A traumatic spectre is, once again, haunting Europe; but it is no longer the ghost of communism, nor is it the purely economic grievance that liberal commentators so desperately wish it to be. As we observe the political landscape of 2026, the rise of ethnonationalist movements across the continent demands a radical theoretical reappraisal. From the entrenched dominance of the AfD in Germany and the Rassemblement National in France, to the sudden, virulent emergence of Restore Britain in the UK, we are witnessing a phenomenon that evades traditional political science.1 Mainstream political analysts invariably approach these movements through the lens of rational-actor theory. They suggest that ethnonationalism is merely a misguided expression of economic anxiety, a reaction to deindustrialisation, or a backlash against the bureaucratic overreach of the European Union. Their proposed solutions remain steadfastly within the Symbolic order: better policies, improved infrastructure, educational programmes, or the careful management of civic immigration. Yet, these interventions consistently fail to defuse the nationalist charge.
To understand why technocratic governance and liberal policy fail to neutralise this threat, we must turn to Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis. Ethnonationalism is not merely a political ideology; it is a complex libidinal economy-a specific organisation of jouissance designed to shield the subject from the traumatic, structural lack inherent in human subjectivity. By examining the works of Ernesto Laclau, Slavoj Žižek, and late Jacques Lacan, we can trace how ethnonationalist movements do not operate on the axis of rational political desire, but rather on the destructive, repetitive circuits of the death drive.
Laclau, the Populist Subject, and the Limits of Desire
Any psychoanalytic investigation into modern populism must contend with the formidable framework established by Ernesto Laclau. In his seminal work, Laclau provided a rigorous formalisation of how a fragmented populace coheres into a political bloc. He demonstrated that ‘The Nation’ or ‘The True People’ possesses no positive ontological content; rather, it functions as an empty signifier-a Lacanian master signifier (S1) that retroactively unifies a heterogeneous ‘chain of equivalence’. Assorted frustrations regarding the economy, cultural traditionalism, and anti-globalisation are glued together by this shared, empty focal point. Furthermore, Laclau accurately identified the necessity of a ‘constitutive outside’. Drawing on the Lacanian Real as a limit to symbolisation, he recognised that an ethnonationalist identity can only maintain its consistency by defining what it is not. The ‘People’ require the ‘Enemy’-the immigrant, the metropolitan elite, the globalist-to sustain their own internal frontier.
However, as insightful as Laclau’s discursive mechanics are, they reveal profound limitations when applied to the visceral density of hard ethnonationalism. A critical examination of these limitations can be found in my post on Laclau’s theory of the populist subject and this one on Trump’s second term, both of which highlight a fundamental flaw in Laclau’s conception of the populist subject’s libidinal investment. Laclau, leaning heavily on Joan Copjec, translates unmet demands into grievances by theorising that each grievance represents an instance of a desire for the lost object, the objet petit a. My basic argument is that is incorrect to assume simply that populism is rooted in unsatisfied desires, which implies that if ‘the people’ could only be given what they want (through policy concessions), the grievance would vanish. But desire, structurally founded upon lack, can never be satisfied. If a liberal administration were to address every demand on a case-by-case basis (creating what Laclau terms a ‘differential chain’), ‘the people’ would remain unappeased.
The problem is that Laclau domesticates the Real. He reduces it to a purely logical or discursive limit; the impossibility of a closed society. In doing so, he strips the Real of its traumatic, material weight and prioritises desire over the much more destructive force that actually fuels ethnonationalism: the drive.
The Circuit of the Drive and the Jouissance of Grievance
If desire seeks an impossible satisfaction, the drive operates on an entirely different economy. As Lacan elucidated in Seminar XI, and as Chapman reiterates, the ‘satisfaction’ of the drive lies precisely in its non-satisfaction. The drive does not want to attain the object; it wants to endlessly orbit it. It is this repetitive, acephalic circling that produces the real, raw satisfaction known as jouissance. This structural distinction explains the fundamental strategy of ethnonationalist movements. Their strategy is not to formulate coherent policies to resolve issues, but rather to perpetually stoke grievances. The grievances are the manifestation of the drive. Liberal democracy attempts to mediate the drive through the Symbolic order-institutions, bureaucracy, and the slow machinery of politics. Ethnonationalism, conversely, bypasses the Symbolic to directly engage the political (the domain of the Real). It offers its followers immediate access to the jouissance of the drive.
We see this in the relentless rhetoric of Restore Britain. Their campaigns regarding ‘stopping the boats’ or ‘reclaiming the streets’ are not practical policy platforms; they are mechanisms for the production of friction. The movement does not actually want the ‘problem’ to be solved, because the complete removal of the antagonist would collapse the entire libidinal structure, cutting off the supply of jouissance. The endless, antagonistic frontier is the point.
Žižek and the Theft of Enjoyment
Where Laclau’s framework remains too clean and overly reliant on the axis of desire, Slavoj Žižek provides the necessary theoretical corrective. Žižek reintroduces the obscene, traumatic density of jouissance into the political field, insisting that the symbolic machinery of nationalism only functions because it is glued together by a sticky residue of the Real. One of Žižek’s most important contributions to understanding the ethnonationalist psyche is the concept of the theft of enjoyment. He posits that the nationalist fantasy is inherently paranoid. It is organised around the conviction that the Other (the refugee, the immigrant, the foreign worker) has stolen the nation’s jouissance.2
The ethnonationalist subject believes that their society would be a harmonious, unified, and fully enjoyable corporate body if it were not for this external parasite. The Other is blamed for ‘stealing our jobs’ while simultaneously being accused of ‘lazily living on benefits’. This contradictory logic is essential: it reveals that the hatred of the Other is, in fact, the subject’s hatred of their own structural castration, projected outwards. The nation is inherently fractured by class struggle and the contradictions of global capital-‘Society doesn’t exist’, as Laclau would say. But rather than face this traumatic lack, the nationalist fantasy elevates the figure of the Intruder to the status of a fetish, a screen that covers over the impossibility of society.Furthermore, the Other is not just a thief; they are perceived to possess a strange, excessive, and obscene jouissance of their own. They are fantasised as having access to a vitality that the host nation lacks. This paranoid relationship to the Other’s enjoyment is the absolute core of the Restore Britain narrative, which constantly frames cultural changes not merely as differences in custom, but as an existential, vampiric drain on the ‘native’ life force.
Crucially, Žižek highlights the ‘obscene superego supplement’. Ethnonationalist communities are rarely bound by their official, public-facing manifestos. Instead, they are cemented by an unwritten, subterranean complicity in transgression. In the digital spaces where Restore Britain organises, cohesion is forged through dark humour, illicit memes, and shared fantasies of violence. To truly belong to the in-group, one must participate in this surplus-enjoyment. Laclau’s focus on the formal articulation of demands entirely misses this nocturnal, superegoic injunction that commands the subject to enjoy the suffering of the Other.
Blood, Soil, and the Body
A persistent question arises: why does ethnonationalism place such an absolute emphasis on ethnicity-on ‘blood and soil’; on being, for example, ‘white Anglo-Saxon’, rather than simply uniting people based on their shared geographic residency or economic class? After all, residents of varied ethnic backgrounds in a deprived post-industrial town share the same lack of infrastructure and the same economic grievances.
The answer lies in the distinction between the Symbolic and the Real. The category of the ‘resident’ or the ‘citizen’ belongs entirely to the Symbolic order. It is a bureaucratic abstraction, a matter of passports and tax codes. But jouissance cannot float freely in the symbolic network; it demands a somatic locus. A shared economic grievance articulates a demand, but ethnonationalism is driven by the structural necessity to locate, isolate, and materialise the cause of one’s missing jouissance. Ethnicity functions as an anchor in the Real. It provides the illusion of a pre-discursive substance. The signifiers of ‘blood’, ‘ancestry’, and ‘race’ masquerade as something existing outside of language. They offer the fantasy of a chthonic, biological bedrock-a substantial fullness that supposedly preceded the alienating cuts of the Symbolic order. While residency is contingent and reversible, ‘blood’ offers the paranoid comfort of an immutable destiny.
This somatic anchoring is a direct response to the conditions of late capitalism. In an era of capitalist realism and algorithmic governance, where everything is reduced to fluid exchange value and abstract data, ethnicity offers a regressive, hard limit. It is a frantic attempt to ground identity in the stubborn, irreducible matter of the flesh, serving as a bulwark against the terrifying, homogenising fluidity of the global market.
When the ‘theft of enjoyment’ occurs in the nationalist fantasy, this threat is always imagined at the level of the body. The racist obsession focuses on birth rates, physical proximity, and bodily boundaries. Because the perceived threat is so profoundly somatic, the defensive barrier must also be somatic. A shared postcode cannot insulate the subject from the traumatic proximity of the Other’s jouissance; only an impenetrable, biological boundary promises to do so. This is why civic nationalism continually fails to satisfy the drive, and why movements inevitably harden into ethnonationalism. The death drive requires a durable, intractable frontier, and biology provides the ultimate canvas for this destructive circling.
The Sinthome: Late Lacan and the Intractable Knot
If we apply classical Freudian analysis, we might treat ethnonationalism as a symptom-a repressed message demanding interpretation and cure. In this framework, resolving the underlying economic grievances or ‘educating’ the subject should dissolve the symptom. But as the intractability of movements such as Restore Britain demonstrates, liberal education and economic tinkering achieve nothing. To understand why, we must turn to Lacan’s later teaching, specifically Seminar XXIII, and his shift from the symptom to the sinthome.3 From this perspective, ethnonationalism is not a message waiting to be deciphered; it is an opaque, unreadable fourth ring in the Borromean topology that artificially knots together the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary.
Under the accelerating pressures of digital modernity, the traditional Symbolic order-the Name-of-the-Father, institutional authority, universal civic identity-is deeply compromised. It can no longer hold the subject’s reality together. In this vacuum, the ethnonationalist sinthome emerges as a synthetic prosthesis. The nationalist subject invents a singular, idiosyncratic knot, fixated on the myths of heritage and the biological Real, to staple their disintegrating universe together.
The ethnonationalist subject does not adhere to their ideology because it makes logical sense; they cling to it because, without this specific organisation of drive-jouissance, their psychic architecture would collapse into absolute subjective destitution. The sinthome operates outside meaning (hors-sens). Attempting to debate a Restore Britain supporter on the terrain of economic statistics or historical facts is theoretically naive. The sinthome is simply a machine for extracting enjoyment from the friction of borders and the hatred of the intruder. Viewed through this lens, the nationalist subject is a structural effect of a malfunctioning code-an acephalic, algorithmic subroutine generated as an emergency patch when the primary Symbolic network fails.
Conclusion: Clinical and Political Horizons
The clinical and political implications of understanding ethnonationalism as a sinthome powered by the death drive are stark. We can no longer operate under the illusion that these movements are temporary aberrations of desire that can be smoothed over by a more efficient democratic process. As I argued in my previous articles, the drive demands its orbit, and it will find a way to extract its jouissance.
If we cannot interpret or dissolve the ethnonationalist knot through standard liberal hermeneutics, what remains? In the clinic, Lacan’s final aim was to help the subject ‘identify with their sinthome’; to separate the subjective scaffolding of the knot from the lethal, destructive excess of the death drive. The work is a pragmatic draining of the toxic surplus-enjoyment, allowing the subject to maintain the idiosyncratic structure that keeps them sane, but without requiring the absolute destruction of the Other to do so.
Translating this clinical objective to the macrosocial, political sphere of 2026 is the defining challenge of our era. How do we build a Symbolic order robust enough to absorb the chthonic anchors of populations adrift in algorithmic capitalism, without feeding the obscene superego that demands blood? Until we confront the politics of the Real, movements like Restore Britain will continue their endless, destructive orbit, feeding on the jouissance of a fractured continent.
Notes and references
- Strictly speaking, applying the label ‘ethnonationalist’ to parties such as Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and France’s Rassemblement National (RN) is contested among political scientists, who often prefer ‘nativist’ or ‘ethnopluralist’. The AfD comes closer to classical völkisch ethnonationalism-an assessment central to the German domestic intelligence agency’s (BfV) ongoing legal battles over its ‘right-wing extremist’ designation-whereas the RN officially repudiates biological racism and frames its préférence nationale policies in the civic language of French Republicanism and laïcité. From a Lacanian perspective, however, this civic veneer is itself symptomatic: where post-war European taboos bar overt racial signifiers, the underlying libidinal boundary against the unassimilable Other simply attaches itself to legally permissible signifiers such as Leitkultur or ‘Republican values’.↩︎
- Slavoj Žižek, “Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead,” New Left Review I, no. 183 (1990): 50–62.↩︎
- Jacques Lacan, The Sinthome: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Polity Press, 2016).↩︎
This article is part of a broader research track. For a complete structural overview, please visit the The Empire of Trauma: From the Event to the Drive Hub.
While psychoanalytic theory conceptualises trauma, repetition, and the limits of the signifier, clinical work takes place in the singular encounter with one’s own symptom. If you are seeking a space to speak that lies outside directive or manualised therapies, I can offer psychoanalytic consultations online via Therapeia. Please click here for further details.