Laclau and the populist subject
Laclau and the populist subject

Laclau and the populist subject

In Ernesto Laclau’s approach to populism, which I referred to in my previous post, the subject has a somewhat ambiguous position. On the one hand, as I argue below, he does make reference to the ‘popular subject’ (though not the populist one), but he is also at pains to avoid a theory of subjectivity that pre-exists political action. In other words, he wants to circumvent a common approach by theorists of populism (and especially right-wing or national populism) that populism is a product of a particular way of looking at the world. For example, the idea that what ‘produces’ right-wing populism is a set of negative attitudes amongst certain individuals and groups regarding immigrants or other ‘outsiders’. The problem here, according to Laclau, is that this is based on the idea that such political practices, for example, discrimination against immigrants, are simply an expression of the ‘inner nature’ of those engaging in such practices, i.e. populist subjects. But as Laclau notes: “The difficulties in determining the populistic character of the subjects of certain practices cannot but reproduce themselves in the analysis of the practices as such, as far as the latter simply expresses the inner nature of those subjects.” [1]

The point Laclau is making is that this tells us very little about populist practices themselves, but rather focuses on the ‘inner life’ or (false) consciousness of the social agents who engage in such practices. For example, in the case of Brexit, although (most) of its political opponents were relatively restrained in their views of ‘Brexiteers’ when speaking to the mainstream media, on social media many were quite open that they regarded anyone who voted for Brexit as ‘ignorant’, ‘thick’, a ‘little Englander’, a ‘fascist’, ‘racist’, ‘bigoted’, and much worse. In other words, the focus of their anger was on ‘the type of people who voted Brexit’, rather than in trying to engage with the actual politics of the situation. Laclau, however, argues that rather than the political practices that constitute populism as being the expression of particular form of subjectivity, such practices constitute the latter. Or, to put it another way, social agents are not populist because of what they think or feel, but rather because of the practices they engage in.

In Populism: What’s in a Name? Laclau refers to the ‘popular subject’ as being one form of the ‘subject of the demand’. This is part of his broader argument regarding how the demands of the populus are met (or not met) by the governing elites. In one scenario such demands are met on a case-by-case basis and constitute what Laclau calls a differential chain. In the other scenario, the demands are not met and begin to constitute what Laclau calls an equivalential chain. Although these are a set of individual demands, they are equivalent by virtue of all being unmet. Laclau argues that:

The subject of the demand is different in our two cases. In the first, the subject of the demand was as punctual as the demand itself. The subject of a demand conceived as differential particularity we will call democratic subject. In the other case the subject will be wider, for its subjectivity will result from the equivalential aggregation of a plurality of democratic demands. A subject constituted on the basis of this logic we will call popular subject.[2]

This argument is developed in more detail in On Populist Reason, where Laclau also develops his idea of the internal frontier. Essentially, according to Laclau, development of the equivalential chain of (unmet) demands produces a division between ‘the people’ who are making such demands and ‘the elite’ (or ‘enemy’) who are frustrating them. In a ‘normal’ democracy there will always be a multitude of demands from the populus; however, as long as these are all negotiated and, in some way or other, met by the ruling administration, then no such internal frontier will arise. The problem starts when a number of demands remain unsatisfied and start to form an equivalential chain; at this point the internal frontier emerges with ‘the people’ on one side and ‘the elite’ on the other.

Laclau argues that populism is a way to constitute relations between social agents. And it is the idea of ‘the people’ that is key in such a constitution. However, he is keen to emphasise that: “…’the people’ is not something of the nature of an ideological expression, but a real relation between social agents. It is, in other terms, one way of constituting the unity of the group.”[3] In other words, ‘the people’, as a shared idea, is what identifies a particular group of social agents as ‘populist’. However, there seems to be something of a circular argument here, insofar as the concept of ‘social agent’ seems to imply a shared experience. In other words, it’s the shared experience (and grievances) of a particular group of individuals that that constitutes them as a social formation in the first place. In fact, the concept of a group implies some form of social organisation to start with.[4]

Does this mean, therefore, that Laclau is relying on an essentially individualistic concept of populism? He appears to be arguing that a ‘group’ or ‘mass’ of human beings are constituted as ‘populist’ by virtue of a set of shared grievances, which in turn creates an ‘internal frontier’ between this ‘group’ and another ‘group’ – ‘the enemy’. The key point here, perhaps, is that although objectively there exist a set of unmet demands, these need to become ‘subjectivised’ as grievances in order to constitute a ‘people’. In other words, even though Laclau is at pains to avoid defining populism in terms of individual prejudices and grievances, this is precisely what his theory demands.

There is, however, a very different way to approach the question of the populist subject. And this is something Laclau touches upon in his own theory of populism (and especially in On Populist Reason). He argues that his theory is still lacking one key element:

Our whole approach to populism turns, as we have seen, around the following theses: (1) the emergence of the ‘people’ requires the passage – via equivalences – from isolated, heterogeneous demands to a ‘global’ demand which involves the formation of political frontiers and the discursive construction of power as an antagonistic force; (2) since, however, this passage does not follow from a mere analysis of the heterogeneous demands themselves – there is no logical, dialectical or semiotic transition from one level to the other – something qualitatively new has to intervene.[5]

And this ‘something qualitatively new’, according to Laclau, is affect. The crux of Laclau’s argument is that, as I suggested earlier, it not enough for there simply to be an equivalential chain of unmet demands; this in itself does not create the populist movement and the antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the enemy’ (often viewed as ‘the elite’). In addition, there has to be what he calls a ‘radical investment’: “The different signifying operations to which I have referred so far can explain the forms the investment takes, but not the force in which the investment consists. It is clear, however, that if an entity becomes the object of an investment – as in being in love, or in hatred – the investment belongs necessarily to the order of affect.”[6]

He also notes that it would a mistake to treat affect and signification as two separate phenomena:

Affect is not something which exists on its own, independently of language; it constitutes itself only through the differential cathexes of a signifying chain. This is exactly what ‘investment’ means. The conclusion is clear: the complexes which we call ‘discursive or hegemonic formations’, which articulate differential and equivalential logics, would be unintelligible without the affective component.[7]

Further on in the text he draws upon Joan Copjec’s The Tomb of Perseverance to develop the idea that the investment of affect (which he now equates with Copec’s use of the term jouissance) is linked to the impossibility of total satisfaction through union with the ‘lost’ primordial object, which Copec equates with the fantasy of the primordial Mother. Instead, the drive can only find ‘satisfaction’ in a range of ‘partial objects’, which all function as the object a. Laclau argues that this relates to the question of the populist subject because: “The mythical wholeness of the mother/child dyad [the fantasy of the union with primordial mother] corresponds to the unachieved fullness evoked – as its opposite – by the dislocations brought about by the unfulfilled demands.”[8] However, Laclau continues, the desire for such fulfilment does not simply disappear, but, rather, gets transferred to a range of partial objects.

At this point Laclau is not altogether clear (although he certainly implies it) as to whether he is equating such ‘partial objects’ to the objects of demand; in other words, whether each unmet demand (which then becomes a desire) relates to an instance of the object a, and whether, in turn, whether the object a relates to his idea of the empty signifier. For example, and with reference to UK politics in the run-up to the general election at some point in 2024, to what extent does the empty signifier ‘stop the boats’ (one of prime minister Rishi Sunak’s ‘five pledges’) also function as an instance of the object a? It certainly appears to be the case that for most national populists in the UK, many of whom are now gravitating towards the Reform party, ‘stopping the boats’, that is, stopping immigration, has become a key political demand. And if Laclau’s analysis is correct then such a demand (which is clearly not being met by the current Tory administration) is also ‘invested’ with jouissance.

Although I think Laclau is definitely onto something here, I’m not convinced he is approaching the question of jouissance and the populist subject in quite the right way. To start with, on reading Laclau’s arguments in On Populist Reason, one gets a sense that the question of affect/jouissance is something of an afterthought or ‘add-on’; in other words, it does not appear to be inherent to his theory of populism. Rather, he appears to have brought it in to try and address the problem of how a series of objective, unmet demands become the basis for a fundamental antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the enemy’. In principle this is not necessarily a problem, insofar as many theories evolve in such a manner. However, I think what is more problematic is his use of the concept of jouissance in the first place. It is not clear from the text whether he is purely relying on Copec’s use of the term or whether he has engaged directly with Lacan’s use of it. The latter question matters, in my view, because Lacan’s concept of jouissance evolved quite radically during his teaching. By the 1970s it had become central to his whole theory of psychoanalysis, whereas prior to this it had been somewhat on the margins, particularly pre-Seminar XI. The very fact that Laclau is keen to emphasise the structuralist nature of his theory, by which he seems to mean his reliance on Saussure, appears to suggest he is drawing upon the Lacan of the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s and what Lydia Liu has called the ‘French Theory’ or ‘Saussurian’ reading of Lacan.[9]

So although I think Laclau is right to emphasise the importance of jouissance in his theory of the populist subject, in my view this needs to be developed somewhat in the light of Lacan’s own development of the concept. This is something I will be addressing in my next article on psychoanalysis and populism.

Notes and references

  1. Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005), 33, italics in original. ↑
  2. Ernesto Laclau, ‘Populism: What’s in a Name’, in Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, ed. by Francisco Panizza (London: Verso, 2005), 37. ↑
  3. Laclau, On Populist Reason, 73. ↑
  4. Which from a Freudian perspective revolves around the ego-ideal as a central (libidinal) focal point (see Freud’s Group Psychology paper, which Laclau draws upon in On Populist Reason). ↑
  5. Laclau, On Populist Reason, 110. ↑
  6. Ibid., 110, italics in original. ↑
  7. Ibid., 111. ↑
  8. Ibid., 114. ↑
  9. Lydia H. Liu, The Freudian Robot: Digital Media and the Future of the Unconscious (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010). ↑

This article is part of a broader research track. For a complete structural overview, please visit the Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Politics in the Real Hub.

 

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