Introduction
The function of the tuché, of the real as encounter—the encounter in so far as it may be missed, in so far as it is essentially the missed encounter—first presented itself in the history of psycho-analysis in a form that was in itself already enough to arouse our attention, that of the trauma.[1]
This statement by Lacan in lesson five of Seminar XI is used by a number of authors as a starting point for their particular analyses of trauma. For example, Hal Foster makes reference to Lacan’s statement quoted above in his discussion of Andy Warhol’s Death in America images:
In this seminar (Seminar XI) Lacan defines the traumatic as a missed encounter with the real. As missed, the real cannot be represented; it can only be repeated, indeed it must be repeated. ” Wiederholen,” Lacan writes in etymological reference to Freud on repetition, “is not Reproduzieren” (50); repetition is not reproduction.[2]
And Cathy Caruth makes two explicit references to missed encounters in her discussion of Lacan’s commentary on Freud’s ‘burning child’ dream, although the whole of her book, Unclaimed Experience, is essentially based on the idea of trauma as a missed encounter.[3] She makes a direct reference to the passage in Seminar XI that I have quoted above, although she does not explicitly state that trauma is a missed encounter with the Real. The centrality of the ‘missed encounter’ in Caruth’s book is picked up by Petar Ramadanovic in his commentary on the text.[4] Furthermore, the importance of Lacan in relation to the idea such a missed encounter is made clear in this passage:
In order to explain Caruth’s concept of trauma further, we go to Lacan and his notion of the missed encounter, the concept that serves Caruth as a model for her idea of the “unclaimed experience,” which names the same disjunctive or paradoxical temporality. Here is Lacan defining trauma as a missed encounter, having in mind, not by chance, Greek tragic plays…[5]
But what does it mean to describe trauma as ‘a missed encounter with the Real?’ Does it mean that, in a state of trauma, the subject somehow ‘side steps’ the Real? But this is not what Lacan appears to be saying in his seminar. In fact, in lesson five, and especially in his analysis of Freud’s ‘burning child’ dream, it is clear that he is arguing that trauma is an encounter with the Real. Furthermore, Jacques-Alain Miller, in his presentation Psychoanalysis, its place among the sciences, states that: ‘This real of Lacan’s, which cannot be said but about which one must speak, is what Freud called ‘trauma’. Lacan’s real is always traumatic. It is a hole in discourse.’[6]
However, in this essay I will argue that trauma is a missed encounter, but that this statement of Lacan’s in Seminar XI has to be read in a particular way for this to make sense. In fact, my central argument is that trauma itself has to be viewed as an encounter with the Real which is missed by the subject. Before developing this argument, however, I would like to explore a bit more Lacan’s central arguments regarding trauma and the Real in Seminar XI. The reason for this is that references to trauma are conspicuous by their absence in much of Lacan’s work, but references to the Real, and a focus on the Real as the central theme of psychoanalysis only increase over time in his teachings. Therefore, if it can be shown, as I think it can, that trauma is simply a way to encounter the Real (albeit in a rather paradoxical form of a ‘missed encounter’) then explicit references to trauma in Lacan’s work become more or less irrelevant.
Lacan, trauma and the Real in Seminar XI
It is in the first section of Seminar XI (lessons two to five) that Lacan begins in earnest to develop a theory of the Real as a function of language, in the sense of being a ‘gap’ in the Symbolic order itself.[7] It is also where he develops his theory of the unconscious as an effect of language, rather than being some kind of ‘mystical’ entity. Even though it could be argued that in this seminar Lacan is at the zenith of his ‘structuralist period’, at the same time he is already clear that there is a limit to language as a symbolic structure. Perhaps what’s particularly interesting in this Seminar is how there appear to be ‘two Lacans’ rubbing shoulders with one another, so to speak. On the one hand there is the Lacan of the signifier, of the Symbolic; and on the other, the Lacan of jouissance (in the form of the objet a and the drive), of the Real.
The unconscious occupies rather contradictory position in all this, because although Lacan speaks of the unconscious as being structured like a language, he also appears to be equating it with the gap in the Symbolic, which is the Real. He talks about the ‘pulsation’ of the unconscious, of it ‘opening’ and ‘closing’.
Lacan goes on to argue that:
…the Freudian unconscious is situated at that point, where, between cause and that which it affects, there is always something wrong…For what the unconscious does is to show us the gap through which neurosis recreates a harmony with a real—a real that may well not be determined.[8]
At this point it becomes difficult, I would argue, to distinguish between the concept of the unconscious and that of the Real. However, one way to differentiate them is to see the unconscious in terms of a structure that creates the ‘gap’ in the Symbolic that Lacan will name as the Real:
Impediment, failure, split. In a spoken or written sentence something stumbles. Freud is attracted by these phenomena, and it is there that he seeks the unconscious. There, something other demands to be realized—which appears as intentional, of course, but of a strange temporality. What occurs, what is produced, in this gap, is presented as the discovery. It is in this way that the Freudian exploration first encounters what occurs in the unconscious.[9]
Here Lacan refers to what occurs in the unconscious, what is produced in the gap. The ‘hole’ in the Symbolic is structural and subject to the laws of the signifying chain, but what is ‘in’ the hole is not. Lacan also refers to the gap of the unconscious as being pre-ontological, which means that it belongs to the order of the unrealised as opposed to non-being.
With regards to the discovery, as Lacan points out, this is essentially as rediscovery, which ‘is always ready to steal away again, thus establishing the dimension of loss.’[10] Just as soon as the unconscious opens up it closes again, and what is lost is the object a, which in Seminar X Lacan had already established as the object cause of desire, and which later on he will refer to as surplus jouissance, a piece of the Real.
Lacan also links both the Real and the unconscious to the concept of cause, which he equates with the Aristotelian idea of tuché. He contrasts this with the idea of law:
Cause is to be distinguished from that which is determinate in a chain, in other words the law. By way of example, think of what is pictured in the law of action and reaction. There is here, one might say, a single principle. One does not go without the other. The mass of a body that is crushed on the ground is not the cause of that which it receives in return for its vital force… Whenever we speak of cause, on the other hand, there is always something anti-conceptual, something indefinite. The phases of the moon are the cause of tides—we know this from experience, we know that the word cause is correctly used here. Or again, miasmas are the cause of fever—that doesn’t mean anything either, there is a hole, and something that oscillates in the interval. In short, there is cause only in something that doesn’t work.[11]
As Paul Verhaeghe notes, the idea of tuché:
…is one of the cornerstones on which Seminar XI is built. As a matter of fact, it goes back to Freud’s starting point as well, i.e. the real of the trauma. Already for Freud, the trauma came down to something where normal representation failed, the traumatic experience could never find an appropriate expression.[12]
However, it is important to recognise that in lesson five of Seminar XI, Lacan is using two key terms which he has ‘borrowed’ from Aristotle: tuché and automaton. And the significance of the former (tuché) can only really be appreciated by comparing it with the latter (automaton), which is related to the idea of law. Verhaeghe argues that the concept of the automaton, in Lacan’s reading, is linked closely to the ‘automaton-model’ of science which was prevalent up until the early twentieth century. This is the classic, positivistic model of the ‘hard’ sciences which is based on the search for deterministic laws. It is also worth pointing out, perhaps, that Freud himself never lost his adherence to this model. The concept of chance (tuché) is anathema to this paradigm, although ironically it reappears in the wake of the ‘new physics’ of the twentieth century, where chance and probability come back to the fore, for example, in the form of quantum theory.
According to Verhaeghe, up until, and to certain extent including, Seminar XI, Lacan himself was an adherent to a form of determinism, that of the signifying chain. Here, the signifying chain or network is governed by its own, ‘objective’ laws, which lie outside the control of the individual human subject; in fact, such a subject is itself the product of the signifying chain. This marks the highpoint of the structuralist thinking, in which the human subject is but an effect of the signifier; an idea which has survived to this day in various form of post-structuralism.
However, as Verhaeghe goes on to argue, Seminar XI also appears to mark a turning point in Lacan’s own thinking regarding the dominance of the signifier (the ‘two Lacans’ that I commented on earlier). This is because he, as did Freud before him, recognised that this automaton of the signifying chain occasionally encounters something which it cannot assimilate, something beyond; in other words, it encounters the Real, the trauma. This lack in the signifying chain is what Lacan defines as tuché, which, according he Verhaeghe, represents a different form of causality; one that arises from the body (through the operation of the drive):
…the body occupies a completely new place. As cause it calls for “an appointment with a real that eludes us” a real that lies beyond the automaton and that comes down to what cannot be assimilated, in the sense of not mediated, not represented. Hence, the idea of cause implies the idea of failure, a failure of the symbolic to cover something of the real: something does not happen, thus causing something else to fill the scene.[13]
Verhaeghe’s reference to the drive brings us to another key aspect of the missed encounter with the Real, that of repetition:
…this “full stop” of the symbolic, the point of causality “where it doesn’t work” concerns the not-realized, the un-born in the chain of signifiers, the non-verbal rest that remains, even when desire has been expressed in the words of a demand. At that point, Freud had already met repetition rather than rememoration, and this repetition has everything to do with the real. The point where the chain stalls, is the very point where the real makes its appearance. The “meeting” with the real is an ever missed meeting, because there is no appropriate signifier.[14]
Repetition marks the perpetual return to the missed encounter with the Real in the automaton of the signifying chain. But why the repetition, why the ever-repeated failed encounter? At this point in Seminar XI, Lacan draws on Freud’s differentiation between remembering and repetition, which Freud elaborates in his paper Remembering, Repeating and Working-through.[15] Freud’s argument, which Lacan takes up in lesson four of his seminar, is that there is a point in the process of the subject’s free associations where he or she can go no further, where he or she encounters a resistance to any further associations. At this point the subject ceases to free-associate but instead acts out:
…we may say that the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it.
For instance, the patient does not say that he remembers that he used to be defiant and critical towards his parents’ authority; instead, he behaves in that way to the doctor.[16]
Freud goes onto argue that the greater the subject’s resistance, the more he or she will act out (repeat). But why does the subject resist in the first place? Lacan is clear on this point: because the subject comes up against the Real, the trauma:
Wiederholen (repeating) is related to Erinnerung (remembering). The subject in himself; the recalling of his biography, all this goes only to a certain limit, which is known as the real. If I wished to make a Spinozian formula concerning what is at issue, I would say—cogitatio adaequata semper vital eandem rem. An adequate thought, qua thought, at the level at which we are, always avoids—if only to find itself again later in everything— the same thing. Here, the real is that which always comes back to the same place—to the place where the subject in so far as he thinks, where the res cogitans, does not meet it.
The whole history of Freud’s discovery of repetition as function becomes clear only by pointing out in this way the relation between thought and the real. [17]
In other words, the subject is being endlessly pulled back to the Real kernel of the (unconscious) network of signifiers, and try as he or she might, can never assimilate, make sense of, the traumatic core at the centre of his or her symbolic universe.
Lacan also makes reference to Freud’s concept of the binding of energy, which Freud explores in some depth in his paper Beyond the Pleasure Principle.[18] This is in the context of Lacan’s question as to why repetition first appeared in traumatic neurosis.
In his paper Freud argues that ‘We may, I think, tentatively venture to regard the common traumatic neurosis as a consequence of an extensive breach being made in the protective shield against stimuli.’[19] Essentially, in the case of such a neurosis there is a failure of a binding of psychical energy (which equates with Lacan’s concept of jouissance) and consequently the subject is temporarily overwhelmed.
Freud goes on to argue:
The manifestations of a compulsion to repeat (which we have described as occurring in the early activities of infantile mental life as well as among the events of psycho-analytic treatment) exhibit to a high degree an instinctual character and, when they act in opposition to the pleasure principle, give the appearance of some ‘daemonic’ force at work.[20]
And this ‘daemonic force’, this ‘beyond the pleasure principle’, is what Freud will define as the death drive, the aim of which is to restore the human organism to an earlier, non-organic state.
The Real as a missed encounter
In the Introduction I argued that Lacan’s statement regarding the ‘missed encounter’ with the Real should be read in terms of trauma as an encounter with the Real which is missed by the subject. In other words, what matters here is the missed encounter with the Real itself, not that it takes the form of a trauma.
But why does this matter? In other words, why is it important to equate trauma with the Real, or to see trauma as a particular manifestation of the Real? It matters, I would argue, because unless trauma is seen as a manifestation of the Real it becomes a separate ‘entity’ in itself. This in turn undermines any serious discussion of the Real in various types of ‘trauma studies’, whether these be in academia or in the clinic.
But in what sense is this encounter with the Real missed? In one sense this would seem to contradict what both Freud and Lacan have to say about trauma; in other words, the subject does encounter the Real and becomes deeply disturbed (traumatised) by such an encounter. One has only to think about post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to see this encounter with the Real in action, as well as in the triggering of a psychosis. The problem here would appear to be precisely that of the encounter, not that of a missed one.
But even if trauma can be seen as a manifestation of the Real, as a form of the Real, this still begs the question regarding the subject’s encounter with the Real as ‘missed’. In fact, I would argue that there are two dimensions to such a ‘missed’ encounter. The first is in relation to the transference and the second is in relation to the structure of the Symbolic order itself.
Later on in Seminar XI Lacan argues that transference to the subject-supposed-to-know is the response of the subject’s encounter with trauma:
One may go so far as to believe that the opacity of the trauma—as it was then maintained in its initial function by Freud’s thought, that is to say, in my terms, its resistance to signification—is then specifically held responsible for the limits of remembering. And, after all, it is hardly surprising, given my own theorization, that I should see this as a highly significant moment in the transfer of powers from the subject to the Other, what I call the capital Other (le grand Autre), the locus of speech and, potentially, the locus of truth.[21]
Lacan argues that the Other, the subject-supposed-to-know, is already present in the opening of the unconscious, ‘however fleeting it may be’. Essentially, the transference is ‘the means by which the communication of the unconscious is interrupted’.[22] Pierre-Gilles Guéguen, in his paper Paradoxes of the Births of Transference, reinforces Lacan’s argument that transference occurs at the very moment of the encounter of the subject with the Real, with the trauma.[23] As Guéguen explains:
Lacan’s expression “closing of the unconscious” in this context designates the fact that in transference the subject gives meaning back to what was disturbed. The subject forgets that he is but the effect of the signifying chain, that he is only its remainder, re-woven with the Symbolic and the Imaginary that for an instant becomes undone. The clinic of trauma gives us the most striking example of this.[24]
Guéguen cites the example of Freud’s text on the Acropolis where he experienced a momentary sense of depersonalisation. He ‘resolves’ this loss of meaning by ‘spinning the story of the rivalry with his father and his guilt at having socially “surpassed” him.’[25] In other words, the intervention of the Other is enough to bring Freud back to ‘reality’, that is, the Symbolic-Imaginary matrix. In this sense the encounter with the Real is not so much ‘missed’ as avoided. The trauma of the Real is too much for the subject to bear so he or she ‘transfers’ to the Other.
At the same time, this is always a missed encounter for quite ‘structural’ reasons. As Lacan notes in lesson five of Seminar XI, just after his remarks about tuché and the missed encounter with the Real:
Is it not remarkable that, at the origin of the analytic experience, the real should have presented itself in the form of that which is unassimilable in it—in the form of the trauma, determining all that follows, and imposing on it an apparently accidental origin?[26]
In other words, the Real, in the form of trauma, cannot be symbolised, cannot be assimilated into the Symbolic order. So structurally there a ‘gap’, a void, in the fabric of ‘reality’, that is, in the network of signifiers. Essentially, the subject ‘encounters’ an absence. The key point here is that this encounter with an absence is not registered as traumatic by the subject; in fact, the subject fails to register anything at all, subjectively. It is only later, retroactively, that the subject is able to construct the trauma; or, more precisely, the narrative of the trauma.
References
- Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (London: Penguin, 1979), p.55. ↑
- Hal Foster, The Return of the Real : The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge, Mass., 1996), p.132). ↑
- Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (John Hopkins University Press, 1996). ↑
- Petar Ramadanovic, ‘The Time of Trauma: Rereading Unclaimed Experience and Testimony’, Journal of Literature and Trauma Studies, 3.2 (2014), 1–23. ↑
- Ramadanovic, ‘The Time of Trauma’, p.11. ↑
- Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Psychoanalysis, Its Place among the Sciences’, Psychoanalytical Notebooks, 27, 2013, 9–19, p.17. ↑
- See, for example, Voruz and Wolf’s preface to The Later Lacan, in which they argue ↑
- Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts, p.22. ↑
- Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts, p.25, italics in original. ↑
- Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts, p.25. ↑
- Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts, p.22, italics in original. ↑
- Paul Verhaeghe, ‘Causality in Science and Psychoanalysis’, in Lacan and Science, ed. by Jason Glynos and Yannis Stavrakakis (London, Routledge, 2002), pp. 119–45, p.129. ↑
- Verhaeghe, ‘Causality in Science and Psychoanalysis’, p.130. ↑
- Verhaeghe, ‘Causality in Science and Psychoanalysis’, p.131. ↑
- S. Freud, ‘Remembering, Repeating and Working Through’, in The Standard Edition (London: Vintage: The Hogarth Press, 1914), XII, 145–56. ↑
- Freud, ‘Remembering, Repeating and Working Through’, p.150, italics in original. ↑
- Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, p.49. ↑
- S. Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, in The Standard Edition (London: Hogarth Press, 1920g), XVIII, 3–64. ↑
- Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, p.31. ↑
- Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, p.35. ↑
- Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts, p.129. ↑
- Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts, p.130. ↑
- Pierre-Gilles Guéguen, ‘Paradoxes of the Births of Transference’, Psychoanalytical Notebooks, 17, 2008, 41–45. ↑
- Guéguen, ‘Paradoxes of the Births of Transference’, p.43, my italics. ↑
- Guéguen, ‘Paradoxes of the Births of Transference’, p.43. ↑
- Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, p.55, italics in original. ↑
Last updated: February 20, 2021
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