Pure psychoanalysis?
Pure psychoanalysis?

Pure psychoanalysis?

In my previous post I touched upon the question of whether there is a ‘baseline’ or ‘gold-standard’ of psychoanalytic treatment. This was in the context of my discussion of the ‘traumascape’ of the ongoing war in Ukraine, and how Ukrainian analysts were having to ‘adapt’ their practice in order to engage with what can only be described as industrial scale trauma. I used the quotation marks because the term ‘adaptation’ does seem to imply such a ‘baseline’ from which the analyst then has to ‘deviate’ in order to engage with what they are presented with. But the key point I was making there was precisely the lack of such a ‘baseline’ or ‘gold-standard’ of psychoanalysis, at least in theoretical or clinical terms. I went on to argue that insofar that such ‘baselines’ do exist, their function is to create and maintain the boundaries and barriers to entry of individual psychoanalytic institutions. In other words, if you wish to belong to a particular psychoanalytic group or organisation you must accept their ‘version’ of what constitutes psychoanalytic theory and practice. In the real world, however, it is not a matter of rigidly adhering to a particular model of psychoanalysis and then attempting to ‘fit’ each new case into such a model. Rather, it is to begin with the individual case itself and then see where it takes you.

In my own clinical practice, for example, I have never found a case that could easily be ‘fitted’ into one of the three Lacanian structures (neurosis, perversion, psychosis). Each one had its own, unique characteristics and trajectory. Clearly, one response to this might be to argue that I should have tried harder and if I had done so it would have become clear which structure I was working with. On the other hand, what exactly are these clinical structures that I seem to have real difficulty with ‘fitting’ my individual analysands into? In his book A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis, Bruce Fink argues that the three structures refer to the three different forms of negation of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father.[1] Repression is the form of negation for neurosis, disavowal is the form of negation for perversion, and foreclosure is the form of negation for psychosis. Now, as Fink points out, one of the advantages of such a structural approach to diagnosis is that it avoids the need for an ever-growing list of ‘conditions’, ‘disorders’, ‘syndromes’ and so on, which is essentially psychiatry’s way of categorising different forms of psychopathology, and which is best exemplified by the DSM-V and the ICD-11. Each category is, essentially, a cluster of presenting symptoms, which, of course, can present themselves in a variety of psychopathologies. In many ways, such an approach is a phenomenological one, insofar that the focus is on naming a particular cluster of presenting symptoms and then treating them, often with medication.

A structural approach, on the other hand, attempts to go beyond phenomenology and engage with the underlying structure of the pathology. Of course, even within psychiatry there are attempts to link a particular pathology, for example, schizophrenia, with some form of neurobiological or genetic ‘malfunctioning’ which can then be controlled by medication or some other intervention. In other words, there is an attempt to link phenomenology with structure or mechanism. In the case of Lacanian psychoanalysis, though, such structures have nothing to do with neurobiology or genetics, but, rather, with the structure and operation of language.

But getting back to my initial point about ‘baselines’: can clinical structures be described as such? In one sense, no, insofar that three different structures can hardly be described as constituting a ‘baseline’. On the other hand, perhaps the overall structural model itself could be. Putting aside the fact that in Lacan’s later work the concept of structure shifted from a linguistic one to a topological one in the form of his theory of the Borromean knot, the key point here is that the notion of structure is retained, and the same could be said for his theory of the four discourses. However, what we are really talking about here, I would argue, is a theory rather than a baseline. In other words, the structural model is essentially a theory of the psyche (and of psychopathology).

When it comes to the question of ‘adaptation’, though (for example, by analysts in the Ukraine war), what exactly is being ‘adapted’? I would argue that it is not so much a theory as a way of practicing psychoanalysis. Now, clearly in psychoanalysis theory and practice are tightly interwoven; in fact, it might be better to speak of psychoanalytic praxis rather than practice. However, this immediately runs into the problem of so-called ‘applied’ psychoanalysis. As I argue in my blog article on this topic, the concept of ‘applied psychoanalysis’ has an interesting history and up until 1914 or thereabouts the term would be used to describe any ‘application’ of the theory of psychoanalysis, whether it be in the consulting room, in art, literature or as a form of sociology (Freud’s Civilisation and its Discontents being a classic example of the latter). I cited in my article the work of Caio Padovan and Vinicius Darriba who argued that in the early days of psychoanalysis (broadly speaking pre-1914) the founding fathers (Freud, Ferenczi, et al) made the distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ on the basis of psychoanalysis as science and psychoanalysis as practice; and, more specifically, psychoanalysis applied to medical problems (psychopathologies).[2] They were also very interested in seeing how the knowledge that emerged from the clinic could be ‘applied’ in other fields, notably in the arts and humanities. In other words, at this point in the history of psychoanalysis at least, it would not make much sense to speak of it as a ‘praxis’, that is, a combination of theory and practice; rather, there was the theory (science) of psychoanalysis and there was its practice, including that of the treatment of psychopathology.

Later on, though, the term ‘applied psychoanalysis’ seems to have become reserved for any application of psychoanalytic theory outside of the clinic of psychopathology; and, more specifically, outside of the clinic of neurosis. Jacques-Alain Miller, in his paper Contraindications to Psychoanalytical Treatment (which I also refer to in my article) argues that, strictly speaking, the many varieties of psychoanalytic treatments that exist today are all forms of ‘applied psychoanalysis’.[3] This is because they all represent deviations, in one way or another, from an ‘ideal’ form of psychoanalysis that Miller defines as ‘pure’. And by ‘pure’ he refers to the work of Edward Glover as a prime example:

What are we to understand here by ‘pure psychoanalysis’? It is psychoanalysis conceived as a treatment of a paramedical order, which aims at a cure, or even ‘normality’, and proceeds by way of an average of five sessions per week, and as Glover says, ‘for a period of one and a half to two years’.[4]

It should be pointed out immediately that Miller is being somewhat satirical here: he is well aware that Glover’s idea of analysis is anything but ‘pure’; in fact, it is simply an idealised version of something that never existed in the first place. However, what’s interesting about such an idealisation is that it does seem to fit the definition of a ‘baseline’ quite well. In other words, if ‘pure’ psychoanalysis is defined in terms of ‘a treatment of a paramedical order’, aims at a ‘cure or even normality’, with a frequency of five sessions a week for up to two years (and, one might add, is restricted to neurosis and involves the patient lying on a couch), then any ‘deviation’ from such a ‘baseline’ could be deemed as an ‘adaptation’.

According to Miller, however: “ ‘Pure psychoanalysis’ has become increasingly reserved for the very formation of the analyst, while the practice of analyst who has been formed in this way distances itself evermore from the conditions of his own formation.”[5] In other words, the nearest a psychoanalyst is going to get to the experience of a ‘pure’ analysis is in their own personal or training analysis. As soon as the analyst engages in clinical practice they are essentially in the realm of ‘applied’ psychoanalysis; or, more precisely, according to Miller, they incarnate the object of the drive and become what he describes as a ‘psychoanalyst-object’. This seems to resonate very closely with Lacan’s idea in Seminar XIX that the analyst occupies the position of the semblance of the object a for the analysand.[6] As Miller puts it:

…if the analyst knows how to be an object, to want nothing a priori for the good of the other, to be without prejudice as regards the good use which can be made of him, he will see the register of contraindications shrink surprisingly to the point where the contraindication is decided case by case. For that, he must have cultivated his docility to the point where he knows how to occupy the place from which to act for any subject. And what an act it is![7]

What Miller is getting at here is that it is no longer a case (as it may have been in the ‘classical’ era of psychoanalysis) that a psychoanalyst could decide whether a particular individual was ‘analysable’, which was often code for neurotic, middle class and with a (relatively) strong ego. Rather, it is now enough for an individual to have a demand for analysis, for an analytical experience (a term, Miller notes, Lacan was using in place of ‘treatment’ as far back as the 1950s). And it is for the analyst to take up the position of ‘psychoanalyst-object’ in response to such a demand. If there is an ‘adaptation’ taking place here, it is purely in terms of such a positioning as opposed to some ‘deviation’ from a mythical ‘baseline’ or ‘pure analysis’. As Miller puts it:

With the psychoanalyst-object, psychoanalysis provides the place for a vacuole, a space between parentheses, where, during a restricted time, a patient has the chance of being a subject, that is to say, of lacking-to-be what otherwise identifies him. It is, if you wish, to use Winnicott’s term, a transitional space, a place of pure semblant, which is like an inversion l’envers] of everyday life, and where the subject is constantly driven back to the birth of sense, to his first babblings. It is a place which welcomes contingency, where necessity loosens its grip, and this is par excellence the site of the possible.[8]

References

  1. Bruce Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique (Harvard University Press, 1997). ↑
  2. Caio Padovan and Vinicius Darriba, ‘The Notion of Applied Psychoanalysis in the Early Years of the Psychoanalytic Movement’, Psicologia USP 27, no. 1 (2016): 104–14. ↑
  3. Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Contraindications to Psychoanalytical Treatment’, London Society of the NLS, 2003. ↑
  4. Ibid. ↑
  5. Ibid. ↑
  6. Jacques Lacan, ……Or Worse: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XIX (Polity Press, 2022). ↑
  7. Miller, ‘Contraindications to Psychoanalytical Treatment’ ↑
  8. Ibid. ↑

The formalisation of the Borromean knots provides the scaffolding for a contemporary clinic of the Real. To explore further entries on the ‘very late Lacan’ and the status of the subject, please visit The Borromean Clinic Hub.