Following on from my previous article, in which I explored the idea of ‘hystory’ in relation to history and Nachträglichkeit, I now want to look at the question of history and Nachträglichkeit in relation to psychosis.
Going back to Miller’s paper, The Space of a Hallucination, having explored Lacan’s notion of hystory and the privileging of truth (the Symbolic, history) over the Real, he goes onto argue that in Lacan’s later teaching his theory of the unconscious shifts from being based on history and hysteria to being based on psychosis.[1] And he develops this argument in the context of Lacan’s response to Jean Hyppolite’s commentary of Freud’s “Verneinung” paper,[2] and especially Lacan’s remarks concerning the Wolf Man case:
Prior to his constructions of the history-unconscious, he (Lacan) had…entered Freud’s theory from the angle of psychosis. This is also what justifies me in seeking the blueprint of his final text in his commentary on Freud’s “Verneinung,” the hallucination of the Wolf Man’s severed finger. In the way Lacan approaches this hallucination, it calls the primacy of historicization into question. He presents it as a phenomenon that escapes history as well as the subjective and semantic reworking of truth. For an element to be historicized, and it is in this respect that Lacan goes further than his “Rome Report,” it has to have been symbolized. There can only be a primary historicization if there is a primary symbolization.[3]
In other words, for history to be possible there has to symbolisation, that is, the Symbolic order itself has to be operating, which is not the case in psychosis.
But is it strictly true to argue that in psychosis there is no history? Or, to put it another way, that the psychotic subject has no (sense of) history? This seems to suggest that the psychotic subject lives in some kind of eternal present, although it might be more accurate to say that the psychotic subject has a different sense of time than the neurotic subject; for the neurotic their ‘history’ is dependent on repression, whereas for the psychotic this is lacking.
However, it doesn’t seem quite right to argue that history is lacking in the psychotic; after all, psychotics are able to construct stories, narratives, as well as anyone else. And this is particularly the case with paranoid subjects, where the delusory constructions are attempts to effect a ‘cure’. Perhaps what’s more problematic, though, is where the psychotic subject situates themselves within such narratives. It’s not so much that the psychotic is absent from their own narrative, from their own story; one only has to read the ‘classic’ psychoanalytic study of psychosis, the memoirs of Daniel Schreber, to appreciate that he is very much part of the story.[4] However, it also becomes pretty clear after reading only a few pages that Schreber occupies a rather peculiar position within his own memoirs. And it’s not simply the content his narrative that might seem rather unusual, including his meditations on the Order of the World, the nature of reality and his sexual relationship with God. It’s also the manner in which he describes all these things, in a very matter of fact way, as if there is no question that things might be otherwise or that perhaps he might be mistaken. There is a complete lack of ‘as if’, ‘maybe’, ‘perhaps (not)’; Schreber does not doubt – he knows.
Take, for example, this quote at the end of chapter four where Schreber becomes convinced that his psychiatrist, Professor Flechsig, is not acting in his best interests:
From then on appeared the first signs of communication with supernatural powers, particularly that of nerve-contact which Professor Flechsig kept up with me in such a way that he spoke to my nerves without being present in person. From then on I also gained the impression that Professor Flechsig had secret designs against me; this seemed confirmed when I once asked him during a personal visit whether he really honestly believed that I could be cured, and he held out certain hopes, but could no longer – at least so it seemed to me – look me straight in the eye.[5]
Or here, in chapter twenty-one, where Schreber is describing transforming himself into a woman in order to have sexual relations with God:
…as soon as I am alone with God, if I may so express myself, I must continually or at least at certain times, strive to give divine rays the impression of a woman in the height of sexual delight; to achieve this I have to employ all possible means, and have to strain all my intellectual powers and foremost my imagination.[6]
In his extended commentary on the Schreber case in Seminar III, Lacan points out the peculiarity of meaning in delusional discourse:
At the level of meaning, it’s characterized by the following, which will appear to you only if you set out with the idea that a meaning always refers to another meaning, that is, precisely, that the meaning of these words can’t be exhausted by reference to another meaning.
This can be seen in Schreber’s text as well as in the presence of a patient. The meaning of these words that pull you up has the property of referring essentially to meaning as such. It’s a meaning that essentially refers to nothing but itself, that remains irreducible. The patient himself emphasizes that the word carries weight within itself. Before being reducible to another meaning it signifies within itself something ineffable, it’s a meaning that refers above all to meaning as such.[7]
What Lacan seems to be getting at here is that for the paranoic subject the weight of meaning is overwhelming, unbearable. Unlike the narrative of the hysteric, for example, where each meaning refers to another meaning in an endless chain of association, for the paranoid subject meaning effectively ‘solidifies’. This becomes particularly apparent in the clinic where the ‘discourse’ of the psychotic patient tends to be a series of (often quite profound) statements and pronouncements, rather than the endless flow of contradictions and jumping from one subject to another that is common with the neurotic patient.
Does this mean that we can speak here of a different kind of ‘history’ in contrast to ‘hystory’? Or to ask the question another way: is the delusory narrative of the paranoiac the equivalent of the historical/hysterical narrative of the neurotic? Furthermore, is there a place for Nachträglichkeit in this alternative form of narrative? In answer to the first question, the answer is surely in the affirmative, although interestingly Miller, in his paper cited earlier, points out that in paranoia, the structure of history-unconscious is retained:
For the schizophrenic, “all of the symbolic is real,” as if all of the symbolic were outside symbolization. There is a level at which the symbolic stops making sense, or history, when it is at the level of noise in which everything and anything can be heard. This is a collapse of two dimensions, the symbolic caving in upon the real. In the paranoiac, on the contrary, Lacan rediscovers retroaction, that is, the signifying mechanism that makes historical turning points possible: the “elementary phenomena […] are merely pre-signifying,” that is, awaiting the signifier that will make them function and enable the construction of a delusion. The paranoiac is subject to the structures of the history-unconscious because for him the relationship to the Other is maintained, and the elementary phenomena are not of the real; they are not cut off from the symbolic and call for a meaning-to-come that their connection with another signifier will give them.[8]
Although the paranoiac’s relation to the Other is problematic, in that the presence of the Other is often unbearable and persecutory, nonetheless it means that the Symbolic order still ‘operates’, at least in an elementary fashion, for the subject. However, as I have argued above, such a ‘paranoiac history’ is different from the ‘hsytorical’ one in terms of the subject’s relationship to meaning.
But is such a history subject to the effects of Nachträglichkeit? To begin to address this question we need to consider the place of trauma in the life the psychotic subject; or, to be more exact, the time of trauma. According to Miller’s reading of hystory, the trauma is effectively ‘written-out’ by the subject’s history. As I pointed out in my previous article, this is based on Lacan’s arguments in the first section of his ‘Rome Report’ and reflects, according to Miller, Lacan’s ‘privileging’, during this period of his teaching, of the Symbolic order. Because of this ‘writing-out’ of the original trauma, it has to be ‘written back in’ through the process of Nachträglichkeit at a later date. In other words, the trauma can only ever occur retroactively.
But what happens in the case of the psychotic subject? Although Miller does not address this question directly in his paper, I think there is a good case for arguing that for the psychotic subject trauma is very much present from the start, because for them the Real ‘surmounts’ the Symbolic; or, as Miller puts it, the Real surmounts the True. And as far as the role of history goes in instilling meaning (and stability) into the psychotic subject, in contrast to the hysteric, for the psychotic trauma has to ‘written-out’ retroactively rather than ‘written-in’. And the ‘writing-in’ of meaning, this installation of history, is the essence of paranoia. So, in this sense it would appear that Nachträglichkeit is essentially redundant to the extent that for the psychotic subject trauma is all too present and Real from the very beginning.
There is, however, still a problem here – although in many ways it’s more a problem for the ‘classical’ interpretation of Nachträglichkeit, that is, the idea of retroactive construction. As I pointed out in another article on the subject, according to Jean Laplanche the essence of Nachträglichkeit is the idea of childhood seduction whereby the (usually) adult seducer/abuser conveys to the infant child, in a very enigmatic form, a series of ‘messages’ regarding their (the adult’s) sexual desire and jouissance. As the child turns into an adult it can spend the rest of their life trying to ‘decode’ these enigmatic messages, and although they may be partially successful, there is always something that escapes meaning, that is, that remains traumatic. What’s unclear in Laplanche’s argument, however, is whether this process of ‘retroactive decoding’ applies to both neurotic and psychotic subjects, although this could well be because he is coming from a different position to that the Lacanians (and Freudians) who subscribe to idea of the differential clinic, that is, a clear distinction between psychosis and neurosis.
Putting these considerations to one side (for the moment at least), it would still appear to be the case that both neurotic and psychotic (paranoiac) subjects ‘have’ a history, at least in the sense they are able to construct narratives or stories regarding their own existence and place in the world. At the same time, though, and as I argued earlier, there are some key differences regarding the nature of such narratives, especially with regards to the position of the subject within them and their relationship to meaning.
Notes and references
- Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘The Space of a Hallucination’, The Lacanian Review 6 (Epub Version), 6, 2018. ↑
- Jacques Lacan, ‘Response to Jean Hyppolite ’s Commentary on Freud’s “Verneinung”’, in Écrits The First Complete Edition in Englsih, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: WW Norton & Co, 1954), pp. 318–33. ↑
- Miller, ‘The Space of a Hallucination’. ↑
- Daniel Paul Schreber, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (New York: New York Review Books, 2000). ↑
- Ibid., p.53, emphasis in original. ↑
- Ibid., p.249. ↑
- Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book III 1955-1956 The Psychoses (London: Routledge, 1993), p.33, emphasis in original. ↑
- Miller, ‘The Space of a Hallucination’. ↑
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