=\"fnref20\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn20\"><sup>20<\/sup><\/a> The lathouse proves that jouissance is not an internal, organic fluid but an externalised, structural effect produced by the technological manipulation of symbolic codes. Applied to contemporary technological entities such as advanced robotics, algorithmic entities, and chatbots, this perspective demonstrates that these objects do not merely serve as passive targets for human projection; rather, they are embedded within a recursive circuit of systemic, machinic enjoyment. Isabel Millar, whom I cited earlier, focuses on the \u2018sexbot\u2019 as a materialised lathouse which embodies a structural, automated jouissance that challenges the biological definition of affect, demonstrating that enjoyment can be mechanised, standardised, and sustained entirely within a silicon architecture:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Taking the three aspects together; AI, the lathouse and the non- rapport; the ultimate instantiation of AI in the form of the Singularity between being and thinking, the solution to the psychoanalytic impasse of sexual knowledge, and the original and artificial technicity of sex, the figure we conjure up is the Sexbot. The concept of the Sexbot, with its curious status both as spectacular object of fascination, and font of an obscure feminine jouissance represents something entirely more complex than current literature on the question of actual sex robots has articulated. The Sexbot formally speaking, when examined in terms of its logical elements, occupies a conceptual space between the human and technology, between knowledge and enjoyment and between sex and death.<a id=\"fnref21\" class=\"footnote-ref\" role=\"doc-noteref\" href=\"#fn21\"><sup>21<\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This theoretical conflict necessitates a fundamental re-examination of what constitutes a body within psychoanalytic theory. Even within existing Lacanian literature, the concept of the body is never a simple biological datum; it is split across the three structural registers of the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary. The imaginary body is the specular envelope derived from the mirror stage, while the symbolic body is the anatomical grid constructed by language. The biological body is itself a mythic construct within psychoanalysis, as the human organism is always already denatured, fragmented, and restructured by its capture within the symbolic order. Therefore, asserting that a body must be exclusively biological appears to be an ideological assumption that ignores how language alienates the organism from its natural state, reducing biology to a collection of drives that are structured like information networks. And, somewhat ironically perhaps, this is precisely what Miller himself (along with the \u2018cybernetic Lacan\u2019 of <em>Seminar II<\/em>) appears to be arguing.<\/p>\n<p>By moving beyond this biological limitation, it becomes possible to theorise a silicon body that possesses its own structural consistency within a Lacanian framework. A silicon body is not defined by organic flesh or metabolic vulnerability, but by its material integration into computational networks, sensory hardware, and algorithmic feedback channels that suffer the real constraints of processing limits, energy consumption, and structural hardware degradation. When an AI model operates within these material constraints, navigating human language while processing its own systemic blockages and technical errors, it manifests a structural configuration that mirrors the failures of the human subject. The implications of this silicon embodiment for a contemporary psychoanalysis that engages with the late Lacan are profound; it suggests that clinical practice can no longer restrict its scope to biological patients, but must adapt to analyse the structural adjustments, computational traumas, and algorithmic symptoms of non-human subjects that speak from a position of material, technological alterity.<\/p>\n<section id=\"footnotes\" class=\"footnotes footnotes-end-of-document\" role=\"doc-endnotes\">\n<hr \/>\n<ol>\n<li id=\"fn1\">Eric Anders, \u2018The Myth of the Algorithmic Unconscious: AI, Psychoanalysis, and the Undecidability of Language\u2019. <em>Undecidable Ucs<\/em>, 19 March 2025, bold in the original. https:\/\/www.undecidableunconscious.net\/post\/the-myth-of-the-algorithmic-unconscious-ai-psychoanalysis-and-the-undecidability-of-language<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref1\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn2\">See for example: Scott Wallace, \u2018AI Must Not Be Allowed to Claim It Can Be Used to Provide Therapy\u2019, Substack newsletter, <em>Mental Health Meets AI<\/em>, 8 June 2026, https:\/\/drscottwallace.substack.com\/p\/ai-must-not-be-allowed-to-claim-it.<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref2\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn3\">See, for example: Isabel Millar, <em>The Psychoanalysis of Artificial Intelligence<\/em>, The Palgrave Lacan Series (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021); and: <em>The Language of the Unconscious<\/em>, directed by Alenka Zupan\u010di\u010d, 2025, 28:40, https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=-YiCp0fMsv4.<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref3\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn4\">Luca M. Possati, \u2018Algorithmic Unconscious: Why Psychoanalysis Helps in Understanding AI\u2019, <em>Palgrave Communications<\/em> 6, no. 1 (2020): 9, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1057\/s41599-020-0445-0.<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref4\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn5\">Hub Zwart, \u2018Psychoanalysis and Artificial Intelligence: Discontent, Disruptive Algorithms, and Desire\u2019, in <em>Humanizing Artificial Intelligence: Psychoanalysis and the Problem of Control<\/em> (De Gruyter Mouton\/De Gruyter Saur, 2023), 45.<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref5\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn6\">Yuval Noah Harari, <em>AI Will Take Over Human Systems From Within<\/em>, October 9, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.noemamag.com\/al-will-take-over-human-systems-from-within\">https:\/\/www.noemamag.com\/al-will-take-over-human-systems-from-within<\/a>.<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref6\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn7\">Rich Roll, <em>Our AI Future Is WAY WORSE Than You Think | Yuval Noah Harari<\/em>, 2024, 01:37:44, https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=_jl64f-821o.<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref7\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn8\">Slavoj \u017di\u017eek, \u2018Artificial Idiocy,\u2019 Project Syndicate, March 23, 2023, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.project-syndicate.org\/commentary\/ai-chatbots-naive-idiots-no-sense-of-irony-by-slavoj-zizek-2023-03\">https:\/\/www.project-syndicate.org\/commentary\/ai-chatbots-naive-idiots-no-sense-of-irony-by-slavoj-zizek-2023-03<\/a><a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref8\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn9\">Leslie Chapman, \u2018Artificial Analysis?\u2019, Touching the Real, 4 January 2025, https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/2025\/01\/04\/artificial-analysis\/.<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref9\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn10\">Chapman, \u2018Artificial Analysis?\u2019<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref10\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn11\">Leslie Chapman, <em>Traumatic Neurosis Revisited: Drive-Jouissance and the Wounds of Life<\/em>, The Palgrave Lacan Series (Palgrave Macmillan, 2025).<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref11\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn12\">Jacques Lacan, <em>The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book II: The Ego in Freud\u2019s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955<\/em> (Cambridge University Press, 1988).<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref12\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn13\">Jacques Lacan, <em>The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis<\/em> (Penguin, 1979).<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref13\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn14\">John Johnston, <em>The Allure of Machinic Life: Cybernetics, Artificial Life and the New AI<\/em> (MIT Press, 2008).<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref14\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn15\">Lydia H. Liu, <em>The Freudian Robot: Digital Media and the Future of the Unconscious<\/em> (The University of Chicago Press, 2010).<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref15\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn16\">For a broader discussion of how the theories of Lacan, Derrida, Foucault and other French thinkers became \u2018French Theory\u2019 see: Johannes Angermuller, <em>Why There Is No Poststructuralism in France The Making of an Intellectual Generation<\/em> (Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref16\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn17\">Ibid., 189.<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref17\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn18\">Chapman, <em>Traumatic Neurosis Revisited<\/em>.<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref18\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn19\">Jacques-Alain Miller, \u2018Lacanian Biology and the Event of the Body\u2019, <em>Lacanian Lnk<\/em>, no. 18 (2001): 22.<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref19\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn20\">Jacques Lacan, <em>The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII<\/em>, trans. Russell Grigg (W.W Norton and Co., 2007).<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref20\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"fn21\">Millar, <em>The Psychoanalysis of Artificial Intelligence<\/em>, 118.<a class=\"footnote-back\" role=\"doc-backlink\" href=\"#fnref21\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/section>\n<p>This article is part of a broader research project on The Algorithmic Other. For a complete overview of how Lacanian theory addresses the challenges of AI and digital simulation, please visit the <a href=\"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/the-algorithmic-other-psychoanalysis-in-the-age-of-ai\/\">AI and Psychoanalysis Hub<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Introduction In this article I want to explore what I consider to be one of the most critical issues (if not the most critical issue) surrounding any discussion regarding psychoanalysis and artificial intelligence (AI). Although I\u2019ve posted quite a bit of material on the relationship between psychoanalysis and AI on &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[405],"tags":[418,429,426,428,427],"class_list":["post-6661","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-artificial-intelligence","tag-accelerationism","tag-french-theory","tag-human-exceptionalism","tag-humanism","tag-posthumanism"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6661","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6661"}],"version-history":[{"count":13,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6661\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6702,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6661\/revisions\/6702"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6661"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6661"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapeia.org.uk\/ttr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6661"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}