In my previous article I began to explore the concept of the war neuroses, with a particular focus on the Symposium on this topic held at the Fifth Annual Congress of the International Psycho-Analytic Association held in Budapest in September 1918. I pointed out that Freud, who wrote the Introduction to the proceedings of the Symposium, and the main participants (Ferenczi, Abraham and Simmel) defined the war neuroses as a form of the traumatic neuroses, which in turn were to be included in the group of the psychoneuroses. But what exactly does the term ‘the traumatic neuroses’ or simply ‘traumatic neurosis’ refer to, and in what way, if any, are the traumatic neuroses different from the transference neuroses, that is, hysterical neurosis and obsessional neurosis?
As Laplanche and Pontalis note in their entry on the subject in The Language of Psychoanalysis, the term ‘traumatic neurosis’ predates psychoanalysis and has been used in psychiatry to refer to events that make incursions upon the subject’s psychical organisation.[1] They point out that here the term ‘traumatic’ is being used metaphorically, because the medical concept of trauma refers to physical wounding, which in neuropsychiatry would include traumas to the central nervous system. This raises some interesting questions regarding the appropriateness of applying the terms ‘traumatic’ and ‘trauma’ to the psychical sphere in the first place, but that is for another discussion.
Laplanche and Pontalis go onto to argue that with regards to the psychoanalytic understanding of the traumatic neuroses there are two key factors at play, which vary from case to case: trauma and disposition. ‘Trauma’ in this context refers to an external event which acts upon the subject, while ‘disposition’, as I pointed out in my article on war neuroses, refers to the idea that the subject already has an underlying psychopathology which the event merely ‘activates’ or ‘triggers’. Things get even more complicated when the concept of actual neurosis is brought into the equation: a type of neurosis which, although sexual in origin, is not the product of psychical mediation, that is, repression and psychical reworking, and, more importantly, occurs in the here-and-now rather than in the subject’s past. Originally Freud classified anxiety neurosis and neurasthenia as the actual neuroses but later on included hypochondria as well. The actual neuroses also appear to be linked to psychosomatic disorders.[2]
Leaving the problem of the actual neuroses to one side for the moment, and referring back to Laplanche and Pontalis’ entry for traumatic neurosis, one of the issues with this concept is that it soon starts to ‘slide’ into the realms of the more ‘classical’ transference neuroses; in other words, many incidences of traumatic neurosis manifest themselves along identical lines as hysteria and obsessional neurosis. This leads Laplanche and Pontalis to comment:
It may thus be seen how psycho-analytic investigation throws the concept of traumatic neurosis into question: it contests the decisive function of the traumatic event-first by stressing its relativity vis-a-vis the subject’s tolerance, and secondly by inserting the traumatic experience into the context of the subject’s particular history and organisation. Seen in this light, the notion of traumatic neurosis appears as nothing more than an initial, purely descriptive approximation which cannot survive any deeper analysis of the factors in question.[3]
In other words, is a separate ‘category’ of traumatic neurosis necessary in the first place when in actual fact it is referring to a pre-existing transference neurosis? But then Laplanche and Pontalis go onto to argue that there may well be a place for a type of neurosis where a trauma (as in an external, intrusive event) plays a key role in the subject’s resulting psychopathology and symptomatology. At this point they refer to Freud’s arguments in Beyond the Pleasure Principle where he discusses the impact of external trauma on the operation of the pleasure principle.[4] According to Freud the traumatic neuroses are characterised by fright or ‘surprise’ as the key causative factor. At the same time, though, he is at pains to point out that traumatic neurosis does not equate with what he describes as the ‘old, naive theory of shock’, whereby the trauma remains at the physical level in the form of, for example, direct damage to the molecular structure of nervous system. Rather, for Freud the trauma is at the psychical level and “…is caused by lack of any preparedness for anxiety, including lack of hypercathexis of the systems that would be the first to receive the stimulus.”[5] In other words, the trauma is linked to the unpreparedness of the subject (how Freud defines fright), not the ‘physicality’ of the traumatic event itself. This is why Freud argues that anxiety is a protection against trauma, because it helps prepare the subject for the event.
Freud also argues that any physical wound or injury inflicted at the time of the ‘traumatic‘ event tends to mitigate the development of psychical trauma (in the form of a neurosis). In other words, and this is in reference to Freud’s experiences of soldiers injured at the front in the Great War, those individuals suffering from physical trauma are less likely to suffer from psychical trauma.[6] However, as Jones and Wessely argue in their paper on the paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of trauma in the twentieth century, follow-up research suggests that Freud was wrong about this: “Although soldiers recovering from wounds appeared to be free of neurosis, once an injury had healed, psychological disorders often emerged.”[7]
Freud also touches on the point that in cases of traumatic neurosis the subject’s dreams often take them back to the traumatic situation, but argues that the reason for this is by no means obvious and that anyone who thinks it is has misunderstood the function of dreaming (although he does not elaborate upon this point).
A bit further on in the text Freud argues that (psychical) trauma is a ‘breach’ of the shield which protects the ‘living vesicle’ (which appears to equate with the cortical layer, and which, according to Freud, is later to become the system Cs) from external stimuli or excitations. However, and at this point Freud’s argument become rather complicated, there are also excitations coming from within the psychical apparatus (for want of a better word) from which there is no such protection. It is only in a later paper, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, that Freud will provide some clarity regarding the relationship between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ sources of trauma.[8]
At this point Freud gives what is probably his most definitive definition of trauma, which is worth quoting in full:
We describe as ‘traumatic’ any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break through the protective shield. It seems to me that the concept of trauma necessarily implies a connection of this kind with a breach in an otherwise efficacious barrier against stimuli. Such an event as an external trauma is bound to provoke a disturbance on a large scale in the functioning of the organism’s energy and to set in motion every possible defensive measure. At the same time, the pleasure principle is for the moment put out of action.[9]
One of the key points to notice here is that for Freud trauma is defined in terms of (external) excitations which overwhelm the individual. The reference to the pleasure principle is important too because, according to Freud, this is what regulates the drives and maintains equilibrium in the psychical apparatus.[10] However, at this point in Freud’s argument it is still not clear why a traumatic neurosis would also be considered a psycho-neurosis. Or, to put it another way, and going back to a point I raised earlier, why the traumatic neuroses are not considered to be actual neuroses. There is no indication thus far in Freud’s argument that an external ‘shock’ or ‘excitation’ is subjected to repression or any other form of psychical ‘working over’. Rather, it would appear that such a shock/excitation directly ‘traumatises’ the subject (or, as Freud would be more likely to put it, the psychical apparatus), in the here-and-now. So in this sense we could perhaps invert Laplanche and Pontalis’ argument and say that the concept of traumatic neurosis is redundant because what we are actually talking about here is a form of actual neurosis.
However, and referring back to my previous article on the war neuroses, this would seem to contradict the argument that Freud and his colleagues were making in the context of the Budapest Symposium, namely that the war neuroses are traumatic neuroses and, furthermore, these neuroses are essentially forms of psychoneuroses. Does this mean that in Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud is recanting his previously held view regarding the traumatic neuroses? Before jumping to that conclusion, I would like to turn to another of Freud’s texts that I briefly referred to earlier, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. In this paper, written in 1925 and first published in February 1926, Freud effectively consolidates his overall argument the nature of traumatic excitations.
It is worth pointing out that in Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud does argue that there are excitations coming from ‘within’, that is, from the drives.[11] However, in that text Freud is still using the term ‘traumatic’ to refer to external excitations (stimuli) and, for some reason, does not apply this term to the internal excitations, even though he acknowledges their existence. In fact, he does not even refer to such excitations as emanating from the drives. In contrast, in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety the term ‘traumatic’ refers to both external and internal stimuli, although the ego’s response to each type of stimuli is radically different. Freud’s argument is complex and evolves over the course of the whole paper. In the paper’s Addenda Freud finally consolidates his theory by arguing that trauma is linked to a sense of helplessness in the subject in the face of a danger; physical helplessness if the danger is ‘real’, by which Freud means ‘external’, and psychical helplessness if the danger is ‘instinctual’, that is, emanating from the drives. However, Freud also argues that these two types of danger can be linked or ‘mingled’ with one another. In these situations:
The danger is known and real but the anxiety in regard to it is over-great, greater than seems proper to us. It is this surplus of anxiety which betrays the presence of a neurotic element. Such cases, however, introduce no new principle; for analysis shows that to the known real danger an unknown instinctual one is attached.[12]
The last sentence of this quote is particularly interesting because it echoes something Freud discusses earlier on in his paper and suggests that there may be a relationship between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ traumas. In part VII of his paper Freud briefly discusses the question of the war (traumatic) neuroses in the context of anxiety as a reaction of the ego to danger and acknowledges that for many commentators (many who were already opposed to psychoanalysis) the traumas of war and the immediate threat to life had ‘disapproved’ the idea of a sexual aetiology for the neuroses. However, he goes onto to argue that “…it would seem highly improbable that a neurosis could come into being merely because of the objective presence of danger, without any participation of the deeper levels of the mental apparatus.”[13]
As with his later remarks in the Addenda regarding the ‘intermingling’ of the two sources of trauma (physical and psychical), Freud is tantalising elusive by what exactly he is referring to in the phrase “participation of the deeper levels of the mental apparatus”. In my view this suggests that Freud is still struggling, some thirty years later, with the problem of ‘real’ trauma, in spite of his so-called abandonment of his ‘seduction theory’ in 1897. In other words, Freud is still trying to work out exactly how such ‘real’, that is, external, events (for example, childhood sexual abuse) are linked to internal psychical mechanisms. Perhaps one reason for his difficulties in making such a connection is that he was well aware of the controversy implicit in arguing that, for example, the traumatic experiences of soldiers on the Austrian front in the Great War with whom Freud had had direct contact, might somehow be linked to unresolved (and repressed) sexual conflicts from early childhood. A century later this is still such a scandalous proposition that it never features in any discussions regarding trauma.
The reason why all this matters, I would argue, is that it poses a difficult question for psychoanalysis with regards to such ‘life-traumas’ as war, abuse, natural disasters, and in fact any type of ‘external’ trauma that may impact on any individual at any time. If such traumas have nothing to do with ‘internal’ psychical processes, and especially those relating to the drive, then what is the relevance of psychoanalysis with regards to such traumas? If the so-called traumatic neuroses are, in reality, forms of actual neuroses, that is, relating to traumas in the here-and-now, then, as Freud himself argued, there is no role for psychoanalysis in their treatment.[14]
At this point, though, it’s important to note that for Freud the actual neuroses did have a sexual causation, just as in the case of the psychoneuroses. The only difference was that in the former case the causation was in the present and not subject to any form of repression or psychical ‘working over’.[15] Freud’s examples included impotence and premature ejaculation in a man and so-called ‘frigidity’ in a woman. So, even if it is argued that Freud’s traumatic neuroses are, in fact, a type of actual neurosis, the question of their sexual aetiology is far from resolved. The real problem here relates to temporality not aetiology.
As I indicated earlier, it’s probably best to conclude that Freud was never that clear whether the traumatic neuroses could be related to ‘internal’ psychical processes or whether they were simply the result of external shocks/excitations in the here-and-now, or at the very least, in the recent past. My own view is that they cannot be treated as something purely ‘external’; and at this point it is worth remembering that even the most ardent cognitive-behaviourist would never make this argument either. Clearly, any external event has to be ‘processed’ in some form in order for it become part of the subject’s own, internal cognitive ‘schema’, their own internal ‘narrative’. From this (cognitive-behaviourist) position, the problem with trauma is that such cognitive ‘processing’ breaks down.
However, from a psychoanalytic position, the problem with trauma is not primarily to do with cognition, with making sense of the experience, but with the regulation of the drive. Or, to put it another way, external shocks, for example sexual abuse, war, other forms of violence, accidents and natural disasters, are ‘traumatic’ insofar as they disturb, to one extent or another, the regulation of the drive or, more precisely, the jouissance of the drive. Now, it is also true that the subject experiences such a disturbance in a number of different ways, including anxiety, nightmares, flashbacks, a range of somatic disorders, and is unable to make sense of such experiences. In my view, Freud’s concept of the traumatic neuroses is a useful ‘bridge’ between so-called ‘life-traumas’ and the (normally latent) trauma of the drive, that is, the jouissance of the drive. Clinically, this excess of drive-jouissance can also precipitate an emergency psychic freeze that mimics primary affective depletion; a mechanism I examine in Trauma, depression and the myth of the lost object.
Notes and references
- Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac Books, 1988), pp.470-473. ↑
- For an introduction to problem of psychosomatics in the context of psychoanalysis see this article which I posted in 2015. ↑
- Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, p.472. ↑
- Sigmund Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, in The Standard Edition (London: Hogarth Press, 1920g), XVIII, 3–64. ↑
- Ibid., p.31. ↑
- Freud’s argument is that: “…if one bears in mind two facts which have been stressed by psycho-analytic research: firstly, that mechanical agitation must be recognized as one of the sources of sexual excitation, and, secondly, that painful and feverish illnesses exercise a powerful effect, so long as they last, on the distribution of libido. Thus, on the one hand, the mechanical violence of the trauma would liberate a quantity of sexual excitation which, owing to the lack of preparation for anxiety, would have a traumatic effect; but, on the other hand, the simultaneous physical injury, by calling for a narcissistic hypercathexis of the injured organ, would bind the excess of excitation.” (Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, p.33) ↑
- Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, ‘A Paradigm Shift in the Conceptualization of Psychological Trauma in the 20th Century’, Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21.2 (2007), 164–75, p.168. ↑
- Sigmund Freud, ‘Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety’, in The Standard Edition (London: Hogarth Press, 1926), xx, 77–175. ↑
- Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, p.29. ↑
- Although there is some confusion or ambiguity regarding this because at the same time Freud appears to be arguing that it’s the principle of constancy that keeps excitation at a low (and constant) level. ↑
- Sigmund Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, in The Standard Edition (London: Hogarth Press, 1920g), XVIII, 3–64.. The relevant passage reads: “Towards. the outside it (the ‘whole mental apparatus’) is shielded against stimuli, and the amounts of excitation impinging on it have only a reduced effect. Towards the inside there can be no such shield; the excitations in the deeper layers extend into the system directly and in undiminished amount, in so far as certain of their characteristics give rise to feelings in the pleasure-unpleasure series. The excitations coming from within are, however, in their intensity and in other, qualitative, respects—in their amplitude, perhaps—more commensurate with the system’s method of working than the stimuli which stream in from the external world. This state of things produces two definite results. First, the feelings of pleasure and unpleasure (which are an index to what is happening in the interior of the apparatus) predominate over all external stimuli. And secondly, a particular way is adopted of dealing with any internal excitations which produce too great an increase of unpleasure: there is a tendency to treat them as though they were acting, not from the inside, but from the outside, so that it may be possible to bring the shield against stimuli into operation as a means of defence against them. This is the origin of projection, which is destined to play such a large part in the causation of pathological processes.” (p.29, italics in original). ↑
- Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, pp.165-166. ↑
- Ibid., p.129. ↑
- See, for example, Freud’s comments in part IV of ‘Studies on Hysteria’ where he writes: “It is very important for me to distinguish the part played by hysteria in the picture of the mixed neuroses from that played by neurasthenia, anxiety neurosis and so on, because, once I have made this distinction, I shall be able to express concisely the therapeutic value of the cathartic method. For I am inclined to venture the assertion that that method is – as a matter of theory – very well able to get rid of any hysterical symptom, whereas, as will be easily understood, it is completely powerless against the phenomena of neurasthenia and is only able rarely and in roundabout ways to influence the psychical effects of anxiety neurosis. Its therapeutic effectiveness in any particular case will accordingly depend on whether the hysterical components of the clinical picture do or do not assume a position of practical importance in comparison with the other neurotic components.” (Freud, Sigmund, and Josef Breuer, ‘Studies on Hysteria’, in The Standard Edition, ed. by James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1895), II, p.261.) ↑
- So, for example, in his paper ‘Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses’, Freud argues that with each of the major neuroses in question, which in this case refers to hysteria and obsessional neurosis on the one hand (the psychoneuroses), and neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis on the other (the actual neuroses), there is one particular disturbance in common and “…these functional pathological modifications have as their common source the subject’s sexual life, whether they lie in a disorder of his contemporary sexual life or in important events in his past life.” (Freud, Sigmund, ‘Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses’, in The Standard Edition (London: Hogarth Press, 1896), III, 142–56, p.149, italics in original) ↑
Last updated: November 17, 2026
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