In a number of articles on this site I have explored Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit, which, in one reading at least, is based on the rather peculiar notion that trauma only occurs retroactively. What’s more, it’s not simply a case of a later experience ‘triggering’ the memory of an ‘original’ trauma; rather, the trauma only occurs, for the first time, at the moment of the later experience.
At the same time, it’s crucial to recognise that something did happen to the subject at the time of the ‘original’ experience; the problem is that they were unable to register it as traumatic at the moment of its occurrence. This is one of the reasons that so much childhood abuse goes unreported until much later on; it’s not simply that the perpetrator convinces the child that this is ‘our little secret’ and/or ‘no-one would believe you anyway’, although of course this certainly does happen. It’s also often the case that at the time of the abuse the child simply doesn’t understand what’s happening to them and it’s only years later when they are in a position to properly ‘process’ their experiences that they are able to tell their story.
But there appears to be a fundamental problem here: most writers and clinicians with a knowledge of psychological trauma agree that it is characterised precisely by the inability of the subject to make sense of certain experiences, whenever they occur. Therefore, the idea that a subject’s inability to ‘process’ or make sense of their experiences is why they are not traumatised seems contradictory.
This still doesn’t explain, though, why many people only become traumatised years or even decades ‘after the event’. Freud’s original argument regarding Nachträglichkeit was that it’s only after puberty that the subject is able to ‘register’ the original experience as traumatic. However, as Bistoen and colleagues argue in their paper on Nachträglichkeit and PTSD, which I cited in a previous post, the original experience can occur post-puberty and in adulthood.[1] Furthermore, Freud’s own concept of the actual neuroses suggest that traumatic experiences can occur at any time in an individual’s life.[2] Does this mean that perhaps we can do without the concept of Nachträglichkeit after all? What if it’s simply a case that some experiences are traumatic and others are not, and that trauma occurs at the time and not retroactively?
In many ways this is the simplest solution and, on the face of it at least, appears to make the most sense. However, it still doesn’t explain the fact that in many instances people are being traumatised by events that they are not directly affected by or which do not appear to deserve the label ‘traumatic’. In other words, in many cases the ‘triggering experience’ for the trauma seems strangely ‘un-traumatic’ as far as the ‘traumatised’ subject is concerned.
Referring to one of Freud’s own examples of Nachträglichkeit, the case of Emma cited in the ‘Project’,[3] this was a young woman seen by him who was unable to go into a shop alone. Freud linked this to a memory she produced in analysis of going into a shop at the age of twelve (Freud notes this was shortly after puberty) and being confronted by two shop assistants who were laughing together. At this point she ran out in fright. She then associated this incident with another memory when she was eight when she went into a shop to buy some sweets and the shopkeeper grabbed her genitals through her clothes. In spite of this experience, she went back a second time but stayed away thereafter. Freud argued that the laughter of the shop assistants provided the associative link with the original incident, which reminded her of the grin of the shop keeper as he assaulted her:
The course of events can now be reconstructed as follows. In the shop the two assistants were laughing; this laughing aroused (unconsciously) the memory of the shopkeeper. Indeed, the situation had yet another similarity [to the earlier one]: she was once again in a shop alone. Together with the shopkeeper she remembered his grabbing her through her clothes; but since then she had reached puberty. The memory aroused what it was certainly not able to at the time, a sexual release, which was transformed into anxiety. With this anxiety, she was afraid that the shop-assistants might repeat the assault, and she ran away.[4]
And Bistoen et al cite the example of a young woman who had been raped as an adult but only became traumatised after hearing that the same man had raped and murdered another woman. Of course, in both examples it is possible to argue that the ‘later’ experience was traumatic for the individuals involved, even if it may not appear to be to an outsider. However, in the second example at least it seems difficult not to make an association between the woman hearing about the rape and murder and her own experience of being raped by the same man. Furthermore, we are not given details of the woman’s earlier history to know if she had indeed had a sexual experience (or experiences) in her childhood. In the case of Emma, things are rather more complicated because Freud explains that in another session she remembered that the shop assistants were laughing at her clothes and that she had felt sexually attractive to one of them. In other words, there is potentially enough in this ‘later’ experience to make it traumatic in its own right.
Having said all this, the concept of Nachträglichkeit is generally accepted within the psychoanalytic world, even if its precise nature and mechanism (not to mention the translation of the term itself) is subject to debate. In recent times there have been a number of excellent summaries and literature reviews covering the topic, including those by Eickhoff,[5] Faimberg,[6] and House and Slotnick.[7] The latter text (Après-coup in French psychoanalysis) is particularly interesting because the authors argue that it is the French accommodation of the term, translated as après-coup, that has kept it in circulation (in both the French and English-speaking worlds) up until the present day. The authors also argue that one of the problems with the concept of Nachträglichkeit is that there has always been an inherent tension, at least with regards to its various English translations, between the idea of it representing deferred action, or that of a ‘ticking timebomb’ waiting to ‘explode’ at a later date; and of it representing retrospective modification, in which later events revise the memory of earlier ones (this was Lacan’s understanding of Nachträglichkeit). I will return to this tension in a moment.
They go onto discuss Laplanche’s theory of après-cous, in which he attempts to resolve the tension between these two contradictory ideas of Nachträglichkeit. The crux of Laplanche’s argument is that childhood sexual experiences always involve another person, either an adult or an older child. Furthermore, and this is the critical point, the other person is also a sexual being who is experiencing enjoyment (in Lacanian parlance, jouissance) from the engagement with the child. This need not be sexual abuse; it could simply be a mother breast-feeding or cuddling her baby. The key point here is that the full meaning of the other person’s jouissance and how it is being communicated to the infant child is lost on its recipient; in effect it gets ‘lost in translation’. To quote Laplanche directly (cited in House and Slotnick):
“Après-coup” is a phenomenon that is not played out within the individual, within the intrapersonal, but rather within the interpersonal domain. Its specificity and its ability to reverse the “arrow of time” depends on this idea and this idea alone. In an individual, après-coup does not principally depend on the successive stages of the person’s life. It depends, first of all, on the simultaneous presence of an adult and an infans (a pre-verbal child). The adult’s enigmatic message (which itself is inhabited by the adult’s own unconscious) constitutes the “avant-coup” of this process that introduces, within the receiver of the message, the infans, an initial disequilibrium. Then, in a second moment, in the après-coup, the enigmatic message drives the infans to translate, a translation which is necessarily imperfect. Such an avant-coup is characteristic of the earliest concrete, practical messages transmitted to the child by the adult in the unavoidable frame of the “fundamental anthropological situation”.[8]
This idea resonates closely with Ferenczi’s concept of ‘Confusion of Tongues’ as articulated in his paper of the same name.[9] In other words, the child is confronted with a language (a ‘tongue’) of sexual enjoyment and desire from the other person that he or she is unable to make sense of. In fact, Laplanche argues that Freud’s theory of childhood seduction, (in)famously ‘abandoned’ by him in 1897 (although the term ‘abandonment’ is a complete misnomer), needs to be reformulated as a ‘general theory of seduction’ which he outlines in detail in his book New Foundations for Psychoanalysis.[10] And essentially, this new theory is based on the idea of an enigma, for both child and adult (in fact, Laplanche refers to the ‘enigmatic signifier), whereby neither child or adult recognise the adult’s sexual desire and jouissance which is transmitted to the chid in form of ‘messages’ which the neither the child or the adult can properly decode.
Just to reiterate: this ‘failure of translation’ is what forms the basis of the trauma for the child, and is what continues to haunt them for the rest of their lives (or at least until they enter psychoanalysis); and it is here that Nachträglichkeit (Laplanche’s après-coup) enters the story. According to Laplanche:
…for the subject, the question [is] “what does he want from me?” [It] entails opening the whole retroactive movement of translation: a search for the secret of the enigmatic message which must always more or less escape his understanding. For the human being, for each of us, this is après-coup’s bidirectional movement. The progressive movement, the movement forward in time, is that of the enigmatic message originally offered by the adult to the child as something “to be translated.” The retroactive, backward movement is located in the succession of attempts at a translation of the message by the receiver, while recognizing that something of the enigmatic will be left out of every translation.[11]
In other words, at various points in their life, the subject will attempt to ‘decode’ or ‘translate’ the enigmatic (sexual) messages imparted to them by the adult ‘perpetrator’ in their childhood. However, such a ‘translation’ never completely succeeds and there is always a traumatic (Real) remainder or residue left. And perhaps the most critical point in Laplanche’s approach to Nachträglichkeit is the role of the other (the other person, not Lacan’s Other) in structuring the subject’s temporality; Nachträglichkeit exists in the first place, as the ‘retroactive, backward movement’, precisely because of the other’s ‘transmission’ of the enigmatic messages to the subject.
But the attentive reader may also have noticed reference to another characteristic of Laplanche’s Nachträglichkeit (après-coup) in the above quote: that of a ‘progressive movement forward in time’. This seems to suggest a much more ‘deterministic’ form of Nachträglichkeit, one in the enigmatic ‘original’ message ‘determines’ the subject’s later efforts to make sense of it. In fact, though, and as I pointed out earlier, there has always been an ambiguity with regards to the term Nachträglichkeit from the very beginning. On the one hand there is the concept of ‘deferred action’ (Strachey’s preferred translation of Nachträglichkeit), in which the causal ‘arrow of time’ goes from past to future and which means ‘past’ events ‘determine’ ‘future’ ones. Laplanche, in his Notes of Afterwardness,[12] argued that this in fact was Freud’s view of Nachträglichkeit.[13] However, there is also the idea of ‘retrospective-modification’, in which later events revise the memory of early ones (what Laplanche refers to as the ‘hermeneutic’ conception of Nachträglichkeit). This is essentially Lacan’s view of the concept and one adhered by Bistoen et al in their paper cited earlier.
In his Notes of Afterwards Laplanche makes it clear he is not comfortable with this ‘dichotomy’ of meanings, that is, Nachträglichkeit as either ‘deterministic’ (the ‘deferred action’ model) or as ‘retrospective-modification’. Rather, he attempts to combine both meanings; there is a real event (the childhood seduction) which ‘determines’ the subject’s subsequent (and ultimately failed) efforts to make sense of such an event. However, these attempts at ‘sense-making’ involve retrospective or retroactive constructions, heavily influenced by events in the subject’s present.
I began this article by referring to my previous writings on Nachträglichkeit, and how the concept is often interpreted in terms of retroactive construction – not only of the traumatic event but the trauma itself. However, in the light of the arguments outlined here I think it probably makes more sense to offer a more nuanced reading of the concept; one which accommodates the ambiguity in the term itself. The advantages of such a reading, I would argue, include recognising that trauma actually does have a real, material origin (rather than a constructed, ‘hermeneutic’ one, which is the danger inherent in the ‘retrospective-modification’ model), and also acknowledging that (psychical) trauma is always intersubjective. In other words, trauma always involves (at least) two human beings – the subject and the other, along with a enigmatic message (or set of messages) regarding the other’s sexual desire and enjoyment. And when that traumatic remainder resists symbolic translation altogether, the resulting clinical impasse is frequently misread as a melancholic loss rather than an emergency defence against unbound drive-jouissance—a distinction I take up in my post Trauma, depression and the myth of the lost object.
Notes
- Gregory Bistoen, Stijn Vanheule, and Stef Craps, ‘Nachträglichkeit: A Freudian Perspective on Delayed Traumatic Reactions’, Theory and Psychology, 2014, 1–20. ↑
- For a comprehensive introduction to Freud’s idea of actual neurosis see J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Hogarth Press – Reprinted by Karnac Books 1988, 1973), pp.10-12. ↑
- Sigmund Freud, ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’, in The Standard Edition (London: Hogarth Press, 1950a), I, 281–397, pp.352-356. ↑
- Ibid., p.354, italics in original. ↑
- F. Eickhoff, ‘On Nachträglichkeit: The Modernity of an Old Concept’, Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 87 (2006), 1453–69. ↑
- H. Faimberg, ‘A Plea for a Broader Concept of Nachträglichkeit’, Psychoanal Q., 76 (2007), 1221–40. ↑
- Jonathan House and Julie Slotnick, ‘Apres-Coup in French Psychoanalysis: The Long Afterlife of Nachtraglichkeit: The First Hundred Years, 1893 to 1993’, Psychoanalytic Review, 102.5 (2015), 683–708. ↑
- House and Slotnick, ‘Apres-Coup in French Psychoanalysis’, p.701, italics in original. ↑
- S. (1949) Confusion of the Tongues Between the Adults and the Child- Ferenczi, ‘Confusion of the Tongues Between the Adults and the Child—(The Language of Tenderness and of Passion)1’, Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 30 (1949), 225–30. ↑
- J. (Jean) Laplanche, New Foundations for Psychoanalysis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). ↑
- Cited in Deborah L. Browning, ‘Laplanche on Après-Coup: Translation, Time, and Trauma’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 66.4 (2018), p.789 ↑
- ‘Afterwardness’ is Laplanche’s English translation of Nachträglichkeit, but après-coup has tended to be used in the English literature instead. ↑
- J. (Jean) Laplanche, ‘Notes on Afterwardness’, in Essays on Otherness, ed. by John Fletcher, Warwick Studies in European Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 260–65. ↑
Last updated: November 17, 2026
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