History, hystory and Nachträglichkeit
History, hystory and Nachträglichkeit

History, hystory and Nachträglichkeit

In my previous article on Nachträglichkeit I argued that the concept is far more nuanced than is often portrayed in the psychoanalytic literature. In particular, I pointed out, drawing upon Laplanche’s concept of après-coup or afterwardness (his term for Nachträglichkeit), there is more to it than simply the idea of retroactive construction of trauma (although this in itself is still a highly contentious concept). As Laplanche reminds us, there is, in one sense at least, an ‘original’ trauma; or, to be more precise perhaps, an original experience which even if it was not registered as ‘traumatic’ at the time by the subject, nevertheless actually occurred.

More importantly, perhaps, Laplanche argues that the trauma that emerges in Nachträglichkeit involves an encounter between (at least) two people: the infant child and another person (usually an adult but not always[1]). And for Laplanche, such an encounter is always a sexual one; even if it’s not actual sexual abuse there is always a sexual dimension to the relationship, a seduction by the other of the child. However, such a seduction is based on an enigma; an enigmatic message or set of messages transmitted from the other to the child relating to the desire and sexual enjoyment of the other. The problem for the child is that they are unable to make sense of the message, to ‘decode’ or ‘translate’ it; and even many years later, as adults themselves, they are still attempting to decipher the cryptic sexual messages from childhood, usually unsuccessfully. In fact, according to Laplanche, each failed attempt at deciphering or ‘translation’ is the essence of Nachträglichkeit. The subject may be able to make some sense of their memories of the experience, but something is always lost, something always escapes representation.

But what has this to do with history? To start with, of course, Nachträglichkeit is all about the subject’s history, insofar as the subject’s past is (retroactively) constructed as a history of trauma. More specifically, perhaps, Nachträglichkeit is instrumental in constructing a narrative of the subject’s trauma; and this narrative constitutes the history of the subject. In this article I want to take a closer look at question of Nachträglichkeit in relation to history and trauma. Before I do this, however, I want to explore history and Nachträglichkeit in the context of psychopathology, or, more precisely, in the context of neurosis. In my next article I will explore these questions in the context of psychosis. The reason for doing this is because it is my contention that history has a different meaning within the context of neurosis than it does within the context of psychosis, and so does the meaning of Nachträglichkeit.

In his paper The Space of a Hallucination, Jacques-Alain Miller explores and develops the concept of hystory.[2] He borrows the term from Lacan’s Preface to the English Edition of Seminar XI, in which Lacan makes a play on the words history and hysteria:

Now, somewhat belatedly, I add my two cents’ worth: a fact of hystory, let’s just say hysteria—that of my colleagues, as it happens, a case of minor importance, but one in which I happened to find myself implicated for having taken an interest in someone—the Aimée of me thesis—who led me to drift over to them through having foisted Freud on myself.[3]

Rather than analysing this rather opaque paragraph, Miller picks up on the single line ‘a fact of hystory, let’s just say hysteria’. In the following quote, the two texts referred to are the Preface already mentioned and Lacan’s Response to Jean Hyppolite’s Commentary on Freud’s ‘Verneinung’:

From what I expounded to you last time, I will retain this opposition between the two terms “history” and “real” that I found at work in these two texts. What the later text adds is that with respect to the real, history is hystory, that is, hysteria.

history and the real

hystory

hysteria

This short-circuit is warranted by the “Preface,” where one finds the following: “a fact of hystory, let’s just say hysteria.” History with an “i,” hystory with a “y” and hysteria are, then, placed in a series. This witticism has to be given its full weight insofar as hysteria constitutes a psychopathological structure in which the impact of the Other, its discourse and its desire, on the subject is displayed in its purest from. This brings us to the angle from which Lacan first approached Freud’s teaching, namely the definition of the unconscious as the discourse of the Other.[4]

Miller is drawing on the first part of Lacan’s ‘Rome Report’, where Lacan argues that the unconscious is the subject’s history:

What we teach the subject to recognize as his unconscious is his history— in other words, we help him complete the current historicization of the facts that have already determined a certain number of the historical “turning points” in his existence. But if they have played this role, it is already as historical facts, that is, as recognized in a certain sense or censored in a certain order.[5]

One of key points about Lacan’s argument in this section, and something which is emphasised by Miller as part of his wider thesis, is that the subject’s historicisation effectively occludes the Real, and the Real of the subject’s trauma. This is made especially clear in the following quote from Lacan:

For to say of psychoanalysis and of history that, qua sciences, they are both sciences of the particular, does not mean that the facts they deal with are purely accidental or even factitious, or that their ultimate value comes down to the brute aspect of trauma.

 

Events are engendered in a primal historicization—in other words, history is already being made on the stage where it will be played out once it has been written down, both in one’s heart of hearts and outside.[6]

According to Miller, this represents the ‘supremacy of the true over the real’.[7] And insofar as ‘truth’, at least during this period of Lacan’s work (the early 1950s), is within the realm of the Symbolic order, then the Real (and trauma as a manifestation of the Real) is repressed.[8] As Miller puts it: ‘…in Lacan’s first advances, the concept of trauma disappears because historicization is primary. A trauma is already a “historical stigma”’.[9] In other words, trauma is always already situated within the Symbolic order, the domain of narrativisation and meaning.

And this seems to chime with the idea of Nachträglichkeit as retroactive construction; the subject only becomes traumatised ‘after the event’ and as a result of a temporal ‘looping back’ from a later to an earlier moment in time. It also rules out the idea of an ‘original trauma’, at least in the sense of the subject being traumatised at the time of the earlier event or experience. However, it should be emphasised that the idea of ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ moments in time, and, along with it, the concept of ‘original trauma’, is already to place us within the realm of history and narrative. In other words, there can only be an ‘origin’ within a symbolic framework, and along with it, the whole concept of ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’. So perhaps it might be more helpful to argue that within the framework of Nachträglichkeit the trauma always comes ‘later’ or ‘afterwards’, which strictly speaking is not the same as there not being an ‘original’ trauma. Or, to put it another way, within this framework, the idea of an ‘origin’ has a different meaning to that of an actual ‘original’ trauma. In Lacanian terms, an ‘origin’ is essentially the signifier S1 which acts as an ‘anchoring point’ for a chain of signifiers S2…Sn which is what creates the chain of signification that constitutes the narrative of history. An actual original trauma, on the other hand equates far more closely with the isolated signifier itself.

And this brings me onto a broader question. Up until now I have been looking at the concept of history and Nachträglichkeit in relation to hysteria (the idea of ‘hystory’). This might suggest that both history and Nachträglichkeit are ‘functions’ of hysteria, or more broadly, neurosis. In other words, history and Nachträglichkeit are dependent on a particular clinical structure which is characterised by a particular form of negation, that is, repression.

Although, as House and Slotnick point out in their review of Nachträglichkeit in French psychoanalysis, Lacan appeared to first emphasise the concept in relation to psychosis, they also note that his use of the term (which he translated as après-coup), only appears once in that context.[10] Therefore, I would argue, this is hardly a basis for arguing that Nachträglichkeit can be used within the framework of psychosis and foreclosure. However, with regards to the question of history itself, it would seem to become problematic once we move beyond the realms of the Symbolic order, which is also the domain of neurosis.

Notes

  1. Such an other, not to be confused with Lacan’s Other, could be an older sibling. Famously, in many of Freud’s cases, the other is a nurse or nanny, as well as the child’s mother. ↑
  2. Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘The Space of a Hallucination’, The Lacanian Review 6 (Epub Version), 6, 2018. ↑
  3. Jacques Lacan, ‘Preface to the English Edition of Seminar XI’, The Lacanian Review (Epub Version), 6, 2018. This is a new translation by Russell Grigg. The original translation was by Alan Sheridan in Lacan, Jacques, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (London: Penguin, 1979) ↑
  4. Miller, ‘The Space of a Hallucination’ ↑
  5. Jacques Lacan, ‘The Function and the Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis’, in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: WW Norton & Co, 2006), pp. 197–268, p.217. ↑
  6. Ibid., p.216. ↑
  7. Miller, ‘The Space of a Hallucination’ ↑
  8. For a discussion regarding Lacan’s different concpetions of ‘truth’ see D. Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.215-17. ↑
  9. Miller, ‘The Space of a Hallucination’. ↑
  10. Jonathan House and Julie Slotnick, ‘Apres-Coup in French Psychoanalysis: The Long Afterlife of Nachtraglichkeit: The First Hundred Years, 1893 to 1993’, Psychoanalytic Review, 102.5 (2015), 683–708. This is in the context of Lacan’s commentary on the ‘Wolf-Man’ case in the ‘Rome Report’. ↑

While psychoanalytic theory conceptualises trauma, repetition, and the limits of the signifier, clinical work takes place in the singular encounter with one’s own symptom. If you are seeking a space to speak that lies outside directive or manualised therapies, I can offer psychoanalytic consultations online via Therapeia.  Please click here for further details.

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