A materialist Lacan?
A materialist Lacan?

A materialist Lacan?

I wonder sometimes if the current Covid-19 crisis is encouraging some Lacanians and fellow-travellers to rethink the whole question of the ontology. And I’m thinking especially of those who in the past have tended to be dismissive, or at least suspicious of, any form of ‘biologism’ or ‘essentialism’ in psychoanalysis. In other words, the idea that there might be a biological ‘base’ to human being and human subjectivity. I only mention Covid because if you are unfortunate to end up in an ICU or worse then, I would argue, it becomes rather more difficult to deny the biological dimension of our existence.

Admittedly, I’m probably being a bit unfair here and constructing a parody of the ‘Lacanian’ who argues that we (that is, human beings) are essentially products of language and that somehow there is no room (or need) for any biological considerations. In actual fact, I suspect most Lacanians would not adopt such a (radically) ‘constructionist’ position, and would allow that there are some aspects of the human being that are ‘beyond’ language and discourse. Just to give a simple example: Lucie Cantin, in her chapter ‘The Trauma of Language’ in After Lacan, argues that there is a need to differentiate between the body and the organism, and that only human beings have bodies.[1] What she is referring to here is the idea that the ‘body’ is a product of language, that is, signifiers, which ‘cut up’ and ‘slice’ the organism in order to form the human body. Although she does not specifically mention the human organism in her text, presumably she is not denying this aspect of the human being, and, if so, is acknowledging that there is an ‘extra-discursive’ dimension to human existence.

The problem here, however, is that this immediately raises the question of essentialism; that is, the idea that there is some universal substance or essence that is at the root of ‘humanness’. But there is an even bigger problem here: namely, that the concept of an ‘organism’ is itself a discursive product; and to be more precise, the product of biological discourse. In other words, biology, as a science, is as much a discourse as any other discipline. This seems to suggest that the dichotomy ‘biology-discourse’ is a false one. Does it follow, therefore, that the radical constructionists are right after all and that, in the end, everything is a product of language and discourse?

Perhaps, but this still begs the question of the being of language itself. For the radical constructionist, the signifier is the basis of reality, which would seem to make it just another type of essence. This is basically Tom Eyers’ argument, or rather, the logical consequence of it, because for him it is the signifier-in-isolation (Lacan’s letter or unary trait) that constitutes the Symbolic order and which in turn constitutes the human subject.[2] Ironically, Eyers uses this idea to promote the idea of a Lacanian materialism in opposition to possible idealist readings of Lacan. I use the word ‘ironically’ because the critique of idealism is also a critique of essentialism, and in this case, the critique of the transcendental subject.

This was the basis of Coward and Ellis’ critique of idealism and its notion of the bourgeois subject, and their use of Lacanian psychoanalysis (along with Barthes’ semiotics) to develop a materialist theory of the subject.[3] At the same time, though, they were aiming to avoid a crude ‘mechanical’ or reductionist materialism, which they saw as a weakness in the traditional Marxist approach. Their ideas were taken up and developed by a number of post-structuralist and post-Marxist theorists, including Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe who argued that a true materialism needed to be based on a relational theory of the subject, rather than an essentialist, idealist one. Although these ideas were introduced in their seminal work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,[4] it was actually in their rebuttal of Norman Geras’ scathing critique of their book[5] that they laid out in some detail the philosophical basis for their arguments.[6]

In particular, they were at some pains to point out the both the differences and the relationships between idealism, realism and materialism. One their key arguments was that there was no necessary contradiction between idealism and realism, because both posit an objective reality beyond human thought. Although this might sound a rather surprising argument in relation to idealism, what Laclau and Mouffe are getting at is that idealism is based on the idea of transcendental forms or ideas, which the (rational) human mind is able to contemplate. This applies equally to Plato’s philosophy as it does to Hegel’s. Perhaps even more surprising, however, is Laclau and Mouffe’s assertion that Marxism is itself idealist, even though Marx claimed to have turned Hegel ‘on his head’. This is because, they argue, Marx, and subsequently his many followers, thought they were able to contemplate the ‘objective laws of history’, that is, the unfolding of the dialectic of history. This is essentially an idealist argument, not a materialist one.

For Laclau and Mouffe, a truly materialist philosophy is based on the constant interplay and dynamics of social relations, which are being continually reconfigured (the basis of hegemony). And it is through this constant interplay and reconfiguration that human subjects are produced, rather than there being any ‘transcendental’ and ‘universal’ essence or form of the subject. In his later writings Laclau is more explicit in his use of Lacanian theory in order to develop his theory of politics and the subject.

Returning for a moment to Eyers’ argument, as I pointed out above although he claims to be promoting the case for a materialist reading of Lacan, the idea of the signifier-in-isolation looks suspiciously like an essentialist one, which, according to Laclau and Mouffe’s approach, would make his an idealist reading. In other words, the signifier-in-isolation becomes the transcendental form or essence that constitutes reality (the Symbolic-Imaginary).

But all this begs the question as to why idealism, and more specifically, essentialism, is so problematic for many people, including many who work within the Lacanian tradition. As Dave Elder-Vass points out, anti-essentialism is foundational for constructionism, that is, the idea that reality is constructed by language and discourse (and in its more radical form this includes the natural world as well as the social).[7] One of the problems with essentialism, according to its opponents, is not only does it posit some kind of fundamental feature (essence) that makes a person what they are, for example a man or a woman, but, furthermore, such essences are fixed and cannot be changed. And from a political point of view, it is this second characteristic of essentialism that is particularly problematic.

But as Elder-Vass goes onto argue, the idea of fixed essences is to misunderstand essentialism. He cites Andrew Sayer’s argument that things are as they are because of the, “…of the intrinsic causal powers, capacities and propensities of their basic constituents and how they are arranged.” [8] These are what Elder-Vass calls the micro-structure of things. However, he stresses that such micro-structures need not exist in isolation, that is, there may be multiple structures within a particular entity; and furthermore, such micro-structures may fall within a range of what is called a natural kind. The idea of natural kinds would be pretty much anathema to anti-essentialists because it argues that, “…things of the world may fall ‘naturally’ into groups, irrespective of how we label them…”[9] This is in complete opposition to the constructionist argument that, “…when we create categories…we cluster things together by the very act of naming them as a class, whereas such classes do not exist in nature before we impose them on it.”[10]

Elder-Vass goes onto explain that there are two types of natural kind (i) the single property type, in which members of this kind have a single property in common, which is based on them having the same micro-structural features; and (ii) cluster kinds, where members have multiple properties in common, which arise from a set of micro-structural features that are only found in members of such a kind. Elder-Vass argues that these different properties (essences) can overlap in many cases, which gives rise to a range of possibilities within a particular cluster kind. Elder-Vass gives the example of the Indian rhino, which shares many features with African White and Black rhinos with the exception of having only one horn instead of two. The essentialist argument is that Indian rhinos have more than one essence; in other words, they are a member of a cluster (natural) kind rather than a single property type. The idea of cluster kinds, in particular, allows for a great deal of ‘flexibility’ with regards to the characteristics of a particular entity, and counters the argument of the anti-essentialists who claim that essentialism equals fixity.

However, I’m not convinced that this argument alone would be enough to convince most constructionists. And the reason for this is that what Elder-Vass defines as ‘linguistic hegemony’ appears to have become entrenched within the social sciences and humanities. This is the idea that reality is constructed by language, and it’s very easy to see why its adherents would turn to Lacanian theory to support such an argument because of the centrality that language plays in Lacan’s work. However, I would argue that this is a misunderstanding of the ontological (for want of a better word) basis of Lacan’s approach to psychoanalysis. More precisely, it is based on a conflation of Lacan’s positions regarding biologism and biology.

Biologism, or biological determinism, is the idea that all human life, experience and behaviour is ultimately grounded in biology, for example in genetics, physiology or neurochemistry. As far as Freud is concerned, I think there are grounds for arguing that throughout his life he held onto this position at least to some extent.[11] Lacan, on the other hand and as Eyers points out in his book, rejected this view.[12] This immediately raises the question, in my view at least, as to the exact nature of the ‘materialism’ that Eyers is promoting; it is clearly not the idea that the human being can be ‘reduced’ to matter or some other ‘substance’. Or is it? As I noted earlier, Eyers’ ‘anti-idealist’ reading of Lacan appears to be haunted by the spectre of essentialism in the form of the signifier-in-isolation.

But coming back to the question of Lacan’s rejection of biologism, this should not be taken as a rejection of biology. As Jacques-Alain Miller demonstrates in his text on Lacanian biology, Lacan took biology very seriously indeed.[13] What interested Lacan, however, was the precise relationship between (human) being, the body, the signifier, the drive, and jouissance, especially in the context of his reading of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle[14] and the concept of the death drive. Bearing all this in mind, I think it would be hard to sustain an argument for using Lacan’s ideas to support constructionism. Instead, I think there is a strong case for arguing that Lacan was operating within a realist ontological framework.

The type of realism I’m referring to here has nothing to do with some kind of ‘naïve empiricism’ based on sensory experience and the idea of cause as a (unperceived) ‘constant conjunction of events.’ Rather, I’m referring to what is now called critical realism, and which has developed out of the work of Roy Bhaskar (who originally used the term ‘transcendental realism’) and others. The key ideas of critical realism were laid out in Bhaskar’s A Realist Theory of Science, first published in 1975.[15]

Bhaskar argued that there were three traditions in the philosophy of science: empiricism, transcendental idealism, and transcendental realism. Empiricism is a tradition rooted in the ideas of the eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume, and which I have, perhaps rather unfairly, referred to above as ‘naïve empiricism’. In fact, Hume’s ideas are anything but naïve, but instead are trying to tackle the fundamental problem of how human beings can know anything about the world.[16] Furthermore, it’s probably fair to say that empiricism, in one form or another, is still regarded, especially by non-scientists, as constituting ‘real science’ and is the basis for much ‘evidence-based’ research. As I indicated above, empiricism is rooted in the idea that knowledge of the world can only be obtained through the senses, which would include the results of experiments and surveys. Empiricism also makes use of theory and hypothesis testing, and this is where things start to become problematic, especially when it comes to the tricky question of causality and the development of scientific laws. Most, if not all, scientific laws are based on the idea that one thing causes another, for example, the moon’s gravity causes the tides. The problem here is that causes can only ever be inferred; there is no way to empirically observe a cause. What can be observed is what Hume referred to as a ‘constant conjunction of events’, by which he meant that if we observe repeatedly that one event follows another, then there are grounds for thinking one ‘causes’ the other. Ultimately, ‘causes’ are based on statistical probability, which is part of the hypothesis testing process, and which in fact has very little to do with sensory observation.

Transcendental idealism, on the other hand, is much more ambitious. Whereas empiricism is well aware of the limits of human knowledge and restricts itself to what can be observed (measured), transcendental idealism, somewhat paradoxically, both recognises the limitations of empiricism and human knowledge and yet, at the same time, attempts to go beyond (transcend) them by virtue of rational thought. It is a tradition that can be traced back to Plato and culminated in the philosophies of Kant and Hegel.[17] As I explained earlier when discussing the differences between materialism and idealism, the latter is based on the idea of transcendental forms or essences (also referred to as universals) and that the sensory world of lived experience is made up of ‘reflections’ of such forms. One of the main problems with this approach, however, is that it is always in danger of collapsing into subjectivism, even though it is not a subjectivist philosophy; in other words, it becomes hard (if not impossible) to differentiate between the objects of thought and the thoughts themselves. Although transcendental idealism does not deny the existence of an objective reality, such a reality essentially collapses into the ideas of the subject contemplating such a reality.

Transcendental or critical realism, on the other hand, attempts to resolve both the limitations of both empiricism and transcendental idealism. Bhaskar’s starting point is that there two types of objects of knowledge: intransitive and transitive. Intransitive objects exist regardless of whether there are human beings there to contemplate them, whereas transitive objects are the ideas that human beings develop about such objects, which is what constitutes science. Closely related to this differentiation of objects is what Bhaskar calls ‘the epistemic fallacy’, which is where ontology (questions about being) becomes transposed into questions about the knowledge of being. And it’s a short step to arguing that questions about the knowledge of being become questions about language (the concepts used to construct the knowledge of being). Although Bhaskar’s main focus of critique is empiricism (especially the Humean variety), he notes that transcendental idealism also falls into the same trap:

…as in some varieties of Platonism and rationalism, he (the philosopher) were to define the world in terms of the possibility of non-empirical knowledge of it. For the transcendental realist it is not a necessary condition for the existence of the world that science occurs. But it is a necessary condition for the occurrence of science that the world exists and is of a certain type. (Bhaskar, 2008: 38)

The key point here is that causal laws are intransitive, unlike the knowledge of such laws, which are transitive; in other words, they would operate even if there was no one there to theorise them. Such laws are ways to describe the underlying mechanisms of reality which produce the phenomena that empiricists are so keen to observe and measure. The role of the scientist is to trigger such mechanisms, for example, by way of an experiment.

Perhaps the most radical, and controversial, assertion of critical realism is that it can not only be applied to the natural world but also to the social world. Although Bhaskar’s original work focused on the natural sciences, he and others soon developed it as way to describe social reality as well. In fact, one of the aims of critical realism is to undermine the commonly held view (especially within the social and ‘human’ sciences) that social reality requires a completely different epistemology in order to engage with it. For the critical realist such a view is untenable; however, this is not because of some crude ‘reductionism’ of social and human reality into biology and physics. Rather, reductionism is replaced with stratification, which is the idea that each ‘level’ or ‘strata’ of reality, for example, physical reality, social reality, etc, has to be engaged with on its own terms. However, this does not mean that each different ‘strata’ occupies a different ontological ‘universe’.

What has all this to do with psychoanalysis? To start with, as far as I can tell there has been very little written about critical realism in relation to psychoanalysis, and, more specifically, Lacanian psychoanalysis.[18] This immediately raises the question: why not? Is it because, as I’ve suggested above, many ‘Lacanians’ take a more constructionist approach to Lacan’s work – either explicitly or implicitly? Quite possibly, but I think it is also the case that (i) the ideas of critical realism have yet to circulate widely within the psychoanalytic community and (ii) there are some real conceptual difficulties when it comes to trying to define the ‘intransitive objects’ of psychoanalysis. In other words, although there are plenty of transitive objects, that is, the body of knowledge that constitutes psychoanalysis, it is hard to conceptualise whether these relate to objects that exist independently of human thought. What, for example, is the ontological status of jouissance, the objet a, the drive, etc?

Notes and references

  1. Lucie Cantin, ‘The Trauma of Language’, in After Lacan: Clinical Practice and the Subject of the Unconscious, ed. by Robert Hughes and Kareen Malone (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 35–47. ↑
  2. See especially his paper on Lacan and materialism (Eyers, Tom, ‘Lacanian Materialism and the Question of the Real’, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 7.1 (2011), 155–66) and his book (Eyers, Tom, Lacan and the Concept of the ‘Real’ (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). ↑
  3. Rosalind Coward and John Ellis, Language and Materialism: Developments in the Semiology and Theory of the Subject (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977). ↑
  4. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 2nd edn (London: Verso, 2001). ↑
  5. Norman Geras, ‘Post-Marxism?’, New Left Review, 163, 1987, 40–82. ↑
  6. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, ‘Post-Marxism without Apologies’, New Left Review, 166 (1987), 79–106. ↑
  7. Dave Elder-Vass, The Reality of Social Construction (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) ↑
  8. Quoted in Elder-Vass, The Reality of Social Construction, 125. ↑
  9. Ibid., 126. ↑
  10. Ibid., 125. ↑
  11. See, for example, the closing paragraph of Analysis Terminable and Interminable, one of Freud’s last substantive texts, in which he writes, in relation to the concept of penis-envy and the ‘masculine protest’: “We often have the impression that…we have penetrated through all the psychological strata and have reached bedrock, and thus our activities are at an end. This is probably true, since, for the psychical field, the biological field does in fact play the part of the underlying bedrock.” Freud, Sigmund, ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’, in The Standard Edition, ed. by James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1937), XXIII 211–253: 252 ↑
  12. For example, in Seminar II Lacan states that, “Freudian biology has nothing to do with biology.” Lacan, Jacques, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 75. However, Lacan immediately clarifies this statement by pointing out that for Freud the question of ‘biology’ was related to the question of (psychical) energy (libido, and what in Lacan would be classified as jouissance). ↑
  13. The text is in two parts: Miller, Jacques-Alain, ‘Lacanian Biology and the Event of the Body Part I’, The Symptom, 2019 <https://www.lacan.com/symptom/lacanian-biology-miller/> and Miller, Jacques-Alain, ‘Lacanian Biology and the Event of the Body Part II’, The Symptom, 2019 <https://www.lacan.com/symptom/lacanian-biology-and-the-event-of-the-body-part-ii/> ↑
  14. Sigmund Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, in The Standard Edition (London: Hogarth Press, 1920g), XVIII, 3–64. ↑
  15. Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, Rev. ed. (London: Routledge, 2008). ↑
  16. For a useful introduction to Hume’s work see Antony Flew’s, ‘Hume’, in A Critical History of Western Philosophy, ed. by D. J. O’Connor (New York: The Free Press, 1985), pp. 253–74. ↑
  17. For an introduction to Kant’s work see Geoffrey J. Warnock, ‘Kant’, in A Critical History of Western Philosophy, ed. by D. J. O’Connor (New York: The Free Press, 1985), pp. 296–318.  For an introduction to Hegel see John N Findlay op. cit., 319-340. ↑
  18. One notable exception is Levi Bryant’s 2009 blog article: Bryant, Levi R., ‘A Psychoanalytic Defense of Realism’, Larval Subjects , 2009 <https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2009/11/17/a-psychoanalytic-defense-of-realism/> ↑