
In my book on traumatic neurosis I argue that the root of trauma is not in the event itself (for example, being subjected to continuous missile and drone strikes) but, rather, in the excitation of the drive.[1] This builds on Freud’s argument in Beyond the Pleasure Principle that trauma occurs when there is breakdown in the functioning of the pleasure principle (or, more precisely, in the principle of constancy) which regulates the drive. But such excitation, which I refer to as drive-jouissance, originates not in the drive itself, but in its perpetual ‘scraping’ of the cultural or psychical ‘landscape’ within which the subject is situated. But whatever the aetiology of such traumas, what matters from a clinical point of view is how they are treated, especially when they are occurring on such an industrial scale as they are in Ukraine. And in many ways, Ukraine has become a laboratory for mass trauma interventions. Of course, this is not the first such ‘laboratory’; there have been many ‘opportunities’, dating back to the First World War (if not earlier,) for psychiatrists and psychoanalysts of various theoretical persuasions to try out their ‘cures’ on a mass population.
The extent of the problem
However, before exploring such interventions, it is worth reminding ourselves of the extent of the psychical scarring that has occurred in Ukraine since February 2022. There have been a number of studies which highlight the scale of the problem. For example, the IOM Ukraine briefing document published in November 2024 examined the mental health challenges faced by the Ukrainian population due to ongoing conflict and displacement, including internally displaced persons (IDPs).[2] Key findings were that nearly 40% of all respondents were at high risk of depression, with IDPs showing the highest rate (50%). Symptoms of depression were also higher amongst women (42%) and individuals with self-reported disabilities (45%). Another study by Lushchak et al investigated the prevalence of stress, anxiety, and PTSD among Ukrainians 9-12 months after the 2022 Russian invasion.[3] The key finding was that 93% of the surveyed individuals faced at least one of the measured mental health issues (stress, anxiety, PTSD) at moderate or severe levels, with refugees were the most vulnerable group, and IDPs experiencing worse mental health than non-displaced persons (NDPs).
But what of the response by the Ukrainian mental health services, including psychoanalysts and psychotherapists? One of the key problems is that even prior to the February 2022 invasion Ukraine’s mental health faced significant challenges, which ultimately impacted the country’s ability to respond to the surge in demand for such services after the invasion.[4] Ukraine inherited a healthcare system, often referred to as the ‘Semashko model’, from the Soviet Union. This model was characterised by a heavy reliance on inpatient psychiatric care in large institutions, with limited emphasis on community-based mental health services, outpatient care, and psychosocial support. This meant that mental healthcare was often centralised, impersonal, and inflexible. A significant portion of the health budget was allocated to institutional care rather than evidence-based community services. And even before the 2022 invasion, Ukraine had substantial mental healthcare needs but with very limited resources.
Furthermore, mental health problems carried significant stigma among Ukrainians, partly due to the Soviet-era practice of weaponising the psychiatric system to hospitalise dissidents. This fostered a deep-seated distrust in mental healthcare services which often deterred individuals from seeking help, even when needed. And many mental health professionals lacked proper training in effective treatment models; for example, many Ukrainian psychologists were trained in pedagogical institutions rather than having dedicated medical education and there were shortages of qualified staff, including psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers. Another major problem is the impact the war has had on the mental health workforce itself. A study by Pinchuk et al showed that the average number of psychiatrists, social workers, and junior nurses per facility steadily declined over the study period.[5] The study also revealed that the war has also led to the relocation of many patients and damage to infrastructure, with nearly half of the hospitals reporting damage due to military action.
Psychoanalytic interventions
In spite of such problems the psychoanalytic community has made a significant response to the traumas of the war. In many cases this has involved much soul searching amongst individual practitioners, many of whom could have chosen to leave once the invasion began. One such example is that of Mariana Velykodna who initially felt disoriented and overwhelmed by the invasion and questioned whether to suspend her practice.[6] She worried she couldn’t be as available or attentive as before because her own inner turmoil was louder than her patients’ stories. She ultimately decided to continue, seeing her practice as a way to cope, maintain a sense of agency, and support her own subjectivity against the dehumanising aspects of war. One of the aspects of her work that she emphasised in her account was that of prioritising the maintenance of the analytic relationship and being a stable object for her patients over strictly adhering to psychoanalytic techniques or the typical frame. She became more open to communication between sessions, rescheduling appointments, and offering overt support. She gave a case example of a patient at a train station who was trying to evacuate and which involved Velykodna staying on the phone with her, offering encouragement and support; ma response she considered ‘abnormal’ for a typical psychoanalytic session.
The question of adaptation of ‘standard’ analytic techniques is a central one when it comes to work of analysts in the midst of the psychical turmoil of the conflict, and is something I explore in more detail below. Jeanne Bernstein’s article Working Under Conditions of War gives an especially good account of how Ukrainian analysts have risen to the challenge.[7] Bernstein’s article is even more interesting due to the fact she begins by gently criticising Freud for ‘diverting’ away from the dreams of traumatised patients in Beyond the Pleasure Principle to that of children’s play. The reference here is to Freud’s somewhat unexpected (and unexplained) discourse on the ‘fort-da’ game played by his grandson Ernst. Bernstein goes onto argue:
Maybe we can also observe here, a sort of repetition compulsion of turning away from the theme of trauma, if we remember that Freud had done so once before in 1897 when he wrote to Fliess that “I no longer believe in my neurotica”. But in addition, I think that Freud might have gotten into troubling waters, had he further used the recurrent dreams/nightmares of injured soldiers as proof of the repetition compulsion germane to the death drive. The recurrent nightmares risked to invalidate his theory of the wishful-filling structure of dreams since the idea that the soldiers wanted to be alerted beforehand of the danger in order not to experience the fright of the impending attack, did not exactly hold together.
But putting such questions to one side for a moment, the focus of Bernstein’s article is on how the psychoanalysts Francoise Davione and Gerald Fromm have supported Ukrainian analysts, led by Alexander Filts in Lviv, in adapting psychoanalytic techniques to war conditions and which have included working in makeshift settings like hospitals or cars. Over nineteen sessions, cases involving soldiers, torture survivors, and refugees, highlighted the need for flexible, non-traditional approaches. Ukrainian therapists have shown ingenuity in addressing trauma, often prioritising immediate emotional connection over rigid psychoanalytic frameworks. Concepts like dissociation, where soldiers separate their soul’ (left at the front) from their injured bodies, are seen as functional for survival and not immediately analysed.
Bernstein notes that Davoine and Fromm, in their supportive role to the Ukrainian analysts, emphasise the role of the therapist as a therapon—a supportive witness who provides ‘little mirrors’ (personal stories, myths, or cultural references) to rebuild a patient’s shattered identity. Neutrality is often counterproductive; instead, analysts must engage with patients’ immediate affective needs, sometimes using their own countertransference to articulate unspoken trauma. The article also highlights the societal role of analysts in facilitating collective mourning and healing. Key lessons from this work include the importance of simplicity in communication and the need for honesty, humility, and respect in therapeutic interactions. The work underscores that trauma speaks to trauma, with both patient and analyst affected by the war’s chaos, requiring adaptive, courageous approaches to foster human connection amidst horror.
The (unhappy) relationship between psychoanalysis and war trauma
Going back to Bernstein initial observations regarding Freud’s ‘diversion’ in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, this seems to highlight a broader problem within psychoanalysis. One of the reasons I undertook my doctoral research into the question of traumatic neurosis, which was subsequently published in book form, was precisely to highlight such a problem. The war in Ukraine, along, of course, with that other unfolding nightmare in Gaza, might seem to make a mockery of much that Freud and Lacan ever wrote or spoke about. What possible value, for example, does a concept such as the Oedipus complex have when it comes to the mass terrorisation and traumatisation of civilians by perpetual missile and drone strikes? However, it is perhaps worth noting at this point that pretty much the same criticism was aimed at Freud over a century ago during the time of the First World War and the emergence of so-called ‘shell-shock’ (Freud’s traumatic neurosis). Surely, the critics argued, this phenomenon disproves everything Freud and his fellow analysts ever said about the role of infantile sexuality in the psychoneuroses.
Freud and his colleagues’ response was to host a Symposium on the topic of the war neuroses at the at the Fifth International Psycho-Analytical Congress in Budapest in September 1918. Sándor Ferenczi, Karl Abraham and Ernst Simmel all presented papers on this topic, and Freud himself wrote the introduction to the proceedings of the Symposium which were published in Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses in 1921.[8] One of the dominant themes of the Symposium was to challenge the idea that I have just outlined, and which was widespread in psychiatric circles, that the war neuroses had ‘disproved’ Freud’s theories, and especially those related to infantile sexuality. According to Freud: “…the opponents of psycho-analysis, whose repugnance to sexuality has shown itself to be stronger than their logic, have hastened to proclaim that investigation of the war neuroses has finally disproved this part of the psycho-analytical theory.”[9] According to these critics, the psychopathologies that emerged as a result of being shelled, machined gunned, trapped for days or weeks at a time in a trench or dug-out, clearly had nothing to do with childhood Oedipal experiences.
The basic thrust of the argument of all the Symposium’s participants, on the other hand, was that the war neuroses were the product of an underlying psychopathology that was rooted in unresolved, childhood sexual conflicts. In other words, those who were suffering from war neurosis were already neurotic.[10] For example, Simmel argued that:
The psycho-analytical explanation of the war neuroses has proved with wonderful clearness the correctness of the Freudian views on hysteria, according to which all physical symptoms represent conversions of something psychical. The body is the instrument of the mind upon which it (the mind) allows its unconscious to manifest itself in plastic and mimic expression. The functions of the unconscious are the deciding factor in the formation and building up of the war neuroses, also the frequently observed instances of the forgetting of events accompanied by feelings hostile to the ego, even when these events are very recent, permits us to recognise from the outside alone the submergence and repression of ideas and affects of a painful nature.[11]
Ferenczi, Abraham, Jones (in his separate paper) and Freud (in his Introduction) all follow a similar line: the traumatic experiences of war ‘trigger’ an underlying psychopathology, often hysterical in nature. Just to give one more example, Abraham in somewhat condescending language, argued that: “It transpires with great regularity that the war neurotics already before the trauma were labile people—to designate it, to begin with, by a general expression—and especially so as regards their sexuality.”[12] By ‘labile’ he appears to mean ‘emotionally volatile’ and which he seems to view as a weakness (in men at least).
In spite of such valiant efforts, the next sixty years or so saw a progressive disengagement of psychoanalysis from the theory and treatment of the war neuroses, culminating in the disappearance of the term completely from the psychiatric literature and the emergence of a completely new paradigm of trauma in the aftermath of the Vietnam War: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). And the reason for my excursion into the history of psychoanalysis in relation to the war neuroses is to highlight a perennial problem at the heart of psychoanalysis and one which once again has reared its head in the traumascapes of Ukraine and Gaza. To put it very crudely, what works in the comfort of a west Hampstead or New York analyst’s consulting room has no place in the war-torn cities of Ukraine filled with mass trauma causalities.
Trauma and the myth of a psychoanalytic ‘baseline’
Of course, there is nothing new about such arguments, as can be seen from the hostility towards Freud’s theories during the Great War that I outlined above. The key question is, though: are such criticisms justified? My contention is that they are not, though perhaps not for the reasons that Freud and his colleagues were proposing at the Budapest Symposium. In fact, in my view there are two main reasons why such criticisms are misplaced. Firstly, the parody of the analyst in their comfortable, safe consulting room far from the front line of war is simply that: a parody. As can be seen from the experiences of Ukrainian analysts, the front line soon arrived at their office doors, and they quickly adapted. But adapted from what? The idea of ‘adaptation’ implies a ‘baseline’ or even a ‘gold standard’ of analytic practice that then has to be adapted. But history shows us that this is a complete fantasy. At most, it is the individual psychoanalytic institutions that create their own particular ‘baseline’ or ‘gold standard’ which their members then have to adhere to. And when enough members decide they no longer wish to adhere to a particular model of psychoanalysis they break away and start their own school. This has always been the case and is perhaps even more so today. The idea of a ‘gold standard’ or ‘baseline’ of analytic practice has little to do with clinical reality and great deal to do with the murky politics of psychoanalytic institutions.
The other reason why I would reject the criticism that psychoanalysis has nothing to offer those who have been subjected to the traumas of war is that psychoanalysis can offer its own concept of trauma which is has nothing to do with the ‘pop-Freudian’ parody of analysis that states that all your problems stem from your childhood sexual conflicts and have nothing to do with the fact you are being continually subjected to drone and missile strikes in the here-and-now. As I noted earlier, my central argument regarding trauma is that it originates from excessive drive excitation (drive-jouissance) which, following Freud’s arguments in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, overwhelm the operation of the pleasure principle. The key point here is that the jouissance in question is a product of the drive’s perpetual circulation around the object a, an idea that Lacan first developed in Seminar XI. However, in Seminar XVII he will further develop the idea of object a as surplus jouissance. In this seminar Lacan argues that the signifier is an apparatus of jouissance. However, there is a further key part of Lacan’s argument, and this is that in its endless repetition, jouissance is running down, disappearing, which he refers to as its entropy. At the same time, though, something appears in place of this ‘disappeared’ or ‘lost’ jouissance, the object a:
What becomes evident…is, as we were saying just before, that there is a loss of jouissance. And it is in the place of this loss introduced by repetition that we see the function of the lost object emerge, of what I am calling the a. What does this impose on us? If not this formula that at the most elementary level, that of the imposition of the unary trait, knowledge at work produces, let’s say, an entropy.[13]
This ‘lost object’, the object a, is a ‘stand-in’ for the ‘actual jouissance’ of the subject is described by Lacan as surplus jouissance. However, in developing his concept of surplus jouissance Lacan also discounts his previous argument (in Seminar VII) that jouissance is a transgression, something forbidden; on the contrary, argues Lacan:
We are not dealing with a transgression, an irruption into some forbidden field through the wearing away of vital regulatory apparatuses (the pleasure principle). In fact, it is only through this effect of entropy, through this wasting, that jouissance acquires a status and shows itself. This is why I initially introduced it by the term “Mehrlust,” surplus jouissance…Only the dimension of entropy gives body to the fact that there is surplus jouissance there to be recovered.[14]
In other words, jouissance is an effect of the repetition of the signifier; a repetition that is ‘powered’ by the circuit of the drive. In Six Paradigms of Jouissance Jacques-Alain Miller argues that this surplus jouissance can be regarded as a supplement to the loss of jouissance and as extending the register of the object a beyond ‘natural’ objects and encompassing those of industry and culture. These are the ‘crumbs’ of jouissance – ‘minor objet petit a‘: “We see our cultural world inhabited by substitutes for jouissance, which are little nothings. These are crumbs of jouissance which give a particular style to our way of life and our way of enjoying.”[15]
At this point it is important to note that Miller appears to contradict the idea that the object a is a ‘product’ of the drive, which was Lacan’s argument in Seminar XI. He argues that when jouissance “… is presented at the objet petit a of the drive, it belongs in a list …the oral object, the anal object, the scopic object, the vocal object…” These correspond to the partial drives that Lacan discusses in Seminar XI. However, Miller continues, “…when you think of jouissance as surplus jouissance, that is to say as that which fills in, but never exactly fills in, the loss of jouissance…here the list of objets petit a increases and extends itself.”[16] What Miller seems to be arguing here is that previously Lacan (following Freud) was arguing that the objects of the drive were all ‘natural’, that is, the erogenous zones of the body, and therefore the object a was related to the ‘lost’ jouissance associated with each of these zones. However, with the advent of the concept of surplus jouissance this effectively generalises the idea of jouissance; in other words, anything, any object in the world, can be seen as ‘it’, the source of the ‘lost’ jouissance.
And, to develop this argument further, each instance of the object a, that is, surplus jouissance, in the world constitutes a site of trauma. This is because the drive is perpetually ‘scraping’ the cultural ‘landscape’,[17] so to speak, for instances of ‘lost’ jouissance (surplus jouissance) and it is this process that can lead to an excess of drive excitation (drive jouissance) which in turn leads to the traumatisation of the subject. At this point it might be better to think of such a cultural landscape with its sites of trauma as a traumascape. In fact, it may not be too far fetched to argue that, in one sense at least, the whole of the cultural world constitutes one massive traumascape, insofar it is saturated with instances of the object a. And in a world of global and 24/7 social media, such a traumascape has indeed reached saturation point. In other words, we are now being constantly bombarded, night and day, with words, sounds and images from across the world. The key point here, however, is that these representations, these signifiers, do not have to be ‘traumatic’ in the sense of conveying images of war and violence per se. Rather, it is the extent to which they constitute a violation of what Freud refers to in Beyond the Pleasure Principle as the ‘psychical apparatus’ and what others might refer to as ‘the self’ or ‘the ego’. In other words, the idea that the subject becomes overwhelmed by surplus jouissance.
Psychoanalysis and the traumascape of Ukraine
And if we think about the war in Ukraine such a traumascape extends from the trenches on the front line to the UAV (drone) ground control stations which may be hundreds (or even thousands) of miles away. In fact, bearing in mind that the war is being constantly beamed around the world via mainstream and social media, one might argue that its traumascape is now global. However, it is important to note at this point that I am not suggesting that anyone who watches images of missile and drone strikes in Ukraine is going to be traumatised in the same way as someone of the receiving end of such strikes. Clearly, if you are in the middle of such a strike the experience is incalculably more intense and wounding than if you are observing it from afar on your smart phone or TV.
Furthermore, the experience or registering of such a trauma may not happen until long after the event itself. This is something Freud recognised very early on in his psychoanalytic work and led to his development of the concept of Nachträglichkeit. This is essentially the idea of a retroactive transcribing of the event as ‘traumatic’ and it is only at this later time (which can be months, years or even decades after the event) that the subject becomes traumatised.[18] Even within the ‘PTSD paradigm’ (as I like to describe it) this is a well-recognised phenomenon, and examples include Vietnam and Falklands war veterans only exhibiting symptoms years after the conflicts ended along with numerous survivors of child abuse who only develop trauma symptoms in (much later) adulthood. With regards to the war in Ukraine, this has serious clinical implications. Although the research I referred to earlier indicates higher than average levels of PTSD even while the war is continuing, this may be dwarfed in comparison to what might be to come in the future, long after the cessation of hostilities.
But returning to the question of trauma as drive-jouissance, what is the role for a psychoanalytic intervention? As I indicated earlier, the idea of an ‘adaptation’ of ‘classical’ psychoanalytic technique is, at the very least, unhelpful and, at worse, positively harmful. I say this because some analysts may feel, because of their specific analytic formation, that they have no role is working with war trauma survivors. But, surely, this is to look at things the wrong way round? Surely, you start with what’s confronting you and go from there? And, truth be told, this is what happens with each new analysis. In fact, this is probably more the case today than ever due to the proliferation of ever more ‘conditions’ and ‘disorder’ that seem to defy the ‘classical’ Freudian and Lacanian clinical structures (neurosis, psychosis and perversion). The fact that some Lacanian formations appear to treat the neurotic structure as the clinical ‘baseline’ is, as I suggested earlier, more a reflection on the ideology and politics of particular Lacanian institutions than anything to do with the existence of such structures in the contemporary world.
Things get even more problematic when it comes to the Millerian circle of Lacanian analysis, where there appears to an increasing questioning of some of the basic tenets of the ‘differential clinic’ itself, and especially the distinction between neurosis and psychosis.[19] This is particularly the case where the focus is on the teachings of the ‘very late Lacan’, that is, of the late 1970s and Lacan’s proposition that “everyone is mad, that is, delusional.”[20] The trajectory of the (Millerian) argument here seems to be that neurosis itself is a form of delusion, which Lacan in his later work would refer to as a sinthome, a knotting together of the Real, Symbolic and the Imaginary.[21] From a clinical perspective the implication of such arguments appears to be that psychoanalysis is no longer about the ‘treatment’ of neurosis but rather an exploration of the ways different subjects establish their delusions, which within this framework appear to function as forms of trauma narrative. And taking this argument one step further, with regards to the traumas of war, it would seem that these simply make the establishment of such delusions/trauma narratives more difficult because of the added disruptions they impose on the pleasure principle.
It is important to note that not all contemporary Lacanians subscribe to this reading of Lacan. David Ferraro, for example, is quite scathing in his critique of the ‘wilder’ interpretations of Miller’s work. For example, he argues that the statement ‘everyone is mad’:
… if it is not merely a rhetorical provocation, stands as a repudiation of structure and paradigmatic shifts. If the delusion in question is identification with the ego, with all the narcissism implied by this, then this slogan merely recapitulates Lacan’s Schema L from the 1950s in which the ego is clearly distinct from the subject. It is equivalent to asserting that there is an imaginary register, which is to say that it stays at the level of the insights of 70 years ago.[22]
This reflects Ferraro’s deeper scepticism regarding attempts, especially amongst the Millerian school, to ‘prioritise’ the (very) late teachings of Lacan at the expense of his earlier, more structuralist based work; and in doing so to effectively abandon the idea of a differential clinic and, along with it, the key role played by the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father in determining clinical structure.
My own view, however, is that Ferraro, and fellow analysts who share a similar position, are on the wrong side of history and are essentially fighting a rear-guard action. War trauma (or, to give it its proper name, traumatic neurosis) has to be engaged with on its own terms. And in essence this means starting from fact that what we are confronted with here is an irruption of the Real into the Symbolic-Imaginary (the subject’s ‘reality’) which overpowers the homeostatic functioning of the pleasure principle, which in Lacanian terms means the semantic functioning of language in the deciphering of jouissance. Again, this is essentially Freud’s argument in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, albeit using different terminology.
But how does an analyst engage with this irruption of the Real? Perhaps a good place to start is to go back to Davoine and Fromm’s idea that I referred to earlier of the therapist/ analyst as a therapon—a supportive witness who provides ‘little mirrors’ (for example, personal stories, myths, or cultural references) to help rebuild the subject’s fractured world. In other words, the analyst can support the subject in establishing a new type of sinthome, that is, a new kind of ‘knotting’ of the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary. In many ways this has strong echoes of how an analyst might work with a psychotic subject; and for good reasons. At the moment of the irruption of the Real into the subject’s ‘reality’ is essentially in the same position as the psychotic. Whether the subject has actually become psychotic is rather more problematic, insofar that ‘classical’ Lacanian theory argues that the clinical structure of psychotic, due to the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, is constituted at a very stage of the subject’s life (according this view one cannot ‘become’ a psychotic later in life). But, as I indicated earlier, perhaps adherence to ‘classical Lacanianism’ in the face of the traumascape of Ukraine is a fruitless enterprise…
Notes and references
- Leslie Chapman, Traumatic Neurosis Revisited: Drive-Jouissance and the Wounds of Life, The Palgrave Lacan Series (Palgrave Macmillan, 2025). ↑
- International Organization for Migration (IOM), Mental Health in Ukraine: Displacement, Vulnerabilities and Support (IOM, 2024). ↑
- Oleh Lushchak et al., ‘Prevalence of Stress, Anxiety, and Symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder among Ukrainians after the First Year of Russian Invasion: A Nationwide Cross-Sectional Study’, The Lancet Regional Health – Europe 36 (January 2024). ↑
- The rest of this paragraph draws on a Google Gemini AI generated article (31 July 2025) on the state of the Ukrainian mental health services prior to the Russian invasion of February 2022: https://gemini.google.com/app/2f65be4c29306257 ↑
- Irina Pinchuk et al., ‘Mental Health Services during the War in Ukraine: 2-Years Follow up Study.’, International Journal of Mental Health Systems (England) 19, no. 1 (2025). ↑
- Mariana Velykodna, ‘A Psychoanalyst’s Experience of Working in Wartime: On Choosing between Bad Options.’, Psychoanalytic Psychology (US) 40, no. 4 (2023): 238–42, ↑
- Jeanne Wolff Bernstein, ‘Working Under Conditions of War, The Ukraine’, CRITICA, 4 February 2025, https://critica.press/2025/02/04/working-under-conditions-of-war-the-ukraine/. ↑
- Sándor Ferenczi and others, Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses (Vienna: The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1921). The book also included a paper written by Ernest Jones and which was originally read before the Royal Society of Medicine, Section of Psychiatry, in April 1918. ↑
- Ibid., 2. ↑
- Or in some cases, psychotic or narcissistic. ↑
- Ibid., 31. ↑
- Ibid., 23. ↑
- Jacques Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII, trans. Russell Grigg (W.W Norton and Co., 2007), 48. ↑
- Ibid., 50. ↑
- Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Six Paradigms of Jouissance’, Psychoanalytical Notebooks, no. 34 (December 2019), 61. ↑
- Ibid., 60. ↑
- For a summary of the concept of ‘drive scraping’ please see my article on war and the theatre of trauma. ↑
- This somewhat peculiar idea is one that I discuss in many articles on this site and in my traumatic neurosis book. ↑
- Although to be fair to Miller, this does not appear to be a position he himself subscribes to. ↑
- Jacques Lacan, “There Are Four Discourses,” Culture/Clinic, no. 1 (2013): 3–4. For an interesting discussion of these ideas see Pierre-Gilles Guéguen, ‘Who Is Mad and Who Is Not? On Differential Diagnosis in Psychoanalysis’, Culture/Clinic, 1 (2013), 66–85. ↑
- See particularly Lacan’s discussion of Joyce in Seminar XXIII (Jacques Lacan, The Sinthome: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016).) ↑
- David Ferraro, “Some Further Questions Prior to Any Possible Treatment of the Psychoses,” Psychoanalysis Lacan 6 (2023): 69–76. ↑
Exploring the ‘wounds of life’ requires moving beyond the literal event to the structural truth of the drive. To see how this analysis fits into a wider clinical framework, please visit the Empire of Trauma Hub.
Last updated: November 5, 2026
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