PTSD and its vicissitudes
PTSD and its vicissitudes

PTSD and its vicissitudes

The invention of PTSD

According to the standard narrative, prior to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) there were a range of psychological ‘conditions’ or ‘disorders’ that were essentially describing the same set of symptoms, which included nightmares, flashbacks, panic attacks, depression, anxiety, difficulties in concentrating, and so on. Much of this narrative focuses on how such symptoms manifested themselves in war, starting with the Great War, which began in 1914, and, depending on which country you were living in at the time, may or may not have ended in 1918.

As a number of authors have argued, PTSD is a direct legacy of the Vietnam War (as opposed to the Great one) and of intense political lobbying by a group of therapists, psychiatrists, and veterans. In 1980 the term PTSD was finally recognised as a psychiatric category and took its place in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III), the ‘bible’ of the American psychiatric profession. For a very readable account of the political and psychiatric ‘construction’ of PTSD, as well as its various ‘predecessors’, see Ben Shephard’s War of Nerves[1] and also Wilbur Scott’s paper on the politics of PTSD in relation to the aftermath of the Vietnam War.[2]

At the same time though, there are striking similarities with the Great War. Like its predecessor, the Vietnam War was (and still is) subjected to a process of ‘reimagining’, to paraphrase the title of Samuel Hynes’ study of the Great War and of English culture.[3] And many of the same issues were at stake in what might be described as ‘Generation Love meets Generation (Cold) War’. There was the question of continuity versus discontinuity: that is, was the war really a major turning point for the United States or was it simply the continuation of a long, drawn out historical process? Was it a generational war, of young versus old? Was it a question of ‘culture versus Kultur’, the progressive, enlightened liberal left versus the old, reactionary, and philistine right? All these questions had been rehearsed (though not, as it turns out, resolved) in the 1920s.

And in the middle of this there is the question of trauma. What to make of, and what to do with, all those psychologically damaged individuals who came back from the war:

More than any other war in the twentieth century, Vietnam redefined the social role of psychiatry and society’s perspective of mental health. Five years after the fall of Saigon, a new psychiatric term was devised, tailored to the needs of veterans. Psychiatric counselling was made available on an unparalleled scale, paid for by the United States government. Even more significantly, Vietnam helped to create a new ‘consciousness of trauma’ in Western society.[4]

Shephard argues that there were four key elements that lay behind this new ‘consciousness of trauma’, and the appearance of this ‘new psychiatric term’ (PTSD). The first was the ‘acrid’ political aftermath of the war in the United States. This was the era of Watergate and where the government itself was on trial. Vietnam, as the war that the US lost, was a toxic and divisive subject, and the question of how it had affected individual (US) combatants was itself a contentious subject. Those who opposed the war wanted to emphasise the negative psychological effects, whilst those who had supported the war wanted to play down such effects. It should also be remembered that, unlike the Second World War, there was no heroic homecoming for soldiers; rather they were more likely to be treated with suspicion and contempt.

The second element was the legacy of the Nazi Holocaust, and to a lesser extent, that of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. As survivors of the concentration camps started to come forward in large numbers in the 1970s to tell their stories, there was a growing realisation amongst American psychiatrists and other mental health professionals of the traumas that the camp inmates had experienced, and in many cases were still experiencing. Some professionals started to make the connection with the experiences of Vietnam veterans and even coined the term ‘survivor syndrome’. This also contributed to a gradual broadening of the notion of trauma, which until then had been confined to the experiences of soldiers in combat.

The third element was the biological revolution in American psychiatry, and with it the growing use of psychotropic drugs to treat a wide range of mental health problems. This was reflected in the proposals for the third edition of the DSM. The two previous versions (DSM I and DSM II) had been heavily influenced by psychoanalytic ideas and terminology, and, perhaps even more significantly in relation to the concerns of the Vietnam veterans, both previous versions had included a category for war-related trauma. In DSM III, however, there was to be no separate classification for trauma, because it was being argued that existing psychiatric categories were adequate to explain the problems suffered by combatants and veterans. This had serious implications for veterans, because in order to receive proper support they felt they needed a separate ‘war trauma’ category; and, furthermore, with regard to possible financial compensation, claimants needed to show a link between combat experiences and their subsequent psychological trauma.

This brings us to the fourth, and perhaps most crucial element of all: the politics of the Vietnam veterans, and particularly their forging of alliances with sympathetic psychiatrists and psychotherapists. Some veteran organisations started to use the media to highlight the psychological effects of the war, and a number of ‘vet horror stories’ appeared, portraying deeply disturbed, and often heavily armed, ex-combatants running amok in the towns and cities of America. Inevitably, perhaps, this was picked up by Hollywood, and films such as Taxi Driver and Rambo helped reinforce the perception that the war had seriously traumatised a whole generation of young Americans, even though the statistics did not back this up. However, the real breakthrough came when psychiatrists sympathetic to the veterans’ cause started to develop a more robust theoretical foundation for trauma, and one of the key individuals here was Mardi Horowitz.[5]

Horowitz, argued that whenever a person experiences a stressful life event (his term for a traumatic experience), they goes through a particular process, which is comprised of specific phases:

1. Outcry

2. Denial

3. Intrusiveness

4. Working through

5. Completion.

The critical phase is that of working through, and this is essentially a process of incorporating the traumatic event, or rather the memory of the event, into the individual’s existing mental schemata or cognitive map. In other words, the traumatic event is initially experienced as something ‘alien’ but through the psychological process of working through it becomes part of the individual’s world view and life history.

One of the interesting points about Horowitz’s theory is that it suggests that anyone can become traumatised immediately following a stressful life event. This does not mean, however, that anyone could go on to develop PTSD. And this brings us to the second part of Horowitz’s theory: some people fail to work through, to process, the traumatic memory effectively (if at all). They get ‘stuck’ at the denial and intrusiveness phases: hence the recurring flashbacks and nightmares, the intrusive thoughts and images, that are so characteristic of PTSD.

So, whilst most (if not all) people might initially experience flashbacks, nightmares, intrusive thoughts, and so on following a traumatic event, most are likely to work through this fairly quickly. This also helps to explain why most people ‘recover’ from PTSD within the first year following the event: they have managed to work through the process (and therefore some might question whether PTSD is really a legitimate diagnosis in these cases).

One of the interesting points about Horowitz’s theory is that it to a certain degree it circumvents (or rather tries to circumvent) the thorny question of predisposition: in other words, all that is necessary is for the individual to be exposed to a traumatic event. The idea that they might have some form of psychological, biological, or, indeed, cultural disposition towards trauma is effectively bypassed. However, as I’ve just noted, Horowitz still leaves the door open regarding the possibility of some form of predisposition because of the fact that some individuals get ‘stuck’ during the ‘working through’ process.

Perhaps more importantly, though, the work of Horowitz and his colleagues was critical in creating a ‘bridge’ between war-related trauma and trauma experienced by individuals in non-combat situations. In other words, it is no longer just war or conflict that is traumatic, but life itself. In practical, psychiatric terms, the immediate effect was the creation of post-traumatic stress disorder and its inclusion in DSM III in 1980, where it has remained ever since, and can now be found in DSM V. The longer-lasting impact, as Shephard points out, is that the whole cultural perception of trauma changed, and ‘life-trauma’ essentially became ‘legitimated’ in public discourse. The real irony to this story, however, is that this happened at the very moment when trauma, as a separate classification, very nearly disappeared for good.

Trauma and the prevalence of PTSD

As indicated above, according the proponents of PTSD, trauma is no longer something that just happens to soldiers who are cowering in their trenches whilst being rained upon by incessant shell fire. Rather, anyone (or so it would seem) can potentially become traumatised; all that is necessary is for them to be exposed, in some way, to a traumatic event. This seems straightforward enough. But what makes such events traumatic in the first place? In other words, what makes ‘trauma’ traumatic? This might seem a rather strange (and pointless) question. However, it has profound implications both for our understanding of PTSD and for its treatment. And one of the reasons that this question is so important is quite simply the fact that although many (if not all) people are subjected to some form of traumatic experience(s) in their lives, most will not be traumatised, or at least not in the sense that they will develop the symptoms of PTSD. This, of course, raises some awkward questions for those who argue that trauma has nothing to do with any kind of individual ‘predisposition’ and that all that is necessary is the presence of a traumatic event. And as I noted above, even Horowitz argued that some individuals appear to have difficulties in working through or ‘processing’ traumatic memories.

With regard to the prevalence of trauma, there is plenty of research. For example, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), cites research that ‘the majority of people will experience at least one traumatic event in their lifetime’.[6] And Litz and Roemer cite research that suggests that around 69% of Americans will have experienced at least one traumatic event, and, not surprisingly, in areas that have experienced widespread conflict, for example, former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, very large numbers of the population will have experienced some form of trauma.[7]

In the general US population, lifetime prevalence of PTSD among men 3.6% and 9.7% among women. In other countries, lifetime prevalence figures vary widely: from 0.3% in China to 6.1% in New Zealand. However, figures for Vietnam veterans are much higher: 30.9% for men and 26.9% for women. For veterans of Afghanistan and Iraq (the second Gulf War), the prevalence of current PTSD was estimated to be 13.8%.[8]

The NICE guidance on PTSD also gives useful information regarding prevalence and incidence (risk) of PTSD. Quoting a large US study in 1995 by Kessler, they give a lifetime prevalence figure of 7.8% (men and women combined). Women are at a much greater risk of developing PTSD following a traumatic event (20.4%) than men (8.1%). NICE also quotes studies that show that different types of traumatic events are associated with different PTSD rates, with rape being associated with the highest PTSD rates – and perhaps it is significant that in the case of rape, it is men who are more likely to reach PTSD criteria (65%) rather than women (46%).

More recent research, for example Atwoli et al, gives a more nuanced picture.[9] They draw upon a number of World Mental Health (WMH) studies (conducted between 2013 and 2015) and instead of relying purely on an approach which looks at a ‘single worst trauma’ occurrence they look at the ‘random traumatic event’ occurrence as well.[10] They first look at the prevalence figures for individual exposure to a traumatic event. There are some significant differences between countries and regions. For example, the figure for South Africa is 73.8%, Spain 54%, Italy 56.1% and Japan 60%. Northern Ireland’s rate of 60.6% was the highest for Europe. This is then compared with prevalence rates for PTSD, and here there is more convergence between South Africa (2.3%), Spain (2.2% and Italy (2.4%). The outlier is Northern Ireland (8.8%). For Japan the figure is much lower (1.3%). However, there is a further refinement of the data when the authors look at conditional risk rates of PTSD; that is the prevalence of PTSD among those exposed to traumatic events as opposed to the overall PTSD prevalence rates (regardless of exposure to traumatic events). The figures here are: South Africa 3.5%, Spain 3.3%, Italy 2.5%, Northern Ireland 17.6%.

Taken together, the data seems to give a mixed picture. Firstly, it is clear that simple exposure to a traumatic event does not necessarily result in the development of PTSD symptoms. Secondly, and perhaps not surprisingly, the nature of the event can significantly increase the chances of the developing such symptoms. The key question, though, is why the differences? Firstly, why doesn’t everyone who is exposed to a ‘traumatic’ event become traumatised and, secondly, why do some events appear to be more ‘traumatic’ than others? Clearly, relying on statistics alone doesn’t get us very far; at best the figures provide an overall, schematic picture which then needs to be investigated further.

PTSD, meaning and symbolic mediation

Although there has been a great deal of research on PTSD since Horowitz’s 1983 paper, the general consensus is that PTSD is essentially a problem with mental or psychical processing. More recently attention has focused on PTSD and memory, and the difficulties some people have in processing traumatic memories. Verhaeghe and Vanheule draw upon the findings of neuropsychological research to argue that patients with PTSD are unable to process traumatic incidents in a normal, associative way.[11] They begin with the same question that I posed earlier: what makes trauma traumatic? And their answer to this question is that there is a failure in symbolic processing, and the representations of the traumatic event cannot be stored in declarative or narrative memory (a form of long-term memory). Instead they are organised in what is called procedural memory, which, although also long-term, is unconscious. In other words, such memories are not directly accessible to the individual, but rather have to be constructed retroactively.

Essentially, what Verhaeghe and Vanheule are getting at is that a traumatic experience is one that cannot be symbolised and given meaning. The trauma doesn’t ‘fit’ into the individual’s subjectivity, it makes no sense. Instead it just keeps repeating itself in the form of flashbacks, nightmares, panic attacks, and so on. Another way of saying this is that trauma is outside of symbolisation and representation.

NICE, in its evaluation of PTSD research, essentially comes to the same conclusion:

The characteristic re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD appear to be the result of the way the traumatic event is laid down in memory. Trauma is overwhelming, and exceeds people’s resources for information processing.[12]

There are important, indeed critical, differences between Verhaeghe and Vanheule’s psychoanalytic approach, and approaches such as Horowitz’s and much of the research cited by NICE, which is essentially based on cognitive psychology. However, all the research points in one direction as far as understanding the root causes of PTSD goes: for some reason, people who suffer from PTSD are unable to ‘process’ the memory of the traumatic event properly, if at all.

The reason, according to Verhaeghe and Vanheule, is that there is a lack of ‘symbolic mediation’ in the history of the subject, and this can be traced back to the person’s early relationships with his mother or other significant caregiver. As a baby and as a very young child, the individual is totally dependent on others – not only in terms of providing for his physical needs, but also in terms of psychological development. In particular, the baby/young child relies on the other person for developing an identity. This is done through a process known as mirroring.

Lacan famously developed his theory of the mirror stage, where the infant literally sees himself in the mirror and (mis)identifies himself with this mirror image.[13] However, what is also critical to this theory is that the infant is being held up in the mirror by another, who, pointing to the image in the mirror, says to the child, ‘Look! That’s you!’ Whether this is treated as an actual experience or more as a metaphor, it shows how the child’s identity formation is intertwined with his relationship with another person.

However, this is not the end of the story. As Verhaeghe and Vanheule go on to argue, this process of mirroring is also a process of regulation, and of integration. Prior to the mirror stage the infant is essentially an undifferentiated bundle of emotions, images, impulses. There is no regulation of the drive, so the infant is being constantly overwhelmed with strong feelings and sensations. In fact, the infant is being, to all intents and purposes, perpetually traumatised. One of the effects of mirroring is to bring order to the chaos of undifferentiated feelings, images, sensations, and so on. The mirror image, both literally and metaphorically, gives the infant a sense of wholeness, a whole-body image.

As the child develops, they continue to rely very heavily on the presence of others not only to satisfy their biological needs but also to act as a mediator of their psychological needs and desires. And much of this process of mediation is done through the medium of language. In later life the individual continues to rely on such symbolic mediation, though this tends to broaden out to include not only intimate relationships but a wider set of social relationships, for example, through work, friendships, leisure activities, and so on. The key point here is that, for some people, this process of symbolic mediation fails – and it fails very early on in childhood development. This means they are never able to process any form of traumatic experience in later life.

This theory raises a number of important issues. First, the crucial role of interpersonal, or more precisely, intersubjective, relationships in the formation of identity and in the regulation of the drive. Second, and leading on from this, the importance of such intersubjective relationships in ‘managing’ traumatic experiences, which has critical implications for treatment. Third, that early childhood experiences are inherently traumatic for the infant. And, fourth, that for some individuals, life remains essentially a traumatic experience, even in adulthood.

This last point is probably the most contentious, because it implies that some people are more vulnerable to the effects of trauma than others. However, as I have already pointed out, the evidence certainly seems to point in this direction. Verhaeghe and Vanheule’s explanation is that for some young children, symbolic mediation, that is, the inter-relationship with the caregiver, ‘fails’ in some way. Consequently, the individual’s sense of identity remains fragile, as does their ability to process overwhelming, that is, traumatic, experiences.

However, in my view, what’s especially interesting regarding Verhaeghe and Vanheule’s argument is their reference to Lacan’s Mirror Stage and the idea that prior to it there is no regulation of the drive, which means the infant subject is being constantly overwhelmed by feelings and sensations, or, as Freud would put it, is overwhelmed by excess excitations. As I briefly touched upon in my previous article one way to look at trauma is in terms of the jouissance of the drive, or as drive-jouissance. From this perspective, trauma occurs when the jouissance of the drive becomes too overwhelming for the subject, and this is brought about when the regulation of such drive-jouissance is disrupted or even put out of action completely.

Notes and references

  1. Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000). ↑
  2. W.J. Scott, ‘PTSD in DSM-III: A Case in the Politics of Diagnosis and Disease’, Social Problems, 37.3 (1990), 294–310. ↑
  3. Samuel Hynes, A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture (London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1990). ↑
  4. Shephard, A War of Nerves, p.355. ↑
  5. Mardi J. Horowitz, ‘Post Traumatic Stress Disorders’, Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 1.3 (1983), 9–23. ↑
  6. NICE, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)’, National Insitute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2005 <http://guidance.nice.org.uk/CG26> [accessed 28 June 2010]. ↑
  7. Brett T. Litz and Lizabeth Roemer, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: An Overview’, Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 3.3 (1996), 153–68. ↑
  8. Jaimie Gradus, ‘Epidemiology of PTSD’, National Center for PTSD, 2007 <http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/epidemiological-facts-ptsd.asp> [accessed 9 April 2012]. ↑
  9. Lukoye Atwoli and others, ‘Epidemiology of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Prevalence, Correlates and Consequences’, Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 28.4 (2015), 307–11 <https://doi.org/10.1097/YCO.0000000000000167>. ↑
  10. The authors explain this approach as follows:“In most epidemiological surveys, respondents report lifetime exposure to a large number of traumas, precluding the separate assessment of PTSD for each traumatic event experienced by every respondent. Historically, studies have asked respondents to nominate the worst traumatic event they had ever experienced, and assessed PTSD in relation to that worst event. Because worst traumas are not the most commonly experienced events in the population and, presumably, have a higher risk of PTSD than typical traumas, this approach overestimates conditional risk of PTSD.In the WMH studies, this problem was resolved by assessing PTSD for both the nominated worst lifetime trauma and another computer-generated ‘random’ event selected from among the respondent’s other lifetime traumas. Sample weights were applied to create an accurate distribution of traumatic events in the sample population.” ↑
  11. Paul Verhaeghe and Stijn Vanheule, ‘Actual Neurosis and PTSD: The Impact of the Other’, Psychoanalytic Psychology, 22.4 (2005), 493–507. ↑
  12. NICE, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’, p.15. ↑
  13. Jacques Lacan, ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience’, in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: W.W.Norton and Company, 2006), pp. 93–81. ↑

 

While psychoanalytic theory conceptualises trauma, repetition, and the limits of the signifier, clinical work takes place in the singular encounter with one’s own symptom. If you are seeking a space to speak that lies outside directive or manualised therapies, I can offer psychoanalytic consultations online via Therapeia.  Please click here for further details.

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