Trump and the triumph of populist jouissance
Trump and the triumph of populist jouissance

Trump and the triumph of populist jouissance

In two previous posts on populism and psychoanalysis I explored Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populism and his theory of the subject. In the first post I made what now appears to be a prescient reference to Trump’s re-election as well as the continuing fall-out from Brexit in the UK. And in many ways the success of Trump seems to have been lifted straight out of the populist play book – or, rather, Laclau’s rather more sophisticated version of it. The Trump camp was able to construct what Laclau refers to as an ‘internal frontier’ between ‘the people’ and ‘the enemy’; and, perhaps more critically, to articulate what Laclau describes as an ‘equivalential chain’ of unmet demands, which can also be described as grievances. These include grievances around the economy, immigration and all things ‘woke’. The Harris camp, on the other hand, seemed somewhat relaxed and complacent about all these issues; an attitude that in the event was to prove fatal.

Since Trump’s ‘shock’ (for whom?) victory there have already been a multitude of ‘analyses’ (some more analytical than others in my view) of the event along with a mounting tide of recrimination on the part of the Democrats. As a non-US citizen it is not for me to add my two pennyworth to such a blame-game, but I do think there are some useful insights that can be drawn from Laclau’s analysis of populism and some of its (‘later’) Lacanian extrapolations.

In the second post that I referred to at the start of this article, that of Laclau’s theory of the populist subject,[1] I noted that it was essential for the unmet demands of ‘the people’ to become subjectified or ‘internalised’ in order for them to become grievances. I went on to discuss what I considered to be Laclau’s rather limited understanding of jouissance (which he borrows from Joan Copjec) that he uses to construct what appears to be a ‘translation’ of demands into grievances based on the idea that each grievance relates to a lost satisfaction, a lost jouissance; in other words, each grievance represents an instance of a desire for the object a. The problem here, I would argue, is that it appears to suggest that populism is rooted in a set of unsatisfied desires and that if only they could be satisfied, that is, by giving ‘the people’ what they want, then everything would be fine. One immediate difficulty here, of course, is that desire, as lack, can never be ‘satisfied’. Although the object a can incarnate itself in an infinite range of actual objects, it is never ‘it’; somehow, ‘it’ always eludes us. So even if the ruling elites were to grant every demand on a case-by-case basis – which would constitute what Laclau refers to as a differential chain and it what constitutes ‘normal’ (that is, liberal) democracy – it would ultimately make no difference: ‘the people’ would still not be satisfied.

However, as Lacan pointed out in Seminar XI, when it comes to the drive and its endless orbit around the object a, its ‘satisfaction’ is precisely (and paradoxically) in its non-satisfaction.[2] Or, to put it another way, it is the endless orbit of the drive that produces the real (Real) satisfaction, that is, jouissance. And this helps explain, I would argue, why populist strategies are based around stoking grievances rather than trying to ‘satisfy’ specific demands, because it’s the grievances, powered by the endless circuit of the drive, that produce jouissance. Or, to be more precise, the grievances are the manifestation of the drive. Perhaps one of the key differences between liberal democracy and populism is that the former attempts to mediate the drive through a complex array of institutions, structures and policies in order to address a series of demands, whereas the latter essentially bypasses such an array in order to directly ‘satisfy’ the drive. This can also be conceptualised in terms of the difference between politics and the political, with the former being in the domain of the Symbolic and the latter in the domain of the Real.[3]

What I’m arguing here is that populism recognises that what ultimately matters is the (non) satisfaction of the drive rather than any attempt to ‘satisfy’ specific demands. Just to reiterate: the ‘satisfaction’ of the drive is, paradoxically its non-satisfaction, which is why it endlessly circles around the ‘lost’ object (the object a). The ‘dynamics’ of populism, following Laclau’s argument, is that of constructing an ‘internal frontier’ between ‘the people’ and ‘the enemy’. Such a frontier is constituted through the construction of a chain of demands that are being frustrated by ‘the enemy’ so they rapidly become ‘translated’ into a set of grievances by ‘the people’ which provides the ‘motor force’ or drive of populism. And it is this endless circuit of the drive that produces the jouissance of populism.

The problem here, of course, is that at the end of the day, this jouissance of the drive cannot be given free rein; at some point it has to controlled, regulated. So at some point, politics has to enter the field…but what kind of politics….?

Notes

  1. Although as I note in that post, Laclau himself does not use the term populist subject but, rather, popular subject. ↑
  2. Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (London: Penguin, 1979). ↑
  3. For a useful discussion on the difference between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ see: Yannis Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political (London: Routledge, 1999). ↑

This article is part of a broader research track. For a complete structural overview, please visit the Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Politics in the Real Hub.