The ‘classical’ clinic
The concept of the ‘differential clinic’ within psychoanalysis is not a new one and is certainly not specific to Lacanian practice. Rather, it is rooted in Freud, and particularly his distinction between neurosis, which in his view was treatable by psychoanalysis, and psychosis, which was not. Things are more complicated when it comes to perversion, and as Laplanche and Pontalis point out, Freud’s distinction between the three diagnostic categories was never as clear cut as it was subsequently made out to be.[1] It is also important to note that Freud did not refer to psychosis, neurosis and perversion as ‘structures’ because he did not have the ‘structuralist’ concept of structure to use in the first place.
I shall return to this point shortly, but firstly I would like to briefly discuss the idea I referred to above regarding the ‘treatability’ of different psychopathologies. This is linked to the idea that the treatment of neurosis is some form of ‘baseline’ for psychoanalysis and that any other type of intervention, for example, in cases of psychosis, is a deviation from such a baseline. Freud argued that psychotic patients could not be psychoanalysed because of the lack of transference, although this was a not a view shared by other analysts, for example Melanie Klein, Margaret Little, and later on, of course, Lacan himself. Having said that, there is little disagreement amongst analysts (Lacanian and non-Lacanian) that work with a neurotic subject is different from that with a psychotic one. And a lot of this has to do with the differential nature of the transference in psychosis and neurosis. As Jean Allouch argues, in the neurotic transference (and particularly in the case of hysteria) the analyst is placed by the analysand in the position of the subject-supposed-to-know, whereas in psychosis the analysand themselves is in that position.[2]
The concept of clinical structure emerges out structural linguistics and its influence on Lacan’s thinking in the 1950s and 1960s. Although the work of Saussure and Jakobson is normally seen as the strongest influence, strictly speaking Lacan’s concept of structure owes as much to Lévi-Strauss as it does to these other two. Structure refers to the relationship between elements rather than the elements themselves. In this case the elements are signifiers, and the structure (the set of relationships) is the signifying network, that is, the Symbolic register, which also represents the Other. In terms of clinical structure, this is about the relationship of the subject to the Other, and the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father is critical here because it is what ‘anchors’ the structure in the first place. Furthermore, Bruce Fink argues that the three main clinical structures (psychosis, neurosis and perversion) correspond to three different forms of negation of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father.[3] For psychosis the form of negation is foreclosure, for neurosis it’s repression, and in the case of perversion it’s disavowal.
The breakdown of the ‘classical’ clinic
One of the major flaws with the ‘classical’ Lacanian clinic, however, is that it does not easily accommodate the proliferation of a whole range psychopathologies that are becoming increasingly common in the analyst’s consulting room. These include personality and somatic disorders, addictions, and so-called ‘ordinary psychosis’. Although from a historical perspective it’s not clear whether there is anything particular new about such pathologies, their presentation in the clinics of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis certainly appear to be. Apart from the case of ordinary psychosis, which can be seen as untriggered psychoses, there seems to be no serious attempt within the Lacanian field to ‘fit’ these pathologies into one of the three ‘classical’ structures’. However, I would argue that key point here is that none of them ‘fit’ into the neurotic structure, which suggests (to me at any rate) that the ‘classical’ Lacanian clinic is really referring to neurosis and its treatment rather than any other structure.
In his 1978 text There are Four Discourses Lacan poses the following question: “How does one go about teaching what cannot be taught? This is something Freud ventured into. He thought that all is but a dream and that everyone (if one can say such a thing), that everyone is mad, that is, delusional.”[4] Although it is not clear from the text whether Lacan was thinking of any specific Freudian writings or simply the general thrust of Freud’s thinking, perhaps the key point here is connection between the terms ‘madness’ and ‘delusion’. ‘Being delusional’ suggests that the subject has lost touch with ‘reality’, but the thrust of Lacan’s argument seems to be that ‘reality’ itself is but a dream, a delusion. Yet at the same time, as Freud was quick to point out, a delusion is an attempt at cure; in other words, and here he was thinking specifically of psychosis, a delusion is an attempt by the subject to rebuild their shattered reality. However, this in turn implies that there is a ‘non-delusional reality’ that can be shattered in the first place. The early Freud might have thought that such a reality actually existed ‘beyond’ neurosis and psychosis; later on, although it is not totally clear from his writings, there seems to have been a move towards the position that the ‘best’ we can hope for is to be neurotic. This certainly ties in with Freud’s increasingly pessimistic view of the efficacy of psychoanalysis.
But if Freud (speaking through Lacan) is right in declaring that everyone is delusional, then the implication here is that neurosis itself is a delusion. But if the idea of delusion can now be extended to neurosis as well as psychosis where does this leave the idea of the ‘differential clinic’ that I discussed previously? In order to address this question it might be helpful to think about another one; namely, the idea of a generalised foreclosure. This is something Russell Grigg discusses in his book Lacan, Language and Philosophy, and is based on the idea of developing Lacan’s original proposition that foreclosure of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father is the mechanism of negation that operates in cases of psychosis.[5] The key argument here is that the Name-of-the-Father is a special case of the sinthome (the archaic spelling of symptóme), a concept that Lacan will develop in his later seminars and especially the one on Joyce (Seminar XXIII).[6] Put some what simplistically, the sinthome is a way to ‘knot’ together the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary, an idea that Lacan illustrates with his Borromean schemas. The sinthome essentially represents a fourth ‘ring’ that holds together the other three (Real, Symbolic, Imaginary), which otherwise would separate from one another and produce a psychosis.
In his Joyce the Symptom lecture, Lacan argues that the Name-of-the-Father is a sinthome in its own right,[7] whereas for Joyce, according to Lacan, his writing was his sinthome. This implies that there are many types of sinthome, the Name-of-the-Father being only one of them, and this is essentially what Lacan ended up arguing. But by the same token, the existence of different forms of the sinthome implies a generalised foreclosure. However, ‘foreclosure’ in this sense has a different meaning to that of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. In the latter case, a particular form of the sinthome is foreclosed, which means another form has to be constructed, namely, the delusion. But a generalised foreclosure seems to suggest that all forms of the sinthome are foreclosed, which doesn’t make any sense. But, as I understand it, this is not what the idea of a generalised foreclosure means. Rather, it appears to be a way to express the necessity for a generalised concept of the sinthome. In other words, without some form the sinthome (which will vary from subject to subject) there would effectively be a generalised psychosis.
The clinic in the era of jouissance One
In Six Paradigms of Jouissance Jacques-Alain Miller argues that in the 1950s Lacan could state that “… ‘there is psychoanalysis.’ It exists, it functions.”[8] By the 1970s, however, Lacan concluded that psychoanalysis no longer worked. Instead “…’there is jouissance.’ There is jouissance as the property of the living body.”[9] What Miller is getting at here is the idea that whereas in the past psychoanalysis was concerned with giving meaning to the subject’s symptoms through the construction of a history, this is no longer possible. Why? Because once the focus shifts to the jouissance of the living body the subject’s history, the meaning of the subject’s symptoms, is no longer relevant – as history, as meaning. In other words, it is no longer about meaning per se; rather, meaning is a way to ‘de-cipher’ jouissance, to alleviate its traumatic (Real) effects.
And this brings up the whole question of the trauma narrative. As I have argued elsewhere on this site, the aim of a great deal of psychotherapy and history is to give meaning to trauma, to ‘de-traumatise’ trauma, so to speak, by turning it into narrative. And it is fair to say that a great deal of psychoanalysis had (and in many cases still has) such an aim. But the critical point here is not to denounce either therapy or analysis for doing this; rather, it is to recognise that this is what’s happening. Otherwise, meaning, narrative, becomes an end in itself; and, more crucially, the jouissance of such narratives becomes lost. What I mean here is that within every trauma narrative, within every attempt to ‘de-traumatise’ trauma, there is jouissance, that is, trauma. And this is the somewhat savage paradox of therapy, of history, of trauma narratives; the more one strives to create meaning the more one begets trauma through the production of ever more jouissance.
In his Six Paradigms essay Miller also makes reference to the idea of jouissance One and this is linked closely to the increasingly problematic ontological status of the Other. In ‘classical’ Lacanian literature the Other represents the Symbolic register itself, language, and the unconscious. However, even in his earlier teachings Lacan makes a number of references to the non-existence of the Other (the Other of the Other), which is also related to his idea of there being no meta-language. However, the question of the Other’s (non) existence is not as straightforward as it might first appear. In order to understand why, it might be helpful to think of Heidegger’s concept of ek-sistence, which, as Kevin Aho points out, “…is a condition of being outside of oneself, of not fully coinciding with oneself or being reducible to one’s current properties.”[10] Only the human being (Dasein) ek-sists, according to Heidegger; everything else is, but does not ek-sist. On this basis, for the Other to exist (ek-sist) it would have to be another human being, another Dasein. But in that case it would not be an Other at all, but another human subject, an other. And, clearly, this is precisely what happens in the neurotic transference: the subject (the analysand) supposes the Other as an other, another subject with a supposed knowledge.
Miller puts it somewhat differently:
The transference means that what is at stake for a neurotic is making the Other exist in order to hand over to it the burden of the logical consistency of the object a. That is what Lacan called the subject-supposed-to-know: Making the Other exist in order to restore to it the object a, made of this object-cause-of-desire…The Other does not exist as real. To say that the Other is the place of truth is to say that the Other is a place of fiction. To say that the Other is a place of knowledge is to say that it has the status of supposition.[11]
The key thing to remember here is that ‘fiction’ simply means a discursive construction, a network of signifiers. And, furthermore, it is mistake to contrast ‘fiction’ with ‘non-fiction’ or ‘truth’. As Miller notes, truth is also in the place of fiction. The opposition to fiction is the Real, which, paradoxically, can only be represented discursively, that is, as fiction.
But if the Other is a fiction what is left? This is where Miller’s concept of jouissance One comes in. This is essentially the living body (as the condition of jouissance) all alone, that is, without the Other. But what does this actually mean? Has Lacanian psychoanalysis somewhat belatedly ‘discovered’ the living body as the subject of psychoanalysis? Surely not! Perhaps it is more the case that because the emphasis of the ‘classical Lacan’ has been on the subject’s relation to the Other, the living body of the subject has been somewhat marginalised. Or it might be more accurate to argue that the body of the ‘classical Lacan’ is somewhat different to that of the body as the condition of jouissance. If, as I argued above, neurosis (and especially hysteria) is taken as the ‘baseline’ of the ‘classical’ Lacan, then the body in question is that of the hysteric, which is an Imaginary body. Whereas the body as the condition of jouissance is a Real body.
Coming back to the question of the differential clinic, if jouissance One rather than the subject’s relation to the Other is the focus of psychoanalysis then is the idea of such a clinic any longer viable? In other words, if neurosis and psychosis represent the subject’s different constructions of the sinthome (which are essentially different forms of delusion) then does it make sense to make such a differentiation in the first place? In my view the answer is yes, even if the subject of analysis is now jouissance One. And much of this is to do with the manner in which the subject constructs their delusion in the first place, and this links to the question of the transference. The neurotic subject may indeed be constructing a fictitious Other, a supposed subject of knowledge, but such a fiction has real (regulatory) effects on the jouissance of the body. The problem for the psychotic subject, however, is that the Other is all too Real and, in many cases, persecutory. Yes, the psychotic subject may well construct a delusion in order to regulate the influx of jouissance on the body, but such a delusion has to be constructed in a very different manner. Whereas the neurotic subject can construct their delusion through the fiction of the Other, the psychotic subject is left to their own devices in the face of the unbearable weight of the (Real) Other’s presence and jouissance.
Notes and references
- Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac Books, 1988), 309, 372. ↑
- Jean Allouch, “Psychotic Transference,” in Lacan on Madness: Madness, Yes You Can’t, ed. Patricia Gherovici and Steinkoler (Hove: Routledge, 2015), 112–26. ↑
- Bruce Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997). ↑
- Jacques Lacan, “There Are Four Discourses,” Culture/Clinic 1 (2013, 3. ↑
- Russell Grigg, Lacan, Language and Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 2008). ↑
- Jacques Lacan, The Sinthome: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016). ↑
- Jacques Lacan, “Joyce the Symptom,” in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XXIII 1975-76: The Sinthome, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 141–48. ↑
- Jacques-Alain Miller, “Six Paradigms of Jouissance,” Psychoanalytical Notebooks, no. 34 (December 2019), 68. ↑
- Ibid., 69. ↑
- Kevin Aho, “Ek-Sistence (Ek-Sisntenz),” in The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon, ed. Mark Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 268. ↑
- Jacques-Alain Miller, “A Contribution of the Schizophrenic to the Psychoanalytic Clinic,” (Re)-Turn: A Journal of Lacanian Studies 1 (Winter 2003), 24-25. ↑
- Please note that this can be spelt either as ‘Saussurian’ or ‘Saussurean’. ↑
Last updated: November 5, 2026