There was an interesting article recently in the Guardian by James Greig which highlights the whole question of trauma and trauma narratives. Greig begins by observing that:
Today, “trauma” is used to describe just about anything: being ghosted, being cheated on by a lover, being betrayed by a friend. In fact, almost any of the painful minutiae of relating to other people. It has become the dominant frame for thinking about unhappiness. There’s good reasons for this: traumatic childhood experiences, for example, are a significant factor in basically any social problem you could care to name, including addiction, mental illness and homelessness. On an individual level, its impact can be profound.
He also notes that over the last decade trauma “has become a common theme in popular culture”, citing a number of TV series, novels and albums to make his point. He is critical of what he describes as ‘reactionary’ criticisms of trauma which argue that only people who have experienced ‘real’ traumatic situations, for example, war, can claim to have been ‘traumatised’:
While it’s important to understand that not all painful experiences are traumatic, I’m not convinced that this kind of linguistic expansion is that big a deal. If someone considers themselves traumatised, they are likely to be in some kind of distress, and deserving of help and sympathy – even if you think the reason offered seems a little insubstantial.
In other words, if someone believes themselves to have been traumatised then they probably have been, although Greig still isn’t clear what ‘being traumatised’ actually means in a psychological sense.
Interestingly, though, he then spends the rest of the article casting doubts over the value of trauma narratives, that is, using trauma (or rather, a story about trauma) as a basis for explaining, both to oneself and to others, why one’s life has turned out so badly (including, it would seem, his own). He worries particularly that such a story “has an obfuscatory effect, drawing a curtain over the more material sources of unhappiness in our lives in the present.” In other words, creating stories (narratives) of trauma can become a way of circumventing the real, material causes for distress – both individual and collective.
At the same time, he argues that “setting up a dichotomy between environmental factors would make no sense. Trauma is an environmental factor, it’s just one that relates to the past.” And by ‘environmental factors’ Greig seems to be suggesting that these can normally be traced back to structural problems and inequalities, which demand a collective response:
It’s not always possible to change our individual circumstances: most of us can’t choose to have more money, work in a less stressful job or live in a nicer flat than we already do. But it is possible to engage in some kind of collective effort to improve them.
Greig seems to be arguing, therefore, that at the end of the day many individuals do indeed suffer trauma, but that the explanations lie in structural inequalities as opposed to any individual propensity (psychological or biological) to trauma, and therefore any narration of such trauma needs to reflect this.
I would argue that in many ways Greig’s analysis is somewhat simplistic and essentially misses the point about trauma narratives. Yes, it is most definitely the case that the roots of trauma often (but not always) lie in what happened to the individual as a child, for example through being sexually abused. Such abuse can certainly be classified as ‘environmental’, rather than being something ‘internal’ to the individual.
However, things are not that simple. To start with, not everyone who has experienced abuse or other forms of violence (either physical or psychological) as a child becomes traumatised at a later date. And neither is it the case that everyone who has experienced poverty or other forms of structural inequality or deprivation becomes traumatised.
But there is an even bigger problem regarding trauma narratives which has very little to do with the structural (or otherwise) causes of trauma. And this is to do with the structure (and structuring) of such narratives themselves. As I shall explain shortly, there is something very peculiar about the construction of trauma – and the clue in in the word ‘construction’. It might appear rather odd to talk about the ‘construction’ of trauma; after all, isn’t the whole point about trauma that it lies outside of ‘structure’ and ‘construction’? Yes, the causes of trauma may indeed by structural, but the impact trauma has on the individual has nothing to do with structure or construction.
Or does it? After all, the very term ‘trauma narrative’ suggests a process of structuring and construction; why not just talk of trauma and being traumatised? Of course, the term trauma narrative may simply be another way of describing the history of a trauma, which I suspect is how Greig is using it. But to tell a story, to describe the history of something, involves a process of construction.
However, things get even more complicated when we look at how such narratives are constructed. It’s tempting to think, perhaps, that such narratives are simply describing traumatic events that occurred at some point in the individual’s past and the effects they continue to have in the present. But what if such narratives are actually creating the trauma itself? Although this sounds a rather bizarre idea this is precisely what Freud argued with his theory of Nachträglichkeit (badly translated by James Strachey as ‘deferred action’). As I’ve noted in a number of posts on this subject, the concept of Nachträglichkeit essentially turns the traditional approach to trauma on its head, because in essence it is arguing that trauma is created retroactively.
And by this I do not mean, as Strachey’s mistranslation appears to imply, that the emergence of trauma is somehow delayed until a later date in the subject’s life when it is ‘triggered’ by an event that ‘reminds’ the subject of the earlier traumatic experience. For example, someone who has been abused as a child may in later life watch a news item about a child abuser and suddenly begin to experience all the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). But within the context of Nachträglichkeit this not because the individual has now been ‘reminded’ of their earlier traumatic experience. Rather, it is only now, many years after the event, that the subject is able to construct the trauma, which then produces traumatic effects. And it is precisely this process of the construction of the narrative of the trauma that places it in its historical context, that is, something that happened many years ago in the subject’s early life. In this sense Nachträglichkeit produces the traumatised subject.
This is not to suggest for a moment that something didn’t happen to the subject in their early life; perhaps even something horrific. Rather, as Freud realised this something did not at the time have much of an effect on the subject. This is because they were not at that point in a position to articulate it as a subjective experience. It is only later (for Freud, this was after puberty) that the subject is able to ‘process’ the experience. But the strange thing is, it’s only through this processing, this symbolising, that the ‘original’ experience becomes traumatic and provides the subject with the basis of a trauma narrative that can then be elaborated as time goes on, for example in years of therapy.
So Greig is right to be sceptical of trauma narratives, but for the wrong reasons. If we take the concept of Nachträglichkeit seriously then it is not the case that individuals are traumatised by early, structural experiences, which could include abuse, poverty, war, and so on. These are just different types of trauma narrative (based around abuse, poverty, war, etc). Rather, it is through an encounter with such experiences in the present day, either directly or vicariously, that the subject constructs the trauma in the here and now. However, this is caused by a rather peculiar process of ‘temporal reversal’ (or perhaps even ‘retroactive causality’) that ‘connects’ the subject with an earlier experience which becomes retroactively traumatised. And who said time travel is impossible…
While psychoanalytic theory conceptualises trauma, repetition, and the limits of the signifier, clinical work takes place in the singular encounter with one’s own symptom. If you are seeking a space to speak that lies outside directive or manualised therapies, I can offer psychoanalytic consultations online via Therapeia. Please click here for further details.