Introduction
To paraphrase Marx, there is a spectre haunting Lacanian psychoanalysis – the spectre of Louis Althusser. And behind Althusser, of course, there is Marx himself…In this article I will begin to make the case for a (long overdue) Lacanian ‘return to Althusser’, which I believe is urgently required in order to address the current crisis in the critique of ideology; a crisis that is occurring at the very moment when such a critique is most desperately needed in the wake of the ‘return of ideology’ and especially the resurgence of populist ideologies.
I emphasise a ‘return to Althusser’ as opposed a ‘return to Marx’ because part of the problem regarding the crisis of ideological critique is precisely the overkill of ‘Lacanian Marxism’; an overkill, I would argue, that has been brought about, at least in part, in an attempt to exorcise the ghost of Althusser. And just to be clear, this ‘exorcism’ has a long history, stretching back over thirty years. Furthermore, even at the time (over thirty years ago) it was recognised, at least in some (Slovenian) quarters, that the figure of Louis Althusser was creating difficulties. The following quote by Mladen Dolar (whose work I will be coming back to later) give us a flavour of the problem:
There is something quite extraordinary about the fate of Althusserian ideas (apart from his personal fate, which is extraordinary beyond measure)… Themes and topics widely discussed two decades ago have passed into oblivion; interest now remains confined to the notoriety of his personal life (scandalous enough to produce even best—sellers). I think this theoretical amnesia is not simply due to his falling out of fashion—it is not that his ideas have simply been superseded or supplanted by better ones. Rather, it is perhaps more a case of forgetting in a psychoanalytic sense, a convenient forgetting of something disagreeable and uncomfortable.[1]
And likewise, this from Slavoj Žižek:
There is something enigmatic in the sudden eclipse of the Althusserian school: it cannot be explained away in terms of a theoretical defeat. It is more as if there were, in Althusser’s theory, a traumatic kernel which had to be quickly forgotten, ‘repressed’; it is an effective case of theoretical amnesia.[2]
In a much more recent paper, published in 2020, Dolar appears to lament the demise of the critique of ideology, which some might argue is rather ironic bearing in mind that he (and Žižek) could be seen as being at least partly responsible for such a crisis in the first place.[3] And Caren Irr’s remarks regarding the demise of ideological critique at the very moment it is most needed seem particularly apt:
In universities, analyzing culture and ideology has long been the responsibility of the hermeneutic disciplines…However, in the first decades of the twenty-first century, many of the tools necessary for ideology critique in particular have been dismantled in favor of approaches such as surface reading and the critique of critique. Some of this resistance to critical readings of ideology announces itself as anti-rational and anti-political — seeing little remaining to the humanities in a period of social crisis beyond the excavation and appreciation of antiquarian curiosities. Other scholarly approaches restrict the “political” (that is, the ideological) to a narrow set of national or subnational themes having no material basis, while still others find too few cultural spaces sufficiently autonomous from capital to allow the project of critique to flourish.[4]
This crisis of the critique of ideology is occurring just as:
Ideology, in all its forms, is proliferating in the twenty-first century. Whether we understand ideology as extreme ideas, the disputed content of political discourse, the institutionalized pragmatism of the status quo, or the spontaneous, embodied, and/or habitual practices of everyday life, it is ubiquitous and effective. The present far-right nationalist sentiments that seem everywhere on the rise present only its most obvious face.[5]
But how is it that just as a robust critique of ideology is most needed such a critique is notable by its absence? After all, there has been no lack of intellectual output on the subject from the 1980s onwards, and particularly in the wake of the work of such theoreticians as Žižek, Dolar, Laclau and others. In order to attempt to address this question I will focus on an aspect of ideology which Althusser himself can be credited for, that of interpellation. I have chosen this topic partly because it has been a longstanding interest of mine (in fact it was through a study of ideology and discourse that I ‘discovered’ Lacan in the first place) and partly because I think the field of ideology is a prime example of ‘Lacanian’ attempts of ‘exorcise’ the spectre of Althusser.
A Lacanized Marx?
The fact that David Pavón Cuéllar’s otherwise excellent paper on ‘Lacanizing Marxism’ never mentions Althusser’s name once is extremely telling; even in 2019, some thirty years after his death, it seems that writers such as Cuéllar, a self-confessed Marxist, are unable to bring themselves to utter his name. In fact, in the whole of the edition of Crisis and Critique dedicated to Lacan’s work, the majority of the references (30 out of 57) occur in one paper,[6] and another ten in the Introduction.[7] However, Cuéllar’s article is interesting for another reason: his concept of ‘Lacanian Marxism’ (for which he is a great advocate in his text) and the related concept of ‘Lacanizing Marxism’. This latter idea refers to the different ways (five of which Cuéllar outlines in his paper) that Lacanian theory has been used to problematise, historicise, generalise, confirm and/or complete various aspects of Marxist writings. So, for example, Cuéllar argues that:
Instead of simply avoiding Marxism by considering it Lacanianly (sic) irrelevant, it is possible to problematise its ideas as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe did by using Lacan to discuss the Marxist conception of the subject, of society or of the working class, as a given empirical being. The Lacanian perspective makes this subject problematic, showing its ‘precariousness and absence of suture’ and its ‘ambiguous, incomplete, polysemical’ character as ‘discursive identity’, which is what makes a ‘hegemonic articulation’ possible and necessary to ‘construct nodal points’ that ‘fix the meaning of the subject’.[8]
It’s worth noting here that in his later work Laclau would ‘Lacanize’ populism as well,[9] a focus that is perhaps more pertinent at the current time than worrying about the fate of his ‘post-Marxism’. However, coming back to Cuéllar’s article, most of it is devoted to his own attempt to ‘Lacanize’ Marx through using these five ‘affirmative effects’ (Cuéllar’s term), namely, problematisation, historicisation, generalisation, confirmation and completion. The degree to which he achieves such a ‘Lacanization’ of Marx and Marxist theory is probably best left to the reader to decide, but what interests me far more is the basic concept of ‘Lacanization’ in the first place; in other words, the idea of using Lacanian ideas to somehow ‘improve’ and/or critique Marxist ones. Although Cuéllar is somewhat scathing about the “average Lacanian (who) is familiar with at least some of the ‘mistakes’ of Marxism”,[10] especially those who have never actually read any Marx, as I have already indicated he still supports the idea of using Lacanian ideas, albeit in a more sensible and sophisticated manner than some of those ‘average Lacanians’, in order to ‘read’ Marx and Marxist theory in a new light:
When read through a Lacanian lens, Marx and the Marxists are transfigured and shown in a totally different light. It’s almost as if they become others or mad. Suddenly, their speeches are full of nonsense, paradoxes, tensions, uncertainties and enigmas. Their theories are reconfigured. Certain parts are revalued and others are devalued and reduced to absurdity. Some of their lateral ideas become decisive, while their central ideas lose importance. Their seemingly simple and obvious notions cease to seem that way; they become complicated, they move away from common sense, they are carried to their ultimate consequences and reappear with new nuances and an unfathomable depth. It happens that their perspective becomes more solid, radicalises and reinvigorates, acquires greater scope and reveals unexpected aspects. We are surprised again by what no longer surprised us. We stop understanding what we understood perfectly.[11]
As Cuéllar notes, reading Marx through a ‘Lacanian lens’ was never an activity that Lacan himself engaged in; any more than he read Hegel, Saussure, and other authors through such a ‘lens’. True, he used the ideas of such thinkers in order to develop and illustrate his own theories, but this is not the same as reading them through a particular ‘lens’. This rather begs the question, therefore, why Cuéllar himself then proceeds to engage in such a reading. With regards to Lacan’s ‘reading’ of Marx, as Adrian Johnston points out in his paper on the ‘very last Lacan’ (which he defines as centred around Seminars XXIV and XXV) Lacan “…particularly starting in the mid-1960s, evinces commitments to a Marxism-indebted materialism as a philosophical position.”[12] Furthermore, it is clear from Lacan’s teachings that certain ‘Lacanian’ ideas, for example, surplus jouissance, are based on Marxist ones (in this example, surplus value).
However, I am not advocating a ‘reverse Lacanization’, that is, using Marxist ideas to problematise, historicise, generalise, confirm and complete Lacanian ideas. Or, rather, not in the way that the ‘Lacanization’ of Marxism seems to operate. In other words, it is not a case of ‘re-reading’ Lacan through a Marxist ‘lens’ any more than it is a case of ‘re-reading’ Marx through a Lacanian ‘lens’. Rather, it is a question of examining what Marx and Marxist ideas can bring to the table, so to speak, in order to shed light on some of Lacan’s key ideas.
Interpellation and its beyond
In chapter twelve of On the Reproduction of Capitalism Althusser outlines his theory of ideology and its central thesis: that ideology interpellates individuals as subjects.[13] In introducing his main thesis Althusser states:
This thesis simply comes down to making our last proposition explicit [that ideology has a material existence]: there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects. In other words, there is no ideology except for concrete subjects (such as you and me), and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject: in other words, by the category of the subject and its functioning.[14]
Althusser is using the term ‘interpellation’ to describe how ideology ‘hails’ the human subject. One of his well-known examples is when someone is ‘hailed’ by a police officer in the street (often as a precursor to being arrested). The moment that the police officer shouts ‘hey, you there!’ the subject in question immediately recognises themselves (and no-one else) as the subject of interest. What interests Althusser is why this happens; in other words, why a particular individual would ‘recognise’ themselves as the subject of the police officer’s attention. At this point it is important to note that, for Althusser, human individuals are always already subjects:
Since ideology is eternal, we must now suppress the temporal form in which we have represented the functioning of ideology and say: ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects. This ineluctably leads us to one last proposition: individuals are always-already subjects.[15]
What Althusser is getting at here is that although the idea of ideological ‘hailing’ (interpellation) seems to suggest a temporal sequence (one is hailed and at this point one recognises oneself as a subject) in reality “…things happen without succession. The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing.[16]
And for Althusser interpellation is effected through a number of different ideological state apparatuses (ISAs), including the Church, schools, the media, the family, the legal system and so on. Some of these ISAs, for example, the family, would appear to have very little to do with the concept of the ‘state’ as it is normally understood and would seem instead to reside in the realm of the ‘private’. However, as Althusser points out, citing Gramsci: “The distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law, and valid in the (subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its ‘authority’.”[17] In other words, the distinction between ‘public’ (state) and ‘private’ is an artificial (and ideological) construction of the capitalist ruling class.
But the ‘recognition’ brought about by ideological interpellation is, in fact, a mis-recognition. And this links back to Althusser’s first ‘thesis: that ideology represents individuals’ imaginary relation to their real conditions of existence. However, this should not be conceived of in terms of some kind of ‘false consciousness’, which is often the ‘standard’ (and naïve) reading of Marx’s concept of ideology. As Althusser explains, the first ‘version’ of the false consciousness argument, which dates back to the emergence of the concept of ideology in eighteenth century, is based on the idea that a small group of dominant individuals (priests or despots, according to Althusser) forge and disseminate ‘Beautiful Lies’ to the people so they would believe they were obeying the will of God, whereas in reality they were submitting to the will of the priests and despots (the ruling class). For example, workers in the factories of Victorian England (and indeed well into the twentieth century) experienced horrendous conditions, long hours and little pay, only to be told every Sunday in church that their salvation was yet to come; and, furthermore, they might be at the bottom of the social pile in their own country but they were still vastly superior to the ‘natives’ in the Empire’s colonies. From a (naïve) Marxist perspective the answer is for such workers to ‘wake up’ and recognise the reality of their exploitation and to join a trade union and/or a political party in order to combat it.
The second ‘version’ is that of Feuerbach, which is taken up by the ‘early Marx’, and argues that ideological distortion is caused by the material alienation of people’s very existence:
This is how Marx defends, in The Jewish Question and elsewhere, the 100 per cent Feuerbachian idea (enhanced with economic pseudoconsiderations in the 1844 Manuscripts) that people devise an alienated (that is, imaginary) representation of their conditions of existence because those conditions of existence are themselves alienating (in the 1844 Manuscripts: because those conditions are dominated [by] the essence of alienated society: ‘alienated labour’).[18]
However, and this is the critical point for Althusser, it is not that people (mis)represent, through ideology, their real conditions of existence (exploitation, poverty, and so on), but, rather, their relation to such conditions. This might seem a rather subtle distinction (between representation and relation) but as I understand it, what Althusser is getting at here is that in the ‘naïve’ reading of ideology there is an underlying (material) reality which is ‘covered over’ and distorted by ideology. This is certainly the case with the first ‘version’ of the false consciousness argument; with the second ‘version’ things are a bit more complicated because it is not altogether clear (in my view at least) how the alienating conditions of existence (which ‘produce’ the ideological distortion) are not, in fact, a relation:
…if it is true that the representation of the real conditions of existence of individuals holding posts of agents of production, exploitation, repression, ideologization and scientific practice arises, in the last instance, from the relations of production and relations deriving from them, we may say the following: every ideology represents, in its necessarily imaginary distortion, not the existing relations of production (and the other relations deriving from them) , but, above all, individuals’ (imaginary) relation to the relations of production and the relations deriving from them. What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of real relations governing individuals’ existence, but those individuals’ imaginary relation to the real relations in which they live.[19]
In one sense, of course, it is perfectly true that, in any work environment, be it a factory, a call centre or even a therapy clinic, most workers do not recognise the true (exploitative) conditions of their situation; or if they do then one must assume they have either resigned themselves to it or are hoping to effect change ‘from within’. In other words, their working situation is distorting their consciousness. But isn’t such a distortion a consequence of the workers’ relationship to their work environment? However, as Irr argues in the article I cited earlier, the term ‘relation’ needs careful consideration. He contends that ‘relation’ should be read as rapport, which is how it appears in Althusser’s French text. Irr notes that in French the primary definitions of the word ‘rapport’ include bureaucratic reports and commercial profit “…with overtones of interpersonal accord or sexual intimacy.”[20] This leads Irr to suggest that:
Retaining a fuller set of connotations for rapport illuminates the “imaginary” aspect of Althusser’s theory of ideology, in particular. Listening for rapport prompts an understanding of ideology as a report that emphasizes the individual’s harmonious social situation and intimate life. As Imre Szeman stresses…for Althusser ideology returns the crisis-ridden subject to a default setting where she concludes, no matter the evidence, “so be it” or “all is well.”[21]
The critical point here is that ideology constructs an imaginary rapport for the subject; that is, an imaginary/illusory sense of harmony with their real conditions of existence. This clearly has strong echoes with Lacan’s contention that there is no sexual rapport, that is, harmony, between the sexes.
Althusser and Lacan
Coming back to Althusser’s concept of interpellation, at first sight it might seem to resonate quite powerfully with the Lacanian idea of subject formation, especially if we think of the subject as being ‘hailed’ by language. In other words, the idea that human subjects are constituted by the human being’s entry into language. However, Dolar argues that the Lacanian subject is, in fact, the result of the failure of interpellation:
To put it in the simplest way, there is a part of the individual that cannot successfully pass into the subject, an element of “pre-ideological” and “presubjective” materia prima that comes to haunt subjectivity once it is constituted as such. A part of external materiality remains that cannot be successfully integrated in the interior. Interpellation was based on a happy transition from a pre-ideological state into ideology: successfully achieved, it wipes out the traces of its origin and results in a belief in the autonomy and self-transparency of the subject.[22]
More critically, though, the Althusserian ‘subject’ is not a subject at all in the Lacanian sense. Rather, it appears to correspond to Lacan’s idea of the specular ego, an imaginary identification with another person (the ‘little other’). As Carsten Strathausen points out: “It is obvious that Althusser’s concept of interpellation rests on the idea of the ‘mirror-stage’ as the founding moment of the ‘imaginary,’ a theory which Lacan developed in his essay ‘The Mirror Stage…’ “[23] The key point Lacan’s paper, of course, is that the infant child’s identification with its image, the image of a ‘whole person’, is a way to cover over the hole, the void that is the human subject.
In fact, later on in his paper, Strathausen discusses Miller’s theory of suture, which he (Miller) defines as:
…the relation of the subject to the chain of its discourse; we shall see that it figures there as the element which is lacking, in the form of a stand-in. For, while there lacking, it is not purely and simply absent. Suture, by extension – the general relation of lack to the structure of which it is an element, inasmuch as it implies the position of a taking-the-place-of.[24]
To develop his thesis Miller engages in a detailed analysis of Frege’s argument in Grundlagen der Arithmetik [25] regarding the genesis of the sequence of whole natural numbers. Miller’s is a complex argument which relies on Frege’s idea that the number zero is a ‘substitute’ or ‘stand-in’ for the actual (or in Miller’s terminology, absolute) zero, that is, nothing. From this proposition Frege claims to be able to generate the whole series of natural numbers. But in the process of generating this series of numbers, which are also a series of signifiers, something, an object, is excluded, which is what Frege defines “not identical with itself.”[26] This (impossible) object is the real zero (nothing) as opposed to the number zero, which, we recall, is the ‘stand-in’ for the actual, impossible object. And it is this impossible object that Miller names as the subject:
The impossible object, which the discourse of logic summons as the not-identical with itself and then rejects as the pure negative, which it summons and rejects in order to constitute itself as that which it is, which it summons and rejects wanting to know nothing of it, we name this object, in so far as it functions as the excess which operates in the series of numbers, the subject.[27]
What Miller appears to be doing here is trying to demonstrate how it is possible for the subject to both appear and disappear (be excluded) at the same time. But more importantly, perhaps, he is formulating the logic of the signifier, which he defines as “…the relation of lack to the trait (the signifier).”[28] If I understand Miller correctly, what he is arguing is that Frege’s logic, that is, the logic that leads to the construction of the series of natural numbers, is precisely the logic of the signifier. In the process of suturing, the subject appears both as a stand-in (in Fregean logic repeated iterations of zero as number) and as excluded, the impossible object, which is the subject of the unconscious. This is represented, according to Miller, by ꞨA, which is the subject excluded from the field of the Other.[29] As Strathausen notes: “Suture, thus, names the process by which the subject identifies itself with itself as the nonidentical; it identifies with the lack as the result of its failed representation.” [30] In other words, the subject that emerges within the chain of signifiers is a ‘stand-in’ for the excluded subject of the Real. The function of ideological interpellation is the create the ‘fiction’ of subjects within a unified totalised field, and although it does not constitute the subject “…it nonetheless provides the space for it to emerge as a lack and simultaneously tries to cover this lack again…”[31] Furthermore:
The inevitable failure of ideological interpellation …results in a lack. Ideology attempts to mask this lack through a fantasy, which again works through identification. This implies that every ideological edifice (i.e., the idea of Society as an organic Whole) “knows” about its own impossibility (the fact that it will never become real) and thus always invents a fantasy which explains in advance its inevitable failure.[32]
Here Strathausen is drawing upon Žižek’s arguments regarding the impossibility of the totalitarian (totalising) aim of ideology, which is linked closely the idea of the ‘impossibility of society’. According to Žižek ideology creates the fantasy of the social whilst recognising the impossibility of the social; an idea, according to Strathausen, that Althusser himself would have rejected. However, this seems to be based on a misrepresentation of Althusser’s concept of ideology, which in works such as For Marx he equates with philosophy and contrasts with (Marxist) science.[33] Althusser is well aware that ideology creates the illusion of totality which sustains our everyday practices and social relations. Marxist Theory (with a capital T),[34] on the other hand, is able to recognise the functioning of ideology, that is, of sustaining capitalist relations. This implies, of course, that Marxist theorists such as Althusser are able to ‘step outside’ of ideology to the extent of being able to recognise both its existence and operation.
Post-Althusserianism and its apologists
And perhaps this is at the root of the desire to exorcise Althusser’s ghost that I touched upon earlier. The idea that it is possible to ‘step outside’ of ideology in order to reveal its nature and operation is at the heart of the ‘critique of ideology’; otherwise such a critique is itself ideological. Now, as I noted above, Althusser himself was very critical of the ‘false consciousness’ concept of ideology; rather, his interest was in trying to understand how ideology actually works. But gaining such an understanding does not in itself imply that there is a ‘way out’ of ideology; anymore than, from a psychoanalytic position, there is a ‘way out’ of the fantasies that govern our day-to-day lives.
As I indicated earlier, the ‘way out’ of ideological mystification for Althusser is through Marxist Theory, that is, historical materialism. The problem, however, that he was developing these ideas at the very moment (the mid-1960s onwards) that Marxism, both as a theory and a political practice, was being called into serious question. Many European Marxists were reeling from the Soviet Union’s suppression of the uprisings in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the revelations regarding the true nature and extent of Stalin’s crimes in the 1930s. Furthermore, the deeply theoretical nature of Althusser’s work was the antithesis of the spontaneity and anarchism of the ‘events of 68’.
But this is only half the story; because from the ashes of Marxist theory a whole new corpus of thought emerged, which often (and erroneously in my view) gets labelled ‘post-structuralism’. I say ‘erroneously’ because as Johannes Angermuller argues in his book Why there is no Poststructuralism in France the terms was essentially an invention of the North American Academy in the 1970s.[35] More specifically, it was an invention of certain English Literature departments within the Academy and before long also found its way into cultural studies’ departments. As the title of his book suggests, in France the term ‘poststructuralism’ has hardly ever been recognised, and none of the so-called ‘poststructuralist’ thinkers (Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, and so on) would ever have recognised this label during their own lifetime. But this is not the end of the story. For not only was the idea of poststructuralism invented in North America but it was soon ‘exported’ back across the Atlantic and found fertile ground in the humanities and cultural studies’ departments of many European universities.[36] And at this point it is perhaps worth mentioning the fate of Lacanian theory itself, which became one of post-structuralism’s many casualties. This is something Lydia Liu highlights in her book The Freudian Robot where she argues that Lacan’s ideas were captured by ‘French Theory’ (her term for post-structuralism), which has very little to do with actual French theory but is rather the product of the aforementioned North American Academy.[37] This capture saw the emergence of what might be best described as the ‘Saussurian Lacan’, that is, Lacan read through the ‘lens’ of structural linguistics, which also seems to be linked to the idea of ‘anti-essentialism’.
The latter term often seems to be a euphemism for anti-materialism, although just to complicate things Laclau and Mouffe argued that Marx was, in fact, an idealist because he still retained the Hegelian notion of the Real as rational and because of this Marx’s historical ‘materialism’ is, in fact, historical idealism, because it is based on being able to ‘grasp’ the objective laws of History, which are in the realm of the form.[38] A true materialism, argue Laclau and Mouffe, would recognise that the ultimate reality of objects is not constituted by the fixed form (the idealist position), which can also be theorised in terms of essences; rather, such a reality must be:
…founded on a systematic weakening of form, which consists in showing the historical, contingent and constructed character of the being of objects; and in showing that this depends on the reinsertion of that being in the ensemble of relational conditions which constitute the life of a society as a whole.[39]
In other words, ‘ultimate reality’ is relational not essentialist, that is, based on objective forms. Furthermore, according to Laclau and Mouffe, essentialism is in fact both idealist and realist, in the sense such forms have an objective reality (even though such a reality resides in an ‘objective mind’), and a great deal of Marxist ‘materialism’ falls into this category. On this basis I think it is reasonable to argue that Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘materialism’ would be better described as a form of social constructionism and what they define, and criticise, as ‘idealism’ might be better described as (critical) realism.[40]
I do not have the space in this text to explore the concept of social constructionism and its relation to realism, but I would strongly recommend Dave Elder-Vass’s The Reality of Social Constructionism as an excellent introduction to the key arguments.[41] But put very simplistically, realists maintain that there is an objective reality beyond human thought, whereas social constructionists maintain either that there is no such distinction or, if there is, because such an ‘objective’ reality is beyond representation and comprehension, it is of no consequence. At this point we need to remind ourselves of Laclau and Mouffe’s assertion that the essence of idealism is not that there is no ‘objective reality’, but rather that there is an identification between human thought and objective form. Such an identification allows the (rational) human mind to comprehend such objective and universal forms which reside in a transcendental reality. Now it should be clear that in this approach to ontology, human thought plays a critical role in comprehending reality, and therefore it follows that language must also place a critical role. What does not follow, however, is the idea that reality can be ‘reduced’ to human thought, which is basically what radical social constructionists (and here I would include Laclau and Mouffe) are arguing for. If there is no objective reality beyond human thought, that is, beyond language and discourse, then clearly reality (including the human subject itself) is a social construction, that is, a construction of language and discourse.
Returning now to the concept of a ‘Lacanized Marx’, in my view a great deal of such ‘Lacanization’ depends on the type of anti-essentialist/social constructionist ontology outlined above. Such an approach would clearly have been anathema to Althusser who, in spite of the density (and wordiness) of his theory, still believed in a reality beyond language; a reality that could be reached through the correct application of Marxist Theory (historical materialism). But as I pointed out earlier, it would seem that the tide of history (and especially the history of ideas) was firmly against him…until now, that is…
Notes and references
- Mladen Dolar, “Beyond Interpellation,” Qui Parle 6, no. 2 (1993), 75. ↑
- Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2008), xxiii-xxiv. ↑
- Mladen Dolar, “Lifting the Veil,” South Atlantic Quarterly 119, no. 4 (October 1, 2020): 671–80. ↑
- Caren Irr, “Introduction: An Althusser for the Twenty-First Century,” Mediations | Journal of the Marxist Literary Group (Online Publication) 30, no. 2 (2017),29-30. ↑
- Ibid., 29. ↑
- Gabriel Tupinambá, “‘Pandora’s Box Has Been Opened’: Lacanian Psychoanalysis and Politics after 2017,” Crisis and Critique 6, no. 1 (2019): 340–63. ↑
- Frank Ruda and Agon Hamza, “Jacques Lacan: Psychoanalysis, Politics, Philosophy,” Crisis and Critique 6, no. 1 (2019): 4–9. ↑
- Cuéllar, ‘Lacanizing Marxism’, 265-266. ↑
- A topic that I have discussed in a number of other postings ↑
- Ibid., 264. ↑
- Ibid., 265. ↑
- Adrian Johnston, “Lacan’s Endgame: Philosophy, Science, and Religion in the Final Seminars,” Crisis and Critique 6, no. 1 (2019): 159. ↑
- Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (London: Verso, 2014). An abridged version of this chapter along with extracts from other chapters in the book formed the basis of Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards and Investigation) which up until the French publication of On the Reproduction of Capitalism in 1995 and the English translation in 2014 was the main reference source for Althusser’s theory of ideology. ↑
- Ibid., 188. ↑
- Ibid., 192, italics in original. ↑
- Ibid., 191, italics in original. ↑
- Ibid., 244. ↑
- Ibid., 182, italics in original. ↑
- Ibid., 183. ↑
- Irr, “An Althusser for the Twenty-First Century”, 32. ↑
- Ibid., 32. ↑
- Dolar, Beyond Interpellation, 77. ↑
- Carsten Strathausen, “Althusser’s Mirror,” Studies in 20th Century Literature, Article 7, 18, no. 1 (1994), 66. ↑
- Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Suture (Elements of the Logic of the Signifier)’, Screen, 18.4 (1977), 25-26. Interestingly, a version of this formed a presentation by Miller in Lesson 9 of Seminar XII. However, this section is missing, at least in Gallagher’s translation. ↑
- Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953). ↑
- Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, 88. ↑
- Miller, ‘Suture’, 32, italics in original. ↑
- Ibid., 32. “If we now determine the trait as the signifier, and ascribe to the number the position of the signified, the relation of lack to the trait should be considered the logic of the signifier.” ↑
- I give a much fuller account of Miller’s reading of Frege in my book Traumatic Neurosis Revisited (Palgrave, 2025), forthcoming. ↑
- Strathausen, “Althusser’s Mirror”, 69. ↑
- Ibid., 69. ↑
- Ibid., 70. ↑
- Louis Althusser, For Marx, E-book edition (London: Verso, 2005). ↑
- In For Marx Althusser states:I shall call Theory (with a capital T), general theory, that is, the Theory of practice in general, itself elaborated on the basis of the Theory of existing theoretical practices (of the sciences), which transforms into ‘knowledges’ (scientific truths) the ideological product of existing ‘empirical’ practices (the concrete activity of men). This Theory is the materialist dialectic which is none other than dialectical materialism. Op. cit., 168. ↑
- Johannes Angermuller, Why There Is No Poststructuralism in France The Making of an Intellectual Generation (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). ↑
- Interestingly, Angermuller includes thinkers such as Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou amongst these European ‘poststructuralists’, which is somewhat ironic bearing in mind that Žižek in particular would be the first to renounce such a label. ↑
- Lydia H. Liu, The Freudian Robot: Digital Media and the Future of the Unconscious (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010). ↑
- Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism without Apologies,” New Left Review 166 (1987): 79–106. I explore the whole question of Lacan’s alleged ‘anti-essentialism’ in my article A Materialist Lacan? ↑
- Ibid., 91, italics in original. ↑
- By ‘critical realism’ I am thinking especially of the work of Roy Bhaskar and colleagues. See for example: Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, Rev. ed. (London: Routledge, 2008). ↑
- Dave Elder-Vass, The Reality of Social Construction (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2012). ↑
Last updated: March 15, 2026