In my previous post I made reference to Lacan’s text There are Four Discourses in which he remarks that Freud “…thought that all is but a dream and that everyone (if one can say such a thing), that everyone is mad, that is, delusional.”[1] At this point it is important to note that Lacan made these remarks in the context of a broader argument regarding the (im)possibility of teaching psychoanalysis. The reference to the four discourses (of the master, the university, the hysteric and the analyst) is that with the exception of the discourse of the analyst they are all discourses of truth, and, in their own ways, domination. There are many ways to read this text, and a particularly comprehensive one is Miller’s Everyone is Mad.[2] However, in this post I want to focus specifically on the idea that ‘everyone is mad, that is, delusional’. As I noted in my previous post, this appears to suggest that the differentiation between neurosis and psychosis is no longer viable because in the ‘classical’ psychoanalytic clinic, the term ‘delusion’ is reserved for those subjects with a psychotic structure. On the other hand, if we are all delusional does such a differentiation make any sense? The answer to this question, I would argue, rather depends on what the term ‘delusion’ actually means in the first place, and whether, to paraphrase George Orwell, some delusions are more delusional than others.
In his essay The Invention of Delusion Miller argues that delusion is discourse.[3] However, this argument is made within a broader context, which is the relationship between elementary phenomena and delusions. The crux of Miller’s argument is that an elementary phenomenon equates with the individual signifier S1 whereas delusion is the relationship S1 to S2. In other words, delusion creates meaning, that is, knowledge, and this is why Miller can argue that “…all knowledge is delusion and delusion is a type of knowledge.”[4] Furthermore, he argues that delusion is an interpretation.
However, it is also important to note that in this text Miller makes a distinction between the elementary phenomena (the basis of delusion) of the psychotic and the unconscious formations of the neurotic: “The elementary phenomenon represents something, albeit we don’t know much about what it is, for someone, for a subject.” Whereas in the case of unconscious formations “…the signifier is linked with another signifier and the subject emerges as an affect of this linkage. Consequently, the subject is not aware of the procedure…”[5] In other words, unconscious formations, for example dreams, symptoms, and so on, are always already present for the subject (or, at least, from their very early childhood). Elementary phenomena, on the other hand, appear in the here-and-now, and are experienced by the subject as something disturbing, unheimlich. As Miller puts it, the subject “…agitated, feels that something will happen.”[6]
One of the key aspects of elementary phenomena from a Lacanian position is that they have the structure of language. This is emphasised by both Miller in the text I have just been discussing, and by Herbert Wachsberger in his text From Elementary Phenomenon to the Enigmatic Experience:
The elementary phenomenon, essential to the status of the process, has been eclipsed by the importance gives to the ‘fertile moments’ and to the paranoiac knowledge [connaissance paranoïaque] that structures them; then, once its relation to the signifier has been defined and its insertion into the subject’s relation to the Other clarified, the elementary phenomenon refinds its place in the field of language.[7]
Previously, psychiatrists (including Lacan in his doctoral dissertation) treated elementary phenomena as just that: phenomena without any (apparent) external cause that come to disturb the subject and, in many case, trigger a psychosis. As Wachsberger notes:
The enigmatic inflection, inspired by Jaspers’s phenomenological approach to the facts of psychosis (“events mean something, but do not mean anything specific”), that Lacan attributed to the elementary phenomenon had already been highlighted by numerous authors as a phenomenon typical of paranoia. Before Jaspers, Marguliès had identified perplexity, undetermined agitation, the sense of an approaching catastrophe, and a tone of anxiety, as signs of an inaugural perturbation to be situated in the sphere of affects. Tiling had noted a confused and indefinable anxiety, or a feeling of being cornered, at the origin of the search for clarifications of the subject. After Jaspers, Westerterp will insist on the strange primary modification of the environment.[8]
From a structural point of view, however, such enigmatic experiences (to use Wachsberger’s term) are elementary signifiers, which in themselves mean nothing – because they are not part of a signifying chain. However, the appearance of such elementary signifiers constitute a ‘push-to-delusion’, and as Miller notes, this involves work on behalf of the subject. In other words, in response to the disturbance of the elementary phenomena/signifiers, the subject has to construct a meaning, that is, a delusion. Perhaps the crucial difference between the delusory construction of the psychotic and the unconscious formations of the neurotic, is that the latter are always already there for the subject, whereas the former have to be constructed in the here-and-now. In that case, perhaps it is not too far fetched to think of such unconscious formations as unconscious delusions? Delusions that are laid down in the prehistory of the subject; in fact, delusions that constitute the history of the subject.
Is this what Lacan means when he states that everyone is mad, that is, delusional? If this is the case then what he really appears to be arguing is that everyone has to find a way to construct meaning. The difference between the neurotic’s meaning and the psychotic’s, however, is that for the neurotic the meaning has already been prepared for them and, somewhat ironically, is the basis of their psychopathology, their neurosis. The psychotic has the opposite problem: they have to create their own delusions in order to ward off the incursion of the elementary signifiers (which is what the elementary phenomena are).
So does this mean some delusions are more delusional than others? No. What it means is that some delusions are laid down at the dawn of history (of the subject) whereas others have to be invented by the subject to fill the void of the absence of such a history.
Notes
- Jacques Lacan, “There Are Four Discourses,” Culture/Clinic 1 (2013), 3. ↑
- Jacques-Alain Miller, “Everyone Is Mad,” Culture/Clinic 1 (2013): 17–42. ↑
- Jacques-Alain Miller, “The Invention of Delusion,” International Lacanian Review, 2005. ↑
- Ibid., 22. ↑
- Ibid., 9. ↑
- Ibid., 11. ↑
- Herbet Wachsberger, “From Elementary Phenomenon to the Enigmatic Experience,” in The Later Lacan: An Introduction, ed. Veronique Voruz and Bogdan Wolf (New York: Sunny Press, 2007), 109. ↑
- Ibid., 108. ↑
Last updated: November 5, 2026