War and theatre of trauma (part 1)
War and theatre of trauma (part 1)

War and theatre of trauma (part 1)

The current conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East are a salutary reminder that despite the Western world’s prolonged ‘holiday from history’ since the (supposed) end of the Cold War, history itself has chosen to forego any such vacation. Instead, the wars of ages continue to tear these (and other) contested territories apart. Furthermore, it’s also a reminder that war is the ultimate in unfettered (and yet, most often, state-sanctioned) violence, and its wake comes trauma.

With regards to psychoanalysis’ relation to war (and, more specifically, the trauma of war) there has always been, I would argue, something of a tension. On the one hand, psychoanalysis, as a (the?) discourse of trauma, is probably unrivalled in terms of its history and its complexities. On the other hand, and I would say this may be especially true when it comes to the Lacanian tradition, there appears to be a reluctance to engage with the full horror and savagery of such violence, particularly with regards to its traumatic effects. I often get the impression that there is something a bit too Real when it comes to war (and related forms of violence such as terrorism) that many analysts find difficult to comprehend and stomach. This is not to say there have not been some very insightful articles on, for example, the Ukraine conflict that are written within a broadly Lacanian tradition.[1] However, these seem to somewhat skirt around the question of trauma itself.

There is also the question as to the extent such ‘war traumas’ (for want of a better term) call into question some of the fundamental tenets of Freud’s theory, especially those that would situate trauma in early childhood. However, it is important to remember that not only was Freud well aware of these questions, but he was also actively involved in working clinically with the effects of such traumas during the Great War. In fact, it was his (and his colleagues’) experience of working with such ‘war neuroses’ that led him to radically change his ideas regarding the drive and the operation of the pleasure principle, and which formed the basis of Beyond the Pleasure Principle.[2] For Freud, war neurosis was simply another term for traumatic neurosis and in Beyond the Pleasure Principle he argued that such a neurosis was brought about by excessive excitation which led to a breakdown in the operation of the pleasure principle.

Furthermore, Freud was very much involved in the organisation of the Symposium held at the Fifth International Psycho-Analytical Congress in Budapest on the subject of the war neuroses. Sándor Ferenczi, Karl Abraham and Ernst Simmel all presented papers on this topic, and Freud himself wrote the introduction to the proceedings of the Symposium which were published in Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses in 1921.[3] Interestingly, one of the motivations behind the Symposium was to refute those critics of psychoanalysis who were arguing that the war neuroses disproved Freud’s idea that early childhood traumas (and their psychical working-over) were at the roots of every neurosis. More particularly, such critics wanted to use the example of the traumas of war to invalidate the idea that psycho-sexual conflicts were at the root of the psychoneuroses. In other words, how could anyone possibly argue that a combatant’s trauma in the trenches had anything to do with a (traumatic) sexual experience in their early childhood?

The analysts at the Symposium rose to the challenge and made the argument that the war neuroses were in fact the product of an underlying psychopathology that was rooted in unresolved, childhood sexual conflicts. In other words, those who were suffering from war neurosis were already neurotic.[4] For example, Simmel argued that:

The psycho-analytical explanation of the war neuroses has proved with wonderful clearness the correctness of the Freudian views on hysteria, according to which all physical symptoms represent conversions of something psychical. The body is the instrument of the mind upon which it (the mind) allows its unconscious to manifest itself in plastic and mimic expression. The functions of the unconscious are the deciding factor in the formation and building up of the war neuroses, also the frequently observed instances of the forgetting of events accompanied by feelings hostile to the ego, even when these events are very recent, permits us to recognise from the outside alone the submergence and repression of ideas and affects of a painful nature.[5]

Ferenczi, Abraham, Jones (in his separate paper) and Freud (in his Introduction) all followed a similar line: the traumatic experiences of war ‘trigger’ an underlying psychopathology, often hysterical in nature. Just to give one more example, Abraham, in somewhat condescending language, argued that: “It transpires with great regularity that the war neurotics already before the trauma were labile people—to designate it, to begin with, by a general expression—and especially so as regards their sexuality.”[6] By ‘labile’ he appears to mean ‘emotionally volatile’ and which he seems to view as a weakness (in men at least).

Unfortunately for psychoanalysis, such ideas did not resonate with wider psychiatric establishment and the next sixty years or so saw a progressive disengagement of psychoanalysis from the theory and treatment of the war neuroses, culminating in the disappearance of the term completely from the psychiatric literature and the emergence of a completely new paradigm of trauma in the aftermath of the Vietnam War: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

In many ways the emergence of PTSD as the ‘trauma paradigm’ would seem to have been the final nail in the coffin for a truly psychoanalytic theory and clinic of trauma. The irony is, though, in terms of symptomatology PTSD seems to bear a striking similarity to its supposedly redundant predecessor, namely traumatic neurosis. As Fassin and Rechtman argue in their book The Empire of Trauma, the “…semiological outlines of PTSD were virtually identical to classic descriptions of traumatic neurosis, merely refining and stabilizing the criteria for the diagnosis.”[7] But what’s at stake here are not the presenting symptoms of PTSD and traumatic neurosis; rather, it’s the question of aetiology. In other words, where does the trauma come from in the first place?

Returning to Freud’s argument in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, as I noted earlier he referred to the overwhelming of the pleasure principle by excitation; but excitation of what and from where precisely? In that text Freud argues that (psychical) trauma is a ‘breach’ of the shield which protects the ‘living vesicle’ (which appears to equate with the cortical layer, and which, according to Freud, is later to become the system Cs) from external stimuli or excitations.  However, there are also excitations coming from within the psychical apparatus (for want of a better word) from which there is no such protection. But it is only in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, that Freud will provide some clarity regarding the relationship between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ sources of trauma. In this text he uses the term ‘traumatic’ to refer to both external and internal stimuli, although the ego’s response to each type of stimuli is radically different. Freud’s argument is complex and evolves over the course of the whole paper and in fact it is only in the text’s Addenda that he finally consolidates his theory. Here he argues that trauma is linked to a sense of helplessness in the subject in the face of a danger; physical helplessness if the danger is ‘real’, by which Freud means ‘external’, and psychical helplessness if the danger is ‘instinctual’, that is, emanating from the drives. However, Freud also argues that these two types of danger can be linked or ‘mingled’ with one another. In these situations:

The danger is known and real but the anxiety in regard to it is over-great, greater than seems proper to us. It is this surplus of anxiety which betrays the presence of a neurotic element. Such cases, however, introduce no new principle; for analysis shows that to the known real danger an unknown instinctual one is attached.[8]

The last sentence of this quote is particularly interesting because it echoes something Freud discusses earlier on in his paper and suggests that there may be a relationship between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ traumas. In part VII of his paper Freud briefly discusses the question of the war (traumatic) neuroses in the context of anxiety as a reaction of the ego to danger and acknowledges that for many commentators (some of whom were already opposed to psychoanalysis) the traumas of war and the immediate threat to life had ‘disapproved’ the idea of a sexual aetiology for the neuroses. However, he goes onto to argue that “…it would seem highly improbable that a neurosis could come into being merely because of the objective presence of danger, without any participation of the deeper levels of the mental apparatus.”[9]

As with his later remarks in the Addenda regarding the ‘intermingling’ of the two sources of trauma (physical and psychical), Freud is tantalisingly elusive by what exactly he is referring to in the phrase “participation of the deeper levels of the mental apparatus”. In my view this suggests that Freud is still struggling, some thirty years later, with the problem of ‘real’ trauma, in spite of his so-called abandonment of his ‘seduction theory’ in 1897. In other words, perhaps Freud is still trying to work out exactly how such ‘real’, that is, external, events (for example, childhood sexual abuse) are linked to internal psychical mechanisms.

Returning now to the question of whether ‘war trauma’ undermines the basic tenets of Freud’s theory of the psychoneuroses, my contention is that it does not: but not for the reasons that were put forward at the Budapest Symposium. It will be recalled that at that event Ferenczi, Abraham, Jones and Simmel all argued that the war neuroses were the product of an underlying psychopathology rooted in childhood sexual conflicts. This suggests that the trauma in the here and now (of battle for example) ‘triggers’ something already present in the psyche of the subject. But as I noted earlier, this was not Freud’s argument in Beyond the Pleasure Principle; rather, he proposed that the trauma was the result of the breaching of the ‘protective shield’ of the psychical apparatus, which in turn disabled the homeostatic function of the pleasure principle.[10] He makes no reference to the idea that such a breaching is the result of some pre-existing and underlying psychopathology. And as I also touched upon above, in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety Freud argues that the excitation that can overwhelm the pleasure principle also emanates from ‘within’ the psychical apparatus, that is, from the drives. Furthermore, in that paper Freud finally arrives at the idea that ‘external’ influences are not enough to explain a traumatic neurosis (which would include a war neurosis). Rather, something else is at play ‘within’ the psychical apparatus. And this something, I argue, is the excitation of the drive itself; which in Lacanian terms can be thought of as the jouissance of the drive (drive-jouissance) – a concept that I explore in some detail in my forthcoming book on the topic of traumatic neurosis.[11]

The key point here is that the trauma that overwhelms the subject is not ‘external’; but neither is it ‘internal’. Rather, it might be better to think of it as extimate, which is an idea that Lacan developed in order to try and overcome the false (in his eyes) dichotomy between ‘internal’ and ‘external’. For example, in Seminar VII Lacan in his discussion of Das Ding (the Thing) talks of its “…intimate exteriority or ‘extimacy’…”[12] and as being “…the Other whose primacy of position Freud affirms in the form of something entfremdet, something strange to me, although it is at the heart of me…”[13] Furthermore, although I argue that trauma is the jouissance of the drive (drive-jouissance), this should not be thought of as something purely ‘internal’ either (‘internal’ to what one may well ask?).

In the context of war, conflict and terrorism, my argument is not to dispute the traumatic nature of such events; on the contrary. Rather, it is to propose that their traumatic nature is rooted in the jouissance of the drive as opposed to something inherently ‘traumatic ‘ in the events themselves. Apart from anything else, if such events were inherently ‘traumatic’ then everyone who is exposed to them should become traumatised, but this is simply not the case. In other words, the majority of people who are exposed to ‘traumatic’ events do not go on to exhibit symptoms of trauma – at least not in any recognised diagnostic sense.[14] However, to argue this is not to revert to the arguments put forward by Ferenczi and others at the Budapest Symposium; that is, those individuals who ‘succumb’ to a traumatic neurosis because of their war experiences are already psychically ‘vulnerable’.

In fact, the concept of the ‘vulnerable subject’ is one of the cornerstones of the present day ‘empire of trauma’ that constitutes the subject matter of Fassin and Rechtman’s book that I referred to earlier. As Nicole Sütterlin notes, although the concept of psychological trauma is often portrayed as a product of modernity, this view is itself now being contested and there is growing interest in the ‘pre-modern’ genealogy of trauma.[15] She gives the examples of the pedagogical work of Johann Heinrich Campe, the empirical psychology of Karl-Philipp Moritz, Johann Christian Reil’s neurophysiology and the idealist philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, all working in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and who all helped develop the idea of the modern subject as inherently vulnerable.

Rather than thinking in terms of ‘vulnerability’ and its close relative ‘victimhood’, it is more helpful, in my view, to look at the operation of the drive in relation to the cultural environment (for want of a better term) of war, conflict and terror, and how this ‘produces’ trauma; that is, how it produces a jouissance that is too much for the subject to bear. This is something I will be exploring in Part 2 of this essay.

Notes and references

  1. See, for example, Sergio Benvenuto’s articles in the European Journal of Psychoanalysis: Benvenuto, Sergio, ‘Realpolitik and Imaginärepolitik: Mearsheimer’s Delusion and the Psychoanalysis of Conflicts – European Journal of Psychoanalysis’, European Journal of Psychoanalysis –, 2023 <https://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/articles/realpolitik-and-imaginarepolitik-mearsheimers-delusion-and-the-psychoanalysis-of-conflicts/> [accessed 18 February 2025] and Benvenuto, Sergio, ‘“Pendant La Guerre, Penser Après” [During the War, Think about the after] Strasbourg Conference, 8 November 2024 – European Journal of Psychoanalysis’, European Journal of Psychoanalysis –, 2025 <https://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/articles/conference-pendant-la-guerre-penser-apres-during-the-war-think-about-the-after-strasbourg-8-november-2024/> [accessed 18 February 2025] ↑
  2. Sigmund Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Hogarth Press, 1920), XVIII, pp. 3–64. ↑
  3. Sándor Ferenczi and others, Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses (Vienna: The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1921). The book also included a paper written by Ernest Jones and which was originally read before the Royal Society of Medicine, Section of Psychiatry, in April 1918. ↑
  4. Or in some cases, psychotic or narcissistic. ↑
  5. Ibid., 31. ↑
  6. Ibid., 23. ↑
  7. Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the Condition of Victimhood (Princeton University Press, 2009), 77. ↑
  8. Sigmund Freud, ‘Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Hogarth Press, 1926), XX, 165-166. ↑
  9. Ibid., 129. ↑
  10. Which, to be more precise, is the principle of constancy. ↑
  11. Leslie Chapman, Traumatic Neurosis Revisited: drive-jouissance and the wounds of life, (London, Palgrave, forthcoming 2025). ↑
  12. Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book VII (Routledge, 1992), 139. ↑
  13. Ibid., 71. ↑
  14. Just to give one research example, Lukoye Atwoli and colleagues drew upon a number of World Mental Health (WMH) studies conducted between 2013 and 2015. They found that, on average, the prevalence rate for ‘traumatic events’ was around 60% whereas the prevalence of PTSD was around 3.5%, although, perhaps not surprisingly, the prevalence in Northern Ireland was much higher (around 9%), which is clearly a legacy of the Troubles. (Atwoli, Lukoye, Dan J Stein, Karestan C Koenen, and Katie A McLaughlin, ‘Epidemiology of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Prevalence, Correlates and Consequences’, Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 28.4 (2015), 307–11) ↑
  15. Nicole A. Sütterlin, ‘History of Trauma Theory’, in The Routledge Companion to Literature and Trauma, ed. by Hanna Meretoja and Colin Davis (Milton: Taylor and Francis, 2020), 11–22. ↑

Exploring the ‘wounds of life’ requires moving beyond the literal event to the structural truth of the drive. To see how this analysis fits into a wider clinical framework, please visit the Empire of Trauma Hub.

 

While psychoanalytic theory conceptualises trauma, repetition, and the limits of the signifier, clinical work takes place in the singular encounter with one’s own symptom. If you are seeking a space to speak that lies outside directive or manualised therapies, I can offer psychoanalytic consultations online via Therapeia.  Please click here for further details.