The premature death of the war neuroses
The premature death of the war neuroses

The premature death of the war neuroses

In September 1918 a Symposium was held at the Fifth International Psycho-Analytical Congress in Budapest on the subject of the war neuroses. Sándor Ferenczi, Karl Abraham and Ernst Simmel all presented papers on this topic, and Freud himself wrote the introduction to the proceedings of the Symposium which were published in Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses in 1921.[1] As Pedro Muñoz and Sílvia Correia note in their discussion of the Congress and its significance in the wider context of psychoanalysis in the second decade of the twentieth century, these lectures attracted a great deal of interest from the military medical authorities representing the Central Powers.[2] And at the time it appeared that a bright future lay ahead for a psychoanalytic understanding of, and a clinical engagement with, the psychical traumas of war.

However, it was not to be. Instead, the next sixty years or so saw a progressive disengagement of psychoanalysis from the theory and treatment of the war neuroses, culminating in the disappearance of the term completely from the psychiatric literature and the emergence of a completely new paradigm of trauma in the aftermath of the Vietnam War: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). I will have more to say later on about this disengagement and the appearance of PTSD, but I would like to begin by returning to the Budapest Symposium and its hopes for a psychoanalytic future, especially with regards to the understanding and treatment of the war neuroses.

The first thing to note is that the term ‘war neurosis’ (or, more precisely, ‘the war neuroses’) were regarded by Freud and his colleagues as a form of traumatic neurosis. This is made clear by Freud in his introduction to the proceedings of the Symposium, and the term ‘traumatic neuroses’ is used a number of times by both Ferenczi and Abraham in their presentations.[3] Somewhat confusingly, perhaps, Freud and Abraham both refer to ‘the traumatic neuroses of peace time’ but not ‘the traumatic neuroses of war (time)’, opting instead for the term ‘the war neuroses’ or simply ‘war neurosis’. This might suggest that they are referring to two different phenomena, that is, the traumatic neuroses (of peace) and the war neuroses, but it is clear from their texts that these terms are equivalent. However, this does raise the question as to whether there is something different or extra-ordinary about the conditions of war as opposed to the conditions of peace which might result in a different form of psychopathology.

I only mention this because one of the reasons for the demise of psychoanalysis as a way to engage with ‘life-traumas’ (of which war is a particularly extreme example) is precisely that it appeared to lack a theoretical framework that would accommodate these types of events. In other words, childhood sexuality and the Oedipal drama appeared to have nothing to do with the traumas of being bombed, shelled, machine gunned, raped or carted off to a concentration camp. And yet, at the time of the Budapest Symposium, this was precisely what Ferenczi and his colleagues were arguing. In fact, one of the dominant themes of the Symposium was to challenge the idea, which was widespread in psychiatric circles, that the war neuroses had ‘disproved’ Freud’s theories, and especially those related to infantile sexuality.[4]

In many ways it’s perhaps unfortunate that the Symposium predated Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where he introduces the idea of the death drive.[5] At least then the participants in the Symposium would have had a psychoanalytic theory that could directly confront the question of human aggression and destructiveness. On the other hand, the concept of the death drive turned out to be even more unpalatable, including for many psychoanalysts, than the idea of infantile sexuality itself. The other point, of course, is that the Symposium was trying to address the (psychical) consequences of the death drive, of human destructive, rather than its causes.

The basic thrust of the argument of all the Symposium’s participants was that the war neuroses were the product of an underlying psychopathology that was rooted in unresolved, childhood sexual conflicts. In other words, those who were suffering from war neurosis were already neurotic.[6] For example, Simmel argues that:

The psycho-analytical explanation of the war neuroses has proved with wonderful clearness the correctness of the Freudian views on hysteria, according to which all physical symptoms represent conversions of something psychical. The body is the instrument of the mind upon which it (the mind) allows its unconscious to manifest itself in plastic and mimic expression. The functions of the unconscious are the deciding factor in the formation and building up of the war neuroses, also the frequently observed instances of the forgetting of events accompanied by feelings hostile to the ego, even when these events are very recent, permits us to recognise from the outside alone the submergence and repression of ideas and affects of a painful nature.[7]

Ferenczi, Abraham, Jones (in his separate paper) and Freud (in his Introduction) all follow a similar line: the traumatic experiences of war ‘trigger’ an underlying psychopathology, often hysterical in nature. Just to give one more example, Abraham, in somewhat condescending language, argues that: “It transpires with great regularity that the war neurotics already before the trauma were labile people—to designate it, to begin with, by a general expression—and especially so as regards their sexuality.”[8] By ‘labile’ he appears to mean ‘emotionally volatile’ and which he seems to view as a weakness (in men at least). And herein, perhaps, lie the seeds of destruction for a psychoanalytic approach to the war neuroses: the idea that some people have a ‘disposition’ towards trauma (because of their underlying psychopathology) whereas other, ‘normal’, subjects do not. However, it is also important to note that even today, a century after the Congress and its Symposium, it still has to be explained why not everyone who has experienced a ‘traumatic’ life event goes onto to develop traumatic symptoms; in other words, what determines whether a person will become traumatised or not when faced with a particular event?

Certainly, at the time of the Budapest Symposium the idea of an underlying ‘disposition’ towards war neuroses was taken very seriously. However, and somewhat ironically (as Freud notes in his Introduction), the cessation of hostilities two months after the Congress also put an end to the opportunity to study the war neuroses. What Freud seems to be suggesting here, although he does not elaborate, is that the War was providing an ample supply of ‘case material’, in hospitals and other health facilities, which could be examined in some detail. Once the War had ended, this ‘material’ rapidly dissipated, and would probably not reappear, even years later, in (mainly private) psychoanalytic clinics.

Furthermore, as Muñoz and Correia, whom I cited earlier, point out, although the Congress came up with a number of concrete proposals to increase access to psychoanalysis, both for the military and the wider public, as well as appointing Ferenczi as president of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), politics soon intervened in the form of the ‘white terror’ – the overthrow of the communist government of Béla Kun in Hungary by Admiral Miklós Horthy in 1919 who imposed strict anti-semitic laws regarding the number of Jewish students and professors at universities. This resulted in Ferenczi, who was himself Jewish, having to relinquish his position to Jones and, perhaps more damaging for psychoanalysis as a whole, meant that many psychoanalysts had to retreat from public life and practice, which was accompanied by the dismantling of the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Association.

Clearly, such setbacks did not mean that psychoanalysis as a whole was a doomed enterprise, but they do illustrate how the vagaries of war and politics can have both a positive and negative influence on clinical practice and innovation.[9] The War provided an opportunity for Freud and his colleagues to study the effects of psychical trauma in a relatively controlled environment and on an industrial scale, and to further develop their theory of the neuroses. It also meant, as is often the case in war time, that the medical and military authorities were more open to new and innovative ideas. By the same token, however, when the political and military situation changed so did the fortunes of psychoanalysis.

But putting all these considerations to one side, perhaps what’s really important here is the idea that the traumas of war – and by extrapolation all other extra-ordinary ‘life events’ – may be related in some way to individual psychopathology. In the current era of PTSD and the broader ‘mental health’ discourse of trauma such an idea is total anathema, but as I indicated earlier, at the time this was taken very seriously amongst the analytic community and the military medical authorities. With regards to the ‘invention’ of PTSD, this is something I have explored in some detail elsewhere. However, the key point to note here is that within the mental health discourse of trauma there is no room (or need) for individual psychopathology; in other words, the question of ‘disposition’ becomes irrelevant. Instead, trauma is something that ‘happens’ to the subject and they have no ‘responsibility’ for their predicament whatsoever.

In Lacanian terms it could be argued that within the mental health discourse of trauma, trauma is the ‘fault’ of the Other; whether the Other be another person or group of people, or something vaguer and more abstract ‘out there’ in the world. In the case of the Great War (and other wars and conflicts since), the Other could be the (often unseen) ‘enemy’, or equally the politicians ‘back home’ who started the war in the first place, or the blundering generals in hiding in their chateaus safely behind the lines who keep ordering their troops forward oblivious of the consequences. At this point it is important to note that even during the Great War itself such sentiments were widespread on all sides. Disillusionment with leaders, both military and political, and sense of betrayal were key factors in the revolutionary fervour that swept through Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary and other countries in the latter stages of the War and its aftermath. And even in the (militarily) ‘victorious’ nations, and especially France and Britain, there was an equal sense of disillusionment and betrayal. Furthermore, as Muñoz and Correia point out in their paper, Freud himself, although initially a supporter of the war, eventually became opposed to it. This being the case, it raises the question as to why the idea of a ‘disposition’ towards war neuroses ever gained traction in the first place.

Some clues as to the motivation for promoting the idea of such a ‘disposition’ are provided in Muñoz and Correia’s paper. They note that both Ferenczi and Abraham had had the opportunity to observe traumatised soldiers at close quarters; Ferenczi became head of the department for neurology at the Mária Valéria Military Hospital where he was able to indulge his interest in the traumatic neuroses, and Abraham became director at the Allenstein Hospital where he was able to observe many cases of war neurosis. Ernst Simmel, the other key contributor at the Budapest Symposium, had been physician in charge at the Military Hospital of Posen where he had gained experience of the war neuroses. So clearly there was already a great deal of interest in the topic within analytic circles.

There was also the question, which again is highlighted in Muñoz and Correia’s paper, of a pre-existing hostility towards psychoanalysis within the medical profession (and the wider society) and especially the idea of infantile sexuality. As I indicated earlier, the Symposium was an ideal opportunity for Freud and his colleagues to challenge those who claimed the war neuroses disproved the idea of a sexual aetiology of the neuroses. In other words, the Congress and its Symposium allowed Freud and colleagues the chance to further the cause of psychoanalysis in general.

This does not mean, however, that they were wrong to argue for a ‘disposition’ towards war neuroses per se; rather, I would argue that they somewhat missed the point as to what ‘disposition’ actually meant in the first place. The essence of their argument was that some individuals were ‘predisposed’ towards war neuroses because they were already neurotic; the war experience simply ‘triggered’ what was there already. The implication here, of course, is that other people are not ‘predisposed’; in other words, they are ‘normal’, have ‘strong egos’, are more ‘resilient’, and so forth. This is certainly the tone of Ferenczi, Abraham and Simmel’s presentations, and in retrospect could be seen as sounding the death-knell for a psychoanalytic theory of war neurosis in particular and traumatic neurosis in general.

But as I indicated just now, this is to miss the point entirely, which is that we are all ‘predisposed’ to trauma. Ironically, this mirrors precisely the argument of those who argue against ‘predisposition’ and who subscribe to the mental health discourse of trauma.. Their argument is that anyone can become traumatised given the right (external) circumstances. My argument is the same; the only difference is that the source of the trauma is ‘internal’ rather than ‘external’ – and even then it’s not quite so simple. What I’m getting at here is that we are all susceptible to the jouissance of the drive, which is the source of the subject’s trauma. And interestingly, although the mental health discourse of trauma argues that the subject is traumatised by ‘external’ forces or events, it still explains the traumatisation process itself as ‘internal’ or, to be more precise, as cognitive. According to this argument, the subject is traumatised because they cannot ‘process’ the traumatic experience; in other words, the experience is traumatic because it is senseless. And the solution to this lack of sense is to construct a trauma narrative which allows the subject to ‘internalise’ the experience.

According to the mental health discourse of trauma, therefore, the subjective experience of trauma lies in the domain of meaning (or, rather, the lack of meaning). In Lacanian terms, this is in the register of the Real. Therefore the ‘solution’ to a lack of meaning is to create meaning in the form of the trauma narrative, which is in the realm of the Imaginary. However, the register of the Real is also the register of the drive and jouissance. This seems to suggest that the psychoanalytic idea of trauma as the jouissance of the drive, or drive-jouissance, is not so far away from the mental health concept of trauma after all – except for one important difference. And this goes back to the question of the source of the trauma, which for the mental health discourse is still ‘external’, ‘out there’ in the world, in the Other.

With regards to the psychoanalytic discourse of trauma, for want of a better term, things are far more complicated because although the Other does have a role to play in the constitution of trauma, this is subject to a complex process of unconscious ciphering and symbolic mediation. This is something I will be returning to in another article but for the time being I will conclude by arguing that in my view Ferenczi and his colleagues were onto something with their theory of the war neuroses all those years ago in Budapest but perhaps didn’t fully understand what it was…

Notes and references

  1. Sándor Ferenczi and others, Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses (Vienna: The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1921). The book also included a paper written by Ernest Jones and which was originally read before the Royal Society of Medicine, Section of Psychiatry, in April 1918. ↑
  2. Correia, Sílvia, and Pedro Muñoz, ‘The Great War and the Fifth International Psychoanalytic Congress in Budapest: Psychoanalysis in the 1910s’, Historia Crítica, 84, 2022, 3–27 ↑
  3. For example, in his Introduction Freud writes: “The war neuroses, in so far as they differ from the ordinary neuroses of peace time through particular peculiarities, are to be regarded as traumatic neuroses, whose existence has been rendered possible or promoted through an ego-conflict.” (p.2) ↑
  4. To quote Freud again: “…the opponents of psycho-analysis, whose repugnance to sexuality has shown itself to be stronger than their logic, have hastened to proclaim that investigation of the war neuroses has finally disproved this part of the psycho-analytical theory.” (p.2). ↑
  5. Sigmund Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, in The Standard Edition (London: Hogarth Press, 1920g), XVIII, 3–64. ↑
  6. Or in some cases, psychotic or narcissistic. ↑
  7. Ferenczi et al, Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses, p.31. ↑
  8. Ibid., p.23. ↑
  9. Although Muñoz and Correia acknowledge that the ‘white terror’ resulted in the emigration of many analysts (one of the principle reasons for the dismantling of the HPA) they still argue that the Congress had a more lasting legacy; for example in the establishment of free analysis clinics in Berlin, Vienna, London and Tegel. They also highlight the fact that representatives of the military authorities attended the Congress and agreed to open up psychoanalytic treatment stations for soldiers. However, it’s important to note that with regards to the latter, this idea never had any real lasting traction. ↑

While psychoanalytic theory conceptualises trauma, repetition, and the limits of the signifier, clinical work takes place in the singular encounter with one’s own symptom. If you are seeking a space to speak that lies outside directive or manualised therapies, I can offer psychoanalytic consultations online via Therapeia.  Please click here for further details.