The time of Nachträglichkeit
The time of Nachträglichkeit

The time of Nachträglichkeit

One of the most peculiar aspects of Nachträglichkeit is that it appears to violate the basic laws of causality. In other words, rather than traumatic past events ‘causing’ trauma symptoms in the present, the memory of such events appears to construct the trauma retroactively. It should be said at this point that not all writers subscribe to this radical viewpoint; for example, Thomä and Cheshire are very critical of the idea of ‘retroactive causation’ and point out that there is nothing in the concept of Nachträglichkeit that requires a reversal of the ‘arrow of time’.[1] They argue that:

…there is …a needless muddle between (a) the logical ‘direction’ (so to speak) of the inference being made by the analyst or theorist who postulates Nachträglichkeit in a particular case, (b) the direction of the causal relationships which are being proposed by such an inference, and (c) the direction of the reconstrual or meaning-attribution being made by the person in question. Of course, both the therapist’s inference and the subject’s reconstrual are somehow backward-directed: but it does not follow from this that the causal mechanisms which are postulated as obtaining between the various events and experiences are themselves backward-directed.[2]

They go onto argue that the (temporal) orientation of Nachträglichkeit is only metaphorically retroactive, and not actually reversing the flow of time. However, I would argue that Thomä and Cheshire are making a category error by stating this; more specifically, they are treating ‘the time of Nachträglichkeit’ as if it were of the same order or category as ‘normal time’, that is, time as we generally experience (and measure) it on a day-to-day basis. It is almost tempting to say ‘physical’ time, that is, the time as measured by physicists, as if this provided the ‘base-line’ for conceptualising and measuring time. However, as Jan Faye points out in his discussion of backward causation (another term for retroactive causation), physicists have their own conception of time which is different from that of ‘normal’, every day experience.[3] For example, according to a number of physicists, at the sub-atomic level time does some very strange things, which may include travelling backwards.

The key point I’m getting at here is that before critics of retroactive causality, including Thomä and Cheshire, put forward their arguments, they need to be clear what ‘category’ or ‘type’ of time they are talking about. But what ‘type’ or ‘category’ of time are we talking about when it comes to Nachträglichkeit? And more to the point, how is it possible, outside the realm of science fiction (and sub-atomic physics), to speak of the flow of time being reversed, and of effect preceding cause (the essence of retroactive causality)?

Perhaps one way to approach this question is to go back to the notion of ‘normal’ or experienced time, and to ask a rather basic question: in what direction does this ‘type’ of time travel’? Before jumping to conclusions, the first thing to point out is that the word ‘direction’ is a spatial rather than a temporal one; in other words, ‘direction’ is being used as a metaphor when describing the flow of time. In that case, though, in principle time could travel in any direction: forwards, backwards, sidewards, upwards, downwards. Therefore, there must be more to the flow of time than simply its ‘direction’. It’s also worth reiterating at this point that ‘normal’ time is also experienced time, that is, as consciously experienced by human subjects. However, this still begs the question as to why such consciously experienced time seems to only flow ‘one way’.

Robin Le Poidevin, in his extended discussion of the experience and perception of time, explores these and many other questions. [4] However, his conclusions are, perhaps not surprisingly, inconclusive. As far as he does reach any type of conclusion, it is that time is more subjective than objective, and is closely tied up with memory; although interestingly he ends his discussion by posing the question as to whether there might be some objective reference point, for example, entropy, that could be used to argue for asymmetric causality, that is, the idea the causal relations are always one way. But leaving this specific argument to one side, in general terms, or at least from a philosophical point of view, causality is not quite as ‘fixed’ as one might suppose even in the case of ‘normal’, that is, experienced, time. Therefore, I would argue, when it comes to a rather different sort of time, that of Nachträglichkeit, perhaps the idea of retroactive causality is not quite as preposterous as it might first appear.

But within the context of Nachträglichkeit what does it mean to speak of retroactive causation, that is, the idea that effect precedes cause? Or, to put it another way, what is the effect and what is the cause in this case? And just as a brief reminder, the idea behind Nachträglichkeit is that an individual only becomes traumatised after the (traumatic) event – and often long after. However, this is not a case of ‘deferred action’, as suggested by Strachey’s mistranslation of the term Nachträglichkeit; in other words, it is not the case that an individual has a traumatic experience at time T1 but does not actually develop traumatic symptoms, for example nightmares, flashbacks, etc, until much later at time T2. Rather, the trauma itself only occurs at T2. In a previous article I give a number of examples, including ones from Freud’s own cases, of this ‘Nachträglichkeit effect’. The reason that this is not simply a case of ‘delayed’ or ‘deferred’ trauma is that although the subject did indeed experience something at T1, this ‘something’ was not registered by the subject as traumatic; in fact, it’s probably true to say it was not registered at all.

One of the (savage) ironies of Nachträglichkeit is that it is only when the subject is psychologically developed enough to ‘process’ the original experience that they experience trauma. And such ‘processing’ often only occurs when, at time T2, the subject has another experience which triggers a temporal ‘looping-back’ to the first experience at T1. But it is not a matter of the second experience reminding the subject of the first one and how traumatic it was; rather, the second experience constructs the traumatic memory of the first one.

But is it accurate to argue that this is in fact a case of retroactive causation? For this to be the case the event at T2 has to cause the event at T1. As I indicated earlier, writers such as Thomä and Cheshire would argue that this is not what happens. Making reference to Freud’s own thoughts on Nachträglichkeit, they argue that he:

…makes it clear that what is doing the ‘causing’ in the here-and-now state of the psychic apparatus (the dynamic system in question) is the memory-trace of the original traumatic experience (E1), and not the original experience itself. Thus the causal action, or some part of the causal potential, of the original experience has indeed been ‘deferred’ from T1 to T2, (or even to Tn) but takes effect eventually, in combination with the effects of some critical later event (E2), through the medium of the memory-trace which is then (at T2) co-present in the dynamic system with its causal effect. [5]

They go on to argue that:

It is beside the point, for the moment, that such access to the objective nature of the historical E1 (the ‘original’ trauma) may be therapeutically irrelevant, as Kris and others have been arguing influentially for some time…However, it is important to emphasize that, even in this sense of a posteriori reconstrual, the orientation of Nachträglichkeit is only metaphorically ‘retrospective’, since no process (whether causal or psychological) is actually working backwards in time, as is suggested by phrases like ‘retrogressive movement of psychic material’, ‘retroactive’ and ‘regressive movements’.[6]

But again, we must ask what ‘category’ of time are they referring to when they argue that there is no ‘actual’ reversal of time, that is, of causality. Their basic argument is that it’s the memory (trace) of the ‘original’ event that’s causing the trauma in the here-and-now, not the actual event itself. The importance of the memory trace is something that Bistoen et al emphasise in their paper on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and Nachträglichkeit, although they prefer the term ‘mnemic trace’ instead.[7] They argue that such a mnemic trace is the equivalent of a single signifier and in relation to the first or ‘original’ experience:

…the first experience is retained in a very specific way: as a single signifier that borders the nonsensical event and that is unable to articulate itself with the rest of the psychic material. It is not accessible for conscious recollection, as it cannot be brought into articulation with the group of signifiers (or representations) that constitutes the Ego… Due to the failure to bestow meaning on the event, to understand it, to realize what has happened, the subject (as an effect of the concatenation of signifiers) is excluded from it. Ultimately, the event can be said not to be subjectively experienced at the time of its occurrence. It is a missed encounter, or an “unclaimed experience,” as (Cathy) Caruth calls it. Hence, the experience initially remains without long-term consequence. Nevertheless, the person who underwent the event is obviously deeply troubled by it, which is evidenced by the acute reaction of distress and fright and by the fact that the scene leaves a mnemic trace. The initial experience opens up an enigma; it raises a question. This question is pending and awaits an answer—sometimes for years. All of this is reminiscent of Jean Laplanche’s notion of the “enigmatic signifier.” [8]

However, at a later date the subject has another experience:

…which results in the realization of the first scene—realization, in the sense that the new experience gives birth to an understanding of what the subject had missed in the first experience. But more essentially: through this understanding, it is as if the potentially traumatic aspects of the scene that were not experienced at T1 (the time of the first experience) are now fully experienced at T2. The subject, through T2, receives access to the traumatic truth of the T1 event for the very first time. The T1 experience starts to be lived as a new subjective event.[9]

It is important to note the phrase ‘as if’ in the above quote; the authors seem to be suggesting that there is something metaphorical (to use Thomä and Cheshire’s term) about the process. However, this raises the question as to whether Bistoen et al are arguing that at time T1 there is no actual trauma or not. Clearly, something happens to the subject (and on this point Thomä and Cheshire are in agreement), but the key point here is that this ‘something’ is only registered by the subject as ‘traumatic’ at a later date. At the same time, though, Bistoen et al are arguing that the ‘original’ experience leaves a mnemic trace in the form of a single signifier, which forms the nucleus of the later ‘realisation’ (symbolisation) of the experience as traumatic.

But is remembrance the same as causation? This may seem a rather strange question but with regards to Nachträglichkeit it is, I would argue, critical. One of the problems with memory, as Freud himself noted and as psychologists and neuroscientists have argued ever since, is that it undergoes continuous reconstruction; in other words, what is remembered is not a naïve representation of ‘what actually happened’. Rather, what is remembered is being continually reworked (or, to use Freud’s term, ‘re-transcribed’) which means there can be no such thing as an ‘original’ or ‘authentic’ memory of a particular event. And, of course, such a reworking or retranscription is taking place in the here-and-now, in the present, which seems to suggest that the present is impacting on the past, albeit in the form of representations of events in the past. But at the end of the day, such representations are all we have to go on, so in this sense, and this sense only, it would appear that the present can change the past, and therefore it is correct to argue that Nachträglichkeit is indeed an example of retroactive causation.

Or is it? If we go back to Bistoen et al’s argument and their idea of a mnemic trace, then this suggests that even if the subsequent reconstruction (in memory) of the ‘original’ event is precisely that – a reconstruction – there is still something remaining outside of the representation of the event. And this something, this remainder, this memory trace, is something of the Real. If this is the case then it would seem the trauma was there all the time, in the form of the mnemic trace, the single signifier. However, this is not the same as arguing that the subject was traumatised by such a trauma at the time of its occurrence. This then raises the question as to whether we can speak of a trauma without a traumatised subject.

And, perhaps more critically, it raises the whole question of what temporal status to grant to retroactive trauma; in other words, if a subject starts to experience traumatic symptoms years, or even decades, after a particular event, then when can the trauma be said to have occurred? According to the theory of Nachträglichkeit, the answer is in the present, or, to be more precise, whenever the event that led to the construction of the traumatic memory occurred. However, this raises an even more fundamental question: to what extent is the mnemic trace of the ‘original’ traumatic event, even ‘within’ time at all? Or, to put it another way, to what extent does the Real of the event represent a completely different temporal order or category…?

Notes and references

  1. H. Thomä and N. Cheshire, ‘Freud’s Nachträglichkeit and Strachey’s “Deferred Action”: Trauma, Constructions and the Direction of Causality’, Int. R. Psycho-Anal., 18 (1991), 407–27. ↑
  2. Ibid., p.413, emphasis in original. ↑
  3. Jan Faye, ‘Backward Causation’, 2001 <https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/entries/causation-backwards/> [accessed 12 December 2020]. ↑
  4. Le Poidevin, ‘The Experience and Perception of Time’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2019 <https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/entries/time-experience/> [accessed 12 December 2020] ↑
  5. Thomä and Cheshire, ‘Freud’s Nachträglichkeit’, p.415, emphasis in original. ↑
  6. Ibid., p.415, emphasis in original. ↑
  7. Gregory Bistoen, Stijn Vanheule, and Stef Craps, ‘Nachträglichkeit: A Freudian Perspective on Delayed Traumatic Reactions’, Theory and Psychology, 2014, 1–20. ↑
  8. Ibid., p.10. For a discussion of Laplanche’s approach to Nachträglichkeit see this post. ↑
  9. Ibid., p.10, emphasis in original. ↑

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