Culture and/or clinic? (part 1)
Culture and/or clinic? (part 1)

Culture and/or clinic? (part 1)

In their introduction to what turned out to be the one and only issue of Culture/Clinic, Marie-Hélèn Brousse and Maire Jaanus  begin by acknowledging that that, traditionally, the idea of culture and that of the psychoanalytic clinic have been regarded as constituting two different fields:

The slash in Culture/Clinic (C/C) underlines the difference but also the proximity between these two entities. Both in France and the United States, psychoanalysis in the Lacanian orientation has developed in two directions: psychoanalysis applied to mental suffering and psychoanalysis applied to culture.[1]

However, they go on to argue that Lacan’s propositions that the unconscious is structured as a language and that the social bond is a discourse that “renders this opposition untenable and enables culture and clinic, with their different emphases, to focus on what is common to them both, the real of the symptom.”[2]

Brousse and Jaanus argue that it’s Lacan’s theory of the four discourses that allow the overlap of clinic and culture, whereby “the symptom circulates with its effects on the body and on thought, creating resonances and soundings that seek both readdress and address.”[3] They go on to argue that:

The analytic and hysteric discourses reveal how the analyst and analysand in the clinic may face and experience new symptoms, new desires, and new forms of jouissance, whereas the master and university discourses expose how other cultural writers and theorists may relate to developments in cultural, social, political, economic and scientific fields.[4]

Slightly further on in the same paragraph the authors refer to civilisation as being a symptom, which in the context of this text seems to suggest that culture itself is a symptom:

It seemed necessary to create a space in which American and European traditions would come into contact, encounter each other, where clinical experience and civilization – considered as a symptom – could exchange views.[5]

At the same time, though, the authors:

…hold that the analytic discourse cannot exist without the experience of the couch. It is its absolute condition, just as experimentation and calculation are the absolute conditions of experimental sciences. The couch is psychoanalysis’s laboratory. Yet cultural productions teach analysts just as much as texts produced by the free associations of analysands during the analytic treatment.[6]

These remarks regarding the ‘overlap’ of clinic and culture still appear to privilege the clinic over culture, even as the authors are at pains to emphasis that ‘culture/clinic’ should be read as ‘culture with clinic’. They also argue, following Lacan, that cultural productions, e.g. artistic ones, ‘pave the way’ for the analyst. In other words, cultural productions, and their creators, for example the directors of TV series, “are outstanding clinicians, staging fragments of subjective discourses.”[7] To put it another way, cultural productions (and producers) are ways to ‘stage’ the analytic act itself:

When we look at artworks or other creative and innovative practices, it is always in this spirit and according to the analytic method, the two poles of which are the signifying chain on the one hand, and the mode of jouissance on the other. These are the two, knotted forces of contradiction and truth that make the modern subject the paradoxical being that Shakespeare so pre-eminently dramatized. [8]

It’s worth noting at this point that the authors are referring to both clinical and cultural psychoanalysis as ‘applied’, which harks back to the early days of psychoanalysis when there was not such a ‘privileging’ of clinical practice (see my post on this). Having said that, I think there is still some confusion regarding whether or not Brousse and Jaanus are privileging the clinic.

On the one hand, they argue that without the experience of the couch, i.e. the clinic, there is no analytic discourse. In this sense, although culture and cultural productions may provide the ‘grist to the mill’ of analytic work (especially bearing in mind that much of the material produced within an analytic session is culturally mediated in the first place), it is only within the context of the clinic that such productions can be properly analysed.

On the other hand, when the authors make remarks such as “The creators of the best TV series are outstanding clinicians, staging fragments of subjective discourses”, then this seems to imply that the analytic clinic is not confined to the analyst’s consulting room.

Perhaps things are even more complicated than this, especially bearing in mind my earlier remark that much (if not all) of the analysand’s productions in the clinic are culturally mediated. By this I mean that whatever an analysand may talk about in analysis, this does not come out of nowhere. More to the point, it does not originate ‘outside’ of culture, even when it appears to refer to what is most intimate and ‘private’ to the subject.

For example, when a subject speaks in analysis about their particular mode of satisfaction, their specific mode of jouissance, this ‘production’, this discourse, may appear to be very intimate and unique to the individual concerned. However, there are a number of difficulties with sustaining this position. To start with, the subject is always already constrained by the language they use to articulate their specific mode of jouissance, unless they resort to a series of neologisms. And even here they are still drawing on elements of an existing language (or languages). Furthermore, the subject did not appear out of nowhere, was not a product of autopoiesis (self-creation); rather they were born both into and from a pre-existing culture, and as a product of a pre-existing genetic coding, which is itself a form of discursive formation. In other words, we have to think very carefully about what it means to be a ‘unique’ subject.

References

  1. Marie-Hélèn Brousse and Maire Jaanus, ‘Culture/Clinic: Two Different Fields but a Single Orientation’, in Culture/Clinic: Applied Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), pp. vii–xvi., p.vii. ↑
  2. Ibid, p.vii. ↑
  3. Ibid p.viii ↑
  4. Ibid p.viii ↑
  5. Ibid p.viii ↑
  6. Ibid p.viii ↑
  7. Ibid p.ix ↑
  8. Ibid pp.viii-ix ↑