The trauma of populism
The trauma of populism

The trauma of populism

The increasing likelihood of another four years of a Donald Trump presidency is a reminder that populism is a political phenomenon that is very much alive and present. And even though, in the UK, Brexit was supposedly ‘done’ after the election of another populist politician, Boris Johnson, in late 2019, its political fallout continues. Furthermore, the forthcoming EU elections (June 2024) could see a further lurch towards the right.  The reference to ‘the right’, however, brings up an important point: populism is by no means the exclusive province of the political right. In fact, Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, in their study of populism in Europe and the US, prefer the term national populism as opposed to the more commonly used right-wing populism. They describe national populism as:

…a movement that in the early years of the twenty-first century is increasingly challenging mainstream politics in the West. National populists prioritize the culture and interests of the nation, and promise to give voice to a people who feel that they have been neglected, even held in contempt, by distant and often corrupt elites.[1]

The example of the so-called ‘Red wall’ voters in the north of England illustrates why a simplistic ‘left-right’ dichotomy fails to encapsulate the politics and ideology of populism. It was these people (who had previously always voted Labour) who enabled Boris Johnson and the Tory party to be elected with a sizable majority in 2019; and it is quite likely that the same voters will be responsible, at least in part, for ensuring a massive Tory defeat later in 2024. This is not because they will ‘return’ to Labour but because many will quite probably vote for an even more ‘right-wing’ party, namely, Reform. Reform is essentially the Brexit party under a new name, and many of its members have made a long political journey from the (far) left to the (far) right.

The key point here is that in one sense they haven’t ‘travelled’ anywhere; rather, their political grievances, which are the same as they always have been, have simply found a new ‘home’. This idea of the same political grievances finding different political ‘homes’ or parties is what Ernesto Laclau explains by use of the concept of the floating signifier.[2] I explored in some detail Laclau’s theory of populism in a previous post in the context of Brexit and there I focused on his concept of the empty signifier as a way to explain how a series of seemingly unrelated demands by the ‘people’ became constructed into an ‘equivalential chain’ that coalesced around the empty signifier ‘get Brexit done’ and which led to the election of the Johnson government. The equivalential chain is also, according to Laclau, what constructs the ‘interior frontier’ between the ‘people’ and the ‘enemy’ (in this case the ‘liberal establishment’ who were trying to ‘thwart’ Brexit.

Although I think there is a great deal in Laclau’s theory that helps explain the spread of national populism in recent years, in this post I want to focus on the idea that national populist ideology is inherently traumatic; far more so, in fact, than other political ideologies. The theoretical framework for what follows was originally laid down in my doctoral thesis, where I focus on the relationship between the Lacanian idea of an ‘inaugural trauma’ through the subject’s entry into language and the more commonly held idea that trauma emanates from the ‘external world’ in the form of ‘traumatic events’. My basic thesis is that far from being two distinct ways to explain trauma, the so-called ‘inaugural trauma’ is, in fact, an effect of the continuous operation of the jouissance of the drive (drive-jouissance), which, based on my reading of an idea of Jacques-Alain Miller, comes from the perpetual ‘scraping’ by the drive of surplus-jouissance in the cultural world (the Symbolic-Imaginary).[3] Drawing on an idea of Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, I argued that the trauma of the drive is the effect of excess excitation brought about by the failure of the pleasure principle.[4] In Lacanian terms, this is the failure of language to properly ‘decipher’ the jouissance of the drive.

What, though, has this got to do with (national) populist ideology? My basic contention is that such an ideology, as a cultural production, is a site for surplus jouissance, just as are all other discourses and discursive formations. However, I would contend that with national populist ideology the process of deciphering jouissance is problematic. More specifically, there is a much greater ‘excess’ or ‘surplus’ of jouissance remaining; or, to put it another way, there is a much greater ‘charge’ of jouissance in national populist ideology than there is with, say, liberal democratic ideology. This helps explain, in my view, the passion of national populist ideology, which is what makes it so seductive. Furthermore, the high degree of ‘charge’ of this ideology tends to make it lack sophistication, which its opponents would see as one its weaknesses. However, it’s precisely this lack of sophistication that makes national populist ideology ‘pliable’ and adaptable, and which helps explain why the same ideas can be adopted by both ‘left’ and ‘right’ depending on the circumstances. On the other hand, there is an inherent weakness to such an ideology, which is that its level of ‘charge’ and ‘passion’ makes it highly irrational (in terms of its internal logic) and in constant danger of collapsing under its own inconsistences, which is why those who subscribe to such an ideology tend to avoid too close a scrutiny.

In his short essay The Impossibility of Society Laclau argues that:

The ideological would consist of those discursive forms through which a society tries to institute itself as such on the basis of closure, of the fixation of meaning, of the non-recognition of the infinite play of differences.  The ideological would be the will to ‘totality’ of any totalizing discourse.  And insofar as the social is impossible without some fixation of meaning, with the discourse of closure, the ideological must be seen as constitutive of the social.  The social only exists as the vain attempt to institute that impossible object of society. [5]

What Laclau is getting at here is that what we call ‘society’ is an attempt to ‘fix’ a configuration of meaning, which in many ways echoes Žižek’s idea of ideology as social fantasy. This can be read both as a fantasy shared by members of a particular social formation, and as the ‘social’ itself being a fantasy.[6] According to Laclau, ideology always fails to ‘fix’ meaning because of the infinite ‘play’ of differences effected by the signifier.  In Lacanian terms the signified is perpetually ‘sliding’ away under the signifier and there is always an excess of meaning.

This attempt to ‘fix’ meaning is also the function of the trauma narrative, which I have referred to in a number of posts. Such narratives can operate both at the individual and collective level, and their function is to ‘detraumatise’ trauma by giving meaning to what are seemingly meaningless experiences or memories. At the level of the individual subject (or even at the level of the small group), psychotherapy works with trauma by facilitating the subject’s struggle to construct a history of their trauma, which in some cases results in what can best be described as the ‘abuse narrative’. At the collective level, trauma narratives can take the form of group or national stories and histories, which can be passed on from one generation to another. In some cases such collective trauma narratives can span centuries or even millennia. For example, in her essay Unclaimed Experience, Cathy Caruth argues that the emergence of Judaism is the result of the ‘return of the repressed’ of the memory of the murder of Moses by his followers, which is following Freud’s argument in Moses and Monotheism.[7]

Although Laclau argues that the failure of ideology to ‘fix’ meaning is due to the infinite play of signifiers which results in a perpetual excess of meaning, there is another explanation, which is that there is always an excess of jouissance. Rather than there being a failure to ‘fix’ meaning due to its overdetermination, meaning is always ‘undermining’ itself because it always contains a ‘kernel’ of the Real.  And, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, the more there is an attempt to ‘fix’ meaning through the construction of ever more elaborate trauma narratives, the more meaning is undermined.

Coming back to the ideology of national populism, as I argued earlier one of its characteristics is its excess of jouissance. In both Freudian and Lacanian terms such an excess can also be conceptualised as trauma. In other words, there is something inherently traumatic about national populist ideology. And herein, I would argue, lies the tragic irony: national populist ideology is traumatic precisely it is desperately attempting to ‘detraumatise’ a trauma. In the case of the UK (and especially England) I have argued elsewhere that Britain has never recovered from the trauma of the Great War, and Brexit can be seen as the latest ‘symptom’ of this. Or, to put it another way, Brexit (which in many ways is still ongoing even in 2024) encapsulates a trauma narrative that seeks to disavow the end of Empire and the steady decline of Britain as a first-rate economic and political power since 1918. The problem here is that the more this trauma narrative tries to ‘restore’ the loss of Empire and the ‘greatness’ of Britain (in the manner of what Svetlana Boym has called ‘restorative nostalgia’ [8]) the more it breaks down under its internal inconsistences and the more traumatic it becomes.

So far I have been discussing national populist ideology as if it were some kind of autonomous entity; and yet, at the same time I have argued that this is an ideology that is heavily ‘charged’ with jouissance. This seems to imply the presence of a human subject (of some description). After all, it doesn’t seem to make much sense to speak an ideology as traumatic in itself; surely, it the subject that is traumatised? So where is the populist subject in all this? This is something I will be exploring in my next post on this topic.

Notes and references

  1. Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy (London: Pelican, 2018), p.ix. ↑
  2. Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005). ↑
  3. Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Six Paradigms of Jouissance’, Psychoanalytical Notebooks, 34, 2019, 11–77. ↑
  4. Sigmund Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1920), XVIII, 3–64. ↑
  5. Ernesto Laclau, ‘The Impossibility of Society’, in New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso, 1990), p.92. ↑
  6. Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 2nd edn (London: Verso, 2008). ↑
  7. Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (John Hopkins University Press, 1996). ↑
  8. Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2002). ↑

This article is part of a broader research track. For a complete structural overview, please visit the Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Politics in the Real Hub.

While psychoanalytic theory conceptualises trauma, repetition, and the limits of the signifier, clinical work takes place in the singular encounter with one’s own symptom. If you are seeking a space to speak that lies outside directive or manualised therapies, I can offer psychoanalytic consultations online via Therapeia.  Please click here for further details.

One comment

  1. Pingback: Laclau and the populist subject – Touching the Real

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *