Introduction: Freud and the nature of language
In my previous post I focused on the concept of drive-jouissance and its relation to war trauma. However, there is one aspect of this topic that deserves further elucidation, and that is the relation of jouissance (and by extension, trauma) to language. In fact, I would argue that the position of language within the field of trauma is critical. To start with, it is through language that trauma becomes ‘detraumatised’, so to speak, because it allows the construction of trauma narratives that give meaning to essentially meaningless experiences and memories. Secondly, and somewhat paradoxically perhaps, without language there would be no trauma in the first place. And in order to gain a better understanding of this second idea we need to start by looking at how Freud viewed the nature of language and especially his differentiation between things and words.
In his paper The Unconscious Freud makes reference to thing-presentations (Sachvorstellung) and word-presentations (Wortvorstellung).[1] Thing-presentations are the raw, sensory, and imagistic representations of objects in the unconscious, while word-presentations are the linguistic representations that allow these unconscious contents to be brought into consciousness through the preconscious:
The system Ucs. contains the thing-cathexes of the objects, the first and true object-cathexes; the system Pcs. comes about by this thing-presentation being hypercathected through being linked with the word-presentations corresponding to it. It is these hypercathexes, we may suppose, that bring about a higher psychical organization and make it possible for the primary process to be succeeded by the secondary process which is dominant in the Pcs.[2]
In other words, according to Freud, the unconscious is primarily composed of thing-presentations, which are not directly accessible to consciousness. For conscious thought to occur, these thing-presentations must be linked to word-presentations, which serve as a ‘bridge’ between the unconscious and the conscious. The transition from thing-presentations to word-presentations is a process of binding and representation. In the unconscious, experiences are stored as fragmented images or sensory impressions, often tied to repressed desires or traumatic events. For these to enter consciousness, they must be “translated” into words, a process that requires the intervention of the preconscious. Freud argues that this translation is what enables repression to be lifted and unconscious material to become thinkable. Yet, this process is never seamless; the unconscious retains its opacity, and some thing-presentations resist verbalisation entirely, remaining as enigmatic residues of psychic life.
The Drive and the Signifier
However, in order to understand this process of ‘translation’ from thing to word we need to shift our attention to the question of the drive and its relation to the signifier. In his paper Instincts and their Vicissitudes Freud outlines the four components of the drive: pressure (Drang), aim (Ziel), object (Objekt), and source (Quelle).[3] The drive is a constant force that originates in the somatic realm but is represented psychically. It is important to note that the drive is not equivalent to instinct; rather, it is a more complex and dynamic force that operates at the boundary between the somatic and the psychical. Freud describes the drive as a ‘frontier concept’ that exists at the intersection of the somatic and the psychical. This concept is crucial for understanding how bodily experiences, including traumatic ones, are represented in the psyche. The drive is not a (purely) biological force; it is also deeply intertwined with the symbolic order and the realm of language. The drive seeks representation in the psyche, and this representation often takes the form of linguistic or symbolic expressions.
However, it is only with Lacan that the relationship between the drive and language becomes clear. And although lessons 13 to 15 in Seminar XI are often taken as the cornerstone of his ‘deconstruction’ of the drive,[4] in fact we need to go back to Seminar II to have a fuller understanding of the connection between the drive (which for Lacan is always the death drive) and the order of signifiers. Right at the end of the last lesson of Seminar II, where he has been discussing the ego in relation to the Imaginary, Lacan states:
The symbolic order is rejected by the libidinal order, which includes the whole of the domain of the imaginary, including the structure of the ego. And the death instinct (drive) is only the mask of symbolic order, in so far – this is what Freud writes – as it is dumb, that is to say in so far as it hasn’t been realised…The symbolic order is simultaneously non-being and insisting to be, that is what Freud has in mind when he talks about the death instinct as being what is most fundamental – a symbolic order in travail, in the process of coming, insisting on being realised.[5]
In other words, Lacan is making the somewhat remarkable claim that the death drive is related to the Symbolic register itself; more precisely, it is the Symbolic register in the process of becoming. This seems a long way from Freud’s concept of the death drive as a ‘reduction to zero’,[6] but makes more sense if we consider Lacan’s argument in Seminar VII that the death drive should not be viewed in terms of a theory of energetics but, rather, as a theory of the signifier and language. In order to explain this assertion he makes an excursion into Sade’s Juliette where he (Sade) discourses on the System of Pope Pius VI. According to Lacan:
Sade lays out for our benefit the theory that it is through crime that man collaborates in the new creations of nature. The idea is that the pure force of nature is obstructed by its own forms, that because the three realms present fixed forms they bind nature to a limited cycle…As a result, the deepest concern that can be imputed to this psychic subject that is Nature is that of wanting to wipe the slate clean, so that it may begin its task once more, set out again with a new burst of energy.[7]
In other words, destruction is the catalyst of renewal and creation. As Lacan notes, although Sade’s language is more poetic than scientific, he is nevertheless making an important point that any evolutionist would recognise. More crucially for Lacan’s argument regarding the death drive, however, is that it is not situated on the side of some form of ‘annihilation principle’, which “…concerns a relationship to a fundamental law which might be identified with that which energetics theorizes as the tendency to return to a state, if not of absolute rest, then as least of universal equilibrium.” Rather, the death drive “…is to be situated in the historical domain: it is articulated at a level that can only be defined as a function of the signifying chain…”[8]
The ‘cybernetic Lacan’
Furthermore, if we go back to Seminar II and focus on what might be best described as Lacan’s ‘cybernetic reading’ of Freud’s theory of the pleasure principle and the principle of constancy,[9] we find that Lacan is attempting to address the relation of the biological organism to the machine and the idea of the mechanism. For example, in lesson three he states:
Thus, when it comes down to it, we always try to explain the living organism in terms of mechanism. The first question which we analysts must answer, and which can perhaps help us get away from the controversy which exists between vitalism and mechanism, is the following – why are we led to think of life in terms of mechanism? [10]
As Lacan notes, the concept of the mechanism in philosophy had changed quite considerably since its introduction in the eighteenth century, especially since the advent of the steam engine, where the emphasis shifted to the idea of regulated energy (through the use of the self-regulator valve), and even more so with the advent of cybernetics in the mid-twentieth century. Cybernetics is especially important here because it allows Lacan to make a direct connection between language and the machine (mechanism) and which he discusses at some length in lesson twenty-three of Seminar II.[11] It is also an opportunity for Lacan to discuss his ideas regarding the ‘exact sciences’ (physics, astronomy, etc) and their relation to the Real. Lacan argues that the exact sciences were born out of the realisation that certain human actions, for example rites, dances and magical invocations had very little influence on the natural order of things: “From the moment man thinks that the great clock of nature turns all by itself, and continues to mark the hour even when he isn’t there, the order of science is born.”[12]
And one of the key aspects of modern science, according to Lacan, is that it ‘reduces’ the Real to a small number of symbols (signifiers). It is important to note that in this seminar Lacan refers to the Real as “…something one always finds in the same place, whether or not one has been there.”[13] In other words, the Real is that which exists independently of human thought or perception, for example (which is the one Lacan uses) the stars in the sky. And sticking with this example, celestial bodies (stars, planets, and so on) domain can be ‘reduced’ to a set of mathematical equations that plot their orbits, evolution and eventual decay. Such equations can be manipulated mathematically, for example using the probability calculus, which Lacan argues appears in its first truly scientific form in Pascal’s treatise on the arithmetic triangle, and which, according to Lacan, constitutes the first machine.[14] Lacan uses the model of such a machine to emphasise the idea of the order of symbols being characterised by presence and absence. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, he uses the example of a gambler to illustrate this idea:
What Pascal develops with the arithmetic triangle, the first machine, has a claim on the attention of the scientific world, in that it enables one to determine immediately what a gambler has the right to expect at any given moment when the succession of turns which makes up a game is interrupted. A succession of turns is the simplest form one can give to the idea of the encounter…What’s at issue is the place, what does or doesn’t come to fill it…[15]
In symbolic (and machine) terms, absence and presence can be represented in binary code, that is, as a series of 0s and 1s. This, argues Lacan, is the key to the development of cybernetics along with the introduction of what he calls the ‘cybernetised doors’, by which he appears to be referring to the electronic switches that form the basis of cybernetic and computer circuits:
Once the door (switch) is open, it closes. When it is closed, it opens…Thanks to the electrical circuit, and to the induction circuit connected on to it, that is to say what is called feedback, it’s sufficient for the door to close for it to be returned by an electro-magnet to an open state and that is its closure again, and its opening again. In that way what is called an oscillation is produced.[16]
It is important to note that Lacan was making these arguments on the cusp of the computer age and so perhaps was not able to fully appreciate the strength of his own models and analogies. In hindsight, perhaps, it is much clearer that he was prefiguring the advent of computers and the machine languages that program them (binary and hexadecimal codes). As John Johnston points out:
Lacan’s machines are really information machines, simple ones at that, since all they do is count, store, and integrate codings of binary numbers (1s and 0s). Yet these basic operations underlie all that a modern digital computer does. Since the computer, or rather its conceptual forerunner, Alan Turing’s universal machine of 1936, is the most important technological invention between Freud and Lacan, Lacan’s rewriting of Freud should be understood as an attempt to redefine the psychic apparatus according to contemporary conditions of mediality.[17]
The critical point here is that at the level of the binary code, the circuit of language equates with the circuit of the drive (which Lacan discusses in Seminar XI). In other words, the drive is the ‘driving force’ of the signifier itself.
From language to lalangue
But even though we have established a relationship between the drive and language, how does this relate to trauma? If trauma can be conceptualised in terms of drive-jouissance (the topic of my previous article) then jouissance is surely the key to answering this question. Taking this one step further, the relationship between jouissance and language is even more critical and one way to explore such a relationship is through Lacan’s concept of lalangue (or llanguage in the English translation). In a footnote in Seminar XX Bruce Fink explains:
The French here, lalangue, is a term Lacan creates simply by putting together the feminine article la with the noun langue (language, but specifically spoken language, as in tongue). Lacan discusses what he means by lalangue in the course of this Seminar (as well as elsewhere); very roughly speaking, it has to do with the acoustic level of language, the level at which polysemy is possible due to the existence of homonyms (like those Lacan plays on throughout this Seminar). It is the level at which an infant (or songwriter) may endlessly repeat one syllable of a word (for example, “la la la”), the level at which language may “stutter” – hence the translation provided here, borrowed from Russell Grigg, “llanguage.”[18]
And in that Seminar Lacan states:
Llanguage serves purposes that are altogether different from that of communication. That is what the experience of the unconscious has shown us, insofar as it is made of llanguage, which, as you know, I write with two l’s to designate what each of us deals with, our so-called mother tongue (lalangue dite maternelle), which isn’t called that by accident.[19]
Furthermore, lalangue is closely connected to what Lacan describes as ‘the One’, which refers to individual signifiers which are all S1s. In other words, rather than there being a single ‘master signifier’ (S1) there is a whole ‘swarm’ (to use Lacan’s term in Seminar XX) of S1s. Lacan states: “The One incarnated in llanguage is something that remains indeterminate (indécis) between the phoneme, the word, the sentence, and even the whole of thought. That is what is at stake in what I call the master signifier.”[20] Lalangue essentially refers to the individual signifier, all alone, isolated from the other signifiers, that is, from the signifying chain.
In her paper Discourse and the jouissance of lalangue Hebe Tizio notes that:
In the 1970s Lacan differentiates the two axes of language – that of speech and that of the sign. With lalangue he elaborates a language which does not serve for communication but rather for jouissance. Language is a derivative of lalangue, which is defined as speech prior to grammatical or lexicographical organization. Lalangue is speech in its disjunction from the structure of language. Here we can think of Schreber´s fundamental language made up of neologisms.[21]
It’s now becoming clear that the jouissance, that is, the trauma, of language is rooted in the signifier itself; in the isolated signifier, the One (which elsewhere Lacan refers to as the unary trait). This is what lalangue is, the jouissance of the ‘swarm’ of S1s. Or, more accurately, the S1, the One, is jouissance. It is only when these isolated signifiers become incorporated into a chain of signification that they form language as such, and in the process their jouissance becomes ‘deciphered’. In other words, meaning appears. If we refer back to Freud’s concept of ‘bound’ and ‘unbound’ energy (for example in Beyond the Pleasure Principle), then through its incorporation into the signifying chain lalangue not only become language but its jouissance becomes ‘bound’, whereas in the form of individual S1, jouissance remains ‘unbound’. And this process of ‘binding’, of ‘deciphering’, is precisely what Lacan is describing in Seminar II, which I referred to earlier, when he discusses the ‘cybernetics of language’, that is, the manner in which the constant repetition of the drive both creates and destroys signification.
Conclusion: the trauma of language
At the beginning of this text I argued that the relationship between trauma and language was important in two ways. Firstly, language provides a way to ‘detraumatise’ trauma through the construction of meaning, and specifically through the construction of trauma narratives. And secondly, without language there would be no trauma in the first place. I hope that my subsequent discussion of Freud’s theory of language, the relationship between the drive and language, and the concept of lalangue sheds some light of both these aspects. Through its incorporation into the signifying network the jouissance of lalangue is ‘bound’, deciphered’, and is ’translated’ into language. And it is through the incessant operation of the drive that such a ‘translation’ is effected.
But what do I mean when I state that without language there would be no trauma? So far, what I have described would appear to suggest the opposite; that is, language is the means of removing trauma. However, if the jouissance of lalangue is incorporated into the signifying network, that is, into language, then clearly such jouissance is still present within language, albeit in a ‘bound’ or ‘deciphered’ form. And if Lacan is right in arguing that the cybernetic operation of language is a way to conceptualise Freud’s pleasure principle, then any disturbance to such an operation would result in the return of trauma, that is, of drive-jouissance.
At this point it is important to recognise that there is another way to think about the traumatic effect of language; one which belongs to the ‘classical’ period of Lacan’s teaching, or what might better described as his ‘structuralist’ period. Here, trauma is the consequence of the human being’s entry into language, and through such a trauma the human subject emerges. Such a trauma might be described as the ‘inaugural trauma’ of the subject,[22] and essentially prioritises the Symbolic order as the ‘agency’ of trauma. It also seems to equate with what Paul Verhaeghe has described as a ‘phallic’ reading of Lacan which is designed to circumvent the question of the Real, jouissance, the drive and the object a.[23] In this reading, the nearest thing that appears to equate to ‘trauma’ is (Symbolic) castration, which is an effect of language. But such a ‘traumatisation’, according to Verhaeghe, is essentially a ‘secondary’, retroactive phenomenon designed to ‘protect’ the subject from a more fundamental trauma, which revolves around the drive and the object a. If this is the case, then it is difficult to see how this could be described as ‘inaugural’. It is only from Seminar XI onwards, I would argue (as does Verhaeghe in another text),[24] that the emphasis shifts towards this more fundamental trauma, which is essentially the trauma of drive-jouissance and its relation to lalangue.
Notes and references
- Sigmund Freud, “The Unconscious,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIV (London: Hogarth Press, 1915), 161–215. ↑
- Ibid., 201-202. ↑
- Sigmund Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIV (London: Hogarth Press, 1915), 111–40. ↑
- Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (London: Penguin, 1979). ↑
- Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 326. ↑
- An argument Freud expounds in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. ↑
- Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book VII (London: Routledge, 1992), 210. ↑
- Ibid., 211. ↑
- Such a reading is something I explore in detail in my forthcoming book Traumatic Neurosis Revisited: drive-jouissance and the wounds of life (London, Palgrave, 2025). ↑
- Ibid., 31. ↑
- Which is a presentation of the final lecture in a special series on the theme of ‘Psychoanalysis and the human sciences’ organised by the Société Française de Psychanalyse and delivered by Lacan on 22 June 1955. ↑
- Ibid., 298. ↑
- Ibid., 297. ↑
- It appears, though not stated explicitly in the text, that Lacan may here be conflating Pascal’s arithmetic triangle with his arithmetic machine (the ‘Pascaline Calculator’) which is generally regarded as the world’s first genuine arithmetical calculator. ↑
- Ibid., 299. ↑
- Ibid., 302. ↑
- , 81-82. ↑
- Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XX 1972-1973: Encore, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: WW Norton & Co, 1999), 44. ↑
- Ibid., 138. ↑
- Ibid., 143. ↑
- Hebe Tizio, “Discourse and the Jouissance of Lalangue,” in The Ordinary Psychoses and the Others under Transference, 2018, https://congresoamp2018.com/en/textos-del-tema/goce-lalengua-discurso/. ↑
- A term I adopt in my forthcoming book referred to earlier. ↑
- Paul Verhaeghe, ‘Subject and Body: Lacan’s Struggle with the Real’, in Beyond Gender: From Subject to the Drive, ed. by Paul Verhaeghe (New York: Other Press, 2001), 65–97. ↑
- Paul Verhaeghe, ‘Causality in Science and Psychoanalysis’, in Lacan and Science, ed. by Jason Glynos and Yannis Stavrakakis (London: Routledge, 2002), 119–45. ↑
Exploring the ‘wounds of life’ requires moving beyond the literal event to the structural truth of the drive. To see how this analysis fits into a wider clinical framework, please visit the Empire of Trauma Hub.
Last updated: March 31, 2026
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