According to psychoanalytic folklore, on 21 September 1897 Freud wrote a letter to Fliess which signalled the abandonment of his theory of childhood seduction:
And now I want to confide in you immediately the great secret that has been slowly dawning upon me in the last few months. I no longer believe in my neurotica [Freud’s theory of the neuroses]. This is probably not intelligible without an explanation: after all, you yourself found credible what I was able to tell you. [1]
Freud’s explanation hinged on several different factors: firstly, he refers to his ‘continual disappointments’ in bringing his analyses with his patients to a ‘real conclusion’ (although he doesn’t explain why this necessarily meant his neurotica was wrong); secondly, he simply couldn’t bring himself to believe that all his patients’ fathers must have been ‘perverts’ (paedophiles, sexual abusers) in order to account for the frequency of the hysteria he was encountering; thirdly “…the certain insight that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathected with affect.”[2] This introduced the idea that unconscious fantasy had a large role to play in his patients’ ‘recollection’ of childhood trauma. And fourthly:
…in the most deep-going psychosis the unconscious memory does not break through, so that the secret of childhood experiences is not disclosed even in the most confused delirium. If one thus sees that the unconscious never overcomes the resistance of the conscious, the expectation that in treatment the opposite is bound to happen, to the point where the unconscious is completely tamed by the conscious, also diminishes.[3]
This letter has been seized upon by many of Freud’s outspoken critics and added fuel to the flames of the ‘Freud wars’ which underwent a resurgence in the 1980s.[4] For many feminists and survivors of child sexual abuse in particular, Freud’s apparent rejection of the reality of childhood sexual trauma was evidence that psychoanalysis itself was no longer helpful in tackling the problem of such abuse. For example, Nicole Sütterlin argues that: “Today, Freud is often discredited for abandoning the notion of real trauma as a pathological determinant and subsuming it into a model of intrapsychic conflicts”.[5] And Nadia Abu El-Haj makes the important point that, to be taken seriously, the ‘victims’ of trauma need traumatic events which are ‘literal’ rather than the result of psychical construction and whose ‘actuality’ could be called into question. As she notes, this applies particularly to the memory of traumatic events:
For those advocating on behalf of victims of sexual assault, rendering traumatic memory literal likewise served crucial forensic purposes. Sexual assault victims’ memories needed to be accurate, not just credible if fathers, boyfriends, acquaintances, and even strangers were going to be prosecuted for the crimes of incest and rape. This battle was waged not only against existing psychiatric practice, or even just against a particular social and political imaginary, but also against a judicial environment in which refusing to believe and/or blaming the victim was the norm.[6]
Such critics accuse psychoanalysis of being a theory and a clinical practice that denies the actuality of childhood ‘seduction’, which may include sexual abuse and the trauma that accompanies it, and that instead propagates the idea that the ‘memories’ of such events are psychical constructions. And, unfortunately, some of Freud’s own reflections on this subject only appear to reinforce this view. For example, in the opening part of his On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement Freud seems to confirm his abandonment of the theory:
If hysterical subjects trace back their symptoms to traumas that are fictitious, then the new fact which emerges is precisely that they create such scenes in phantasy, and this psychical reality requires to be taken into account alongside practical reality. This reflection was soon followed by the discovery that these phantasies were intended to cover up the auto-erotic activity of the first years of childhood, to embellish it and raise it to a higher plane. And now, from behind the phantasies, the whole range of a child’s sexual life came to light’.[7]
However, as Karin Ahbel-Rappe points out in her paper on Freud’s seduction theory, the question of whether or not he really did ‘abandon’ his belief that his patients’ neuroses were rooted in actual childhood sexual experiences is a contested one. She argues that:
Recent accounts of the seduction theory and the question of its abandonment have emphasized the continuity of Freud’s work before and after the seduction theory, claiming that Freud did not abandon his concern with the event of seduction but rather came to appreciate that an understanding of fantasy was also essential.[8]
As Laplanche and Pontalis note: “Right up to the end of his life, Freud continued to assert the existence, prevalence and pathogenic force of scenes of seduction actually experienced by children.” Furthermore, ”… Freud could never resign himself to treating phantasy as the pure and simple outgrowth of the spontaneous sexual life of the child. He is forever searching, behind the phantasy, for whatever has founded it in its reality….” [9] And even more critically they go on to argue that:
…the crucial question is to decide whether the seduction-phantasy has to be considered merely as a defensive and projective distortion of the positive component of the Oedipus complex or whether it is to be treated as the transposed expression of a fundamental datum, namely, the fact that the child’s sexuality is entirely organised by something which comes to it, as it were, from the outside: the relationship between the parents, and the parents’ wishes which pre-date and determine the form of the wishes of the subject.[10]
In other words, it is not a case of either/or: either there is an actual event in the subject’s early childhood, or such an event is constructed in phantasy at a later date. Rather, the ‘childhood trauma’ is probably best viewed as a complex interweaving of phantasy and actuality; something did happen, but not necessarily in the manner that it is recalled by the subject at a later date. Another way to express this is to argue that Freud augmented his original theory of (actual) childhood seduction by adding the dimension of psychical construction to it. And linked closely to this is his concept of Nachträglichkeit, which I have written about in a number of previous articles. Put very simply, the argument here is that ‘childhood’ trauma is a retroactive construction. Something did indeed happen earlier on in the subject’s history, but at the time of its occurrence this ‘something’ was not registered by the subject as ‘traumatic’. It is only at a later date that another event generates a retroactive associative chain ‘back’ to the ’original’ event and constructs, in the here-and-now, a trauma. It is important to emphasise that this is not denying that something actually occurred in the subject’s history, for example, sexual abuse. Rather, it is to argue that the subject was unable to register the nature of the ‘original’ event; such a registration only occurs later on. And, bearing in mind that Freud introduced the concept of Nachträglichkeit prior to his alleged ‘abandonment’ of his theory of childhood seduction, it suggests that even in his early work Freud was not positing a ‘naïve’ concept of trauma, that is, a traumatic experience occurs in the subject’s early life, the memory of which is repressed and which in turn produces a psychoneuroses in adulthood. Rather, Freud was already aware that psychical (re)construction played a key role in the development of adult psychopathology.
But what’s at stake here for psychoanalysis? Why does it matter if Freud ‘abandoned’ his belief in actual childhood sexual ‘seduction’ (abuse) or not? One answer, as I’ve already touched upon above, is that it calls into question the viability of a psychoanalytic engagement with childhood sexual abuse; which is somewhat ironic bearing in mind it is probably only thanks to Freud that the recognition of such abuse entered the public discourse in the first place. And, as I also noted above, this is precisely the charge that many critics of Freud level against him: that he came to deny the existence of actual childhood sexual abuse and instead argued that it was some elaborate psychical construction. The implication here is that psychoanalysis would have very little, if anything, to offer someone who had suffered such abuse in their childhood. The problem here is that this focus on childhood sexual encounter and its subsequent effects on the subject’s history and psychopathology would seem to be psychoanalysis’ ‘unique selling point’, its modus operandi; without such a focus what is the point of psychoanalysis? Why not just stick to psychotherapy and trauma counselling?
Although, as I hope I have already made clear, I do not believe that Freud ‘abandoned’ his theory of actual childhood ‘seduction’, let’s just imagine for a moment that he did. Furthermore, let’s just imagine for a moment that someone visits a psychoanalyst who adheres to Freud’s theory, that is, that there is no actual childhood sexual experience, but, rather, a psychical construction of such abuse, which for many subjects remains unconscious – at least until they enter psychoanalysis. If, during the course of the analysis, the analysand starts to recount certain events from their early childhood that suggest they may have been sexually abused, is the analyst then going to turn round and say to the analysand: ‘this is just an elaborate fantasy, clearly it never actually happened’? Of course not! Hopefully they will say very little at all, but instead allow the analysand the time and space to tell their story. The key point here is that for the analysand their (hi)story is real and it has real effects. And lurking in the shadows is an even more fundamental question, which is that of the ‘actuality’ of the ‘past’ itself. All history is, ultimately, a construction, a narrative; no one knows what ‘really’ happened at the time. Even people who are still alive to tell their stories still have to rely on their not-so-reliable memories, which are constantly reconstructing the past to suit the needs of the present. As I touched upon above, this is the work of Nachträglichkeit. When it comes to the question of childhood sexual experience and abuse this is not for one moment to deny it ever happened; rather, it is to acknowledge that all we ever have to go on is the retroactive reconstruction of events.
However, the difficulty here, I would argue, is that it is precisely the ‘actuality’ of past events that’s at stake for many individuals. This is especially true for people who have actually been abused in their childhood and who at the time were met with disbelief and denials when they tried to recount such experiences. In other words, for them it is critical that they are believed by their analyst or therapist, and anyone else they tell their story to. The complexities of the transference, let alone Nachträglichkeit, are simply not going to cut it with such individuals! And, as I noted earlier, if criminal proceedings are involved, it is even more critical that such events are deemed to have actually happened.
Returning now to my contention that Freud did not ‘abandon’ his theory of childhood ‘seduction’, but, instead, augmented it with the theory of psychical construction and working over,[11] what are the implications for clinical practice? In fact, does it make any difference if the analyst believes that an analysand’s account of childhood sexual abuse is based on ‘actual’ events or is a retroactive construction? As I indicated earlier, all the analyst (and the analysand) has to go on is the (re)construction of events, so in one sense their ‘actuality’ is beside the point. However, the key issue to remember here is that just because all we have to go on is the (re)construction, the representation, of events, this does not mean that such events never occurred. In fact, even if we subscribe to Freud’s theory of Nachträglichkeit (which I do), he argued that there always remains a trace of the actual event. Bistoen, Vanheule, and Craps, in their paper on Nachträglichkeit and PTSD argue that Lacan’s ideas regarding the signifier are especially instructive in terms of developing a deeper understanding of the mechanism of Nachträglichkeit. They argue that there is an ‘original’ distressing event that cannot be fully understood at the time of its occurrence because the subject is unable to symbolise it. However, the event leaves behind a ‘mnemic trace’ that is engraved in memory by a single signifier, which both signals and covers up the senselessness of the experience. Commenting on Freud’s ‘Emma’ case (one of his early uses of the theory of Nachträglichkeit), they write:
This single signifier, which is metonymically chosen by the subject, hems in or borders the hole of the nonsensical experience. In Emma’s case, this could be the linguistic element ‘clothing’ or the visual trace of the shopkeeper’s grin, something that simultaneously points to and obscures the original mystifying scene. It is crucial to grasp that this single signifier or representation remains ‘mute,’ as it does not become associated with other elements that would confer meaning upon it.[12]
Their argument here is that it is only when this single signifier can form part of a signifying chain that it can allow the subject to confer meaning and ‘sense’ on their experiences. This happens at the time of the ‘second’ event where the subject realises, for the first time, the full meaning of the ‘original’ experience, and at this point becomes traumatised by it. The crucial point here is that something has to have actually occurred for such a trace to be there in the first place. The difficulty, of course, is knowing precisely what this something is. However, for those of us who subscribe to a realist epistemology then this should be the focus of the analytic, however difficult it may be, rather than denying that there was something there in the first place.
Notes
- Sigmund Freud, The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904, trans. Jeffrey M. Masson (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belkap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 264. ↑
- Ibid., 264. ↑
- Ibid., 265. ↑
- See for example Jeffrey Masson’s vitriolic attack on Freud’s so-called abandonment of the seduction theory: Jeffrey M. Masson, The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of the Seduction Theory (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1984). ↑
- Nicole A. Sütterlin, “History of Trauma Theory,” in The Routledge Companion to Literature and Trauma, ed. Hanna Meretoja and Colin Davis (Milton: Taylor and Francis, 2020), 13. ↑
- Nadia Abu El-Haj, Combat Trauma: Imaginaries of War and Citizenship in Post-9/11 America (Kindle Edition) (London: Verso, 2002), 91. ↑
- Sigmund Freud, “On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIV (London: Hogarth Press, 1914), 17-18, italics in original. ↑
- Karin Ahbel-Rappe, ‘“I No Longer Believe”: Did Freud Abandon the Seduction Theory?’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 54.1 (2006), 171, italics in original. ↑
- Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac Books, 1988), 406-407. ↑
- Ibid., 407, my italics. ↑
- Here I am following Laplanche and Pontalis’ argument in The Language of Psychoanalysis that, “Understood very broadly, psychical working out (or over) might be said to cover all of the operations of the psychical apparatus.” (366). However, they are also clear that Freud’s specific use of the term was in reference to the transformation of energy through binding or diversion. ↑
- Gregory Bistoen, Stijn Vanheule, and Stef Craps, “Nachträglichkeit: A Freudian Perspective on Delayed Traumatic Reactions,” Theory and Psychology, 2014, 9. ↑
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Last updated: November 5, 2026
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