Online analysis and the question of ‘presence’
Online analysis and the question of ‘presence’

Online analysis and the question of ‘presence’

The advent of Covid saw a massive proliferation of online analytic work, basically because there was no other option if analysts wanted to stay in business. Since then it would appear that some practitioners have reverted to ‘in-person’ analysis, whilst others have remained online, or, perhaps more commonly, have developed a ‘hybrid’ practice with a mixture of ‘in-person’ and online work. I deliberately use quotation marks around ‘in-person’ because I would argue this term is problematic in itself, especially in relation to the question of presence, which I will return to later.

As Paolo Migone points out in his paper on psychoanalysis on the internet, there is nothing especially new in the concept of ‘online’ analysis; or perhaps a better term might be ‘remote’ analysis, because he reminds us that telephone analysis has been around since the 1950s.[1] And Bruce Fink, writing just before the advent of Skype, argues that telephone analysis can sometimes be the only way to continue an established analysis if, for example, the analysand has relocated some distance away.[2] However, what Migone is really interested in is the idea that the introduction of ‘proper’ online analysis, that is, using Zoom, Skype, Teams, etc, raises important questions about ‘in-person’ analysis itself. He states that his paper will deal:

…specifically with the theoretical implications of both online and offline therapy for therapeutic technique, and in order to do so it will necessarily discuss also the differences between the two therapeutic settings. It is argued that the way we think about online therapy has direct implications for the way we think and practice traditional, “offline” therapy. In other words, this paper will not deal with the question of therapeutic action or with the validity of online therapy. Internet therapy (sic) is only taken as a pretext—an excuse, so to speak—in order to reflect on theory of psychoanalytic technique in general… [3]

Migone is particularly interested in the question of the transference and what online therapy (to use his terminology) tells us about transference in general. And this is a question I would like to explore in this text from a Lacanian position. And although he makes a very brief reference to the question of the bodily presence of the analyst right at the end of his paper, I would also like to tease this out a bit more, again drawing upon Lacanian theory.

Regarding the question of the transference, as Lacan argued in Seminar XI, where there is a subject-supposed-to-know there is transference.[4] Another way to look at this is to think of the transference to the Other. As Miller points out, in cases of neurosis this Other is a fictitious creation of the analysand:

The transference means that what is at stake for a neurotic is making the Other exist in order to hand over to it the burden of the logical consistency of the object a. That is what Lacan called the subject-supposed-to-know: Making the Other exist in order to restore to it the object a, made of this object-cause-of-desire…The Other does not exist as real. To say that the Other is the place of truth is to say that the Other is a place of fiction. To say that the Other is a place of knowledge is to say that it has the status of supposition.[5]

In psychosis, the Other is Real (and in many cases persecutory); and as Jean Allouch points out, the analysand themselves is in the position of the subject who knows (there is no ‘supposition’ about it).[6] All the analyst can do is to bear witness to the subject and their delusory constructions. But in either case (neurosis or psychosis) does it make any difference to the operation of the transference whether the analysis is ‘in-person’ or online? In cases of neurosis the transference to the (fictitious) Other will still take place and in cases of psychosis the analysand will still be the one who knows and the analyst will still bear witness to this and, in some unfortunate situations, will occupy the place of the persecutory Other.

However, this brings us to the question of presence, and more specifically, the bodily presence of the analyst. In a more general sense the body matters in psychoanalysis, especially when it comes to the question of jouissance. As Miller argues in his paper on Lacanian biology, the living body is the condition of jouissance.[7] Furthermore, the speech of the embodied subject is a ‘carrier’ of jouissance, which is something Lacan had already noted in his study of the Schreber case.[8] But, surely, this would still be the case whether the analysis was ‘in-person’ or online. What, though, of the analyst’s body? What effect does the physical presence of the analyst have on the analytic relation, and, specifically, on the nature of the transference? As far as the psychotic transference goes, the short answer is probably very little, except insofar that the analyst becomes a threatening and persecutory Other, in which case the subject may feel physically in danger. This also suggests, and there appears to be some evidence to back it up, that in some cases of psychosis online work is very much preferable precisely because the subject may feel less threatened.  In cases of neurosis, things are somewhat more complicated because of the question of the analysand’s (and in some cases, the analyst’s) fantasises of presence. In other words, the physical presence of the analyst may evoke a range of unconscious (and not so unconscious!) fantasies regarding the relationship between the analysand and the analyst. On the other hand, of course, such fantasies could well be in play during online analysis, so once again it is not at all clear whether, in the transferential sense at least, there is much difference between ‘in-person’ and online analysis.

Returning to Migone’s argument that online analysis provides us an opportunity to examine the assumptions regarding analysis in general (‘in-person’ and online), perhaps the central question is the one relating to presence.  This is not so much in the Derridean sense where the focus in the relation between speech and presence (although this would be an interesting and worthwhile exploration in itself), but, rather, the idea (or fantasy) of bodily presence.  In fact, perhaps what really warrants further investigation is the extent to which there is a sense of bodily presence online and what this tells us about ‘in-person’ bodily presence.  In other words, are we mistaken in assuming that bodily presence in ‘in-person’ analysis is the ‘benchmark’ or ‘gold standard’ against which such a presence (if indeed it exists at all) in online analysis is clearly a poor substitute?

Notes

  1. Paolo Migone, “Psychoanalysis on the Internet: A Discussion of Its Theoretical Implications for Both Online and Offline Therapeutic Technique,” Psychoanalytic Psychology 30 (April 1, 2013) ↑
  2. Bruce Fink, Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic Technique A Lacanian Approach for Practitioners (Digital Edition) (New York: W.W.Norton and Company, 2007). ↑
  3. Migone, “Psychoanalysis on the Internet”, 282. ↑
  4. Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (London: Penguin, 1979). ↑
  5. Jacques-Alain Miller, “A Contribution of the Schizophrenic to the Psychoanalytic Clinic,” (Re)-Turn: A Journal of Lacanian Studies 1 (Winter 2003), 24-25. ↑
  6. Jean Allouch, “Psychotic Transference,” in Lacan on Madness: Madness, Yes You Can’t, ed. Patricia Gherovici and Steinkoler (Hove: Routledge, 2015), 112–26. ↑
  7. Jacques-Alain Miller, “Lacanian Biology and the Event of the Body,” Lacanian Lnk, no. 18 (2001): 6–29. ↑
  8. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book III 1955-1956 The Psychoses (London: Routledge, 1993). ↑